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ABSTRACT 
Command and control (C2) is an enigma that has been studied by military leaders 
and warfare analysts for hundreds of years.  As a result of the numerous definitions and 
concepts of C2, the design of C2 systems is a challenge to systems engineers.  Adding to 
the challenge is the understanding and integration of new operational concepts, such as 
Network-Centric Warfare, identified by stakeholders as necessary to meet operational 
needs.  Through the use of a system architecture methodology, this thesis created a 
general vision of the system; identified the boundaries of, inputs to, outputs from, and 
objectives for the system; described what the system was to do with the identified inputs 
to produce the desired outputs; described the resources that comprised the system, the 
procedures by which the system was used, and the controls on the system; and proposed 
two alternative system architectures from which an analysis of designs could be 
conducted.  From this methodology, numerous points of integration between doctrine and 
material, as well as areas for future effort and study, were identified to assist in the 
development and integration of net-centric systems and net-centric doctrine to meet the 
command and control needs of future tactical naval forces. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Command and control (C2) is an enigma that has been studied by military leaders 
and warfare analysts for hundreds of years.  As a result of the numerous definitions and 
concepts of C2 throughout history, the design of a C2 system is a daunting challenge to 
the systems engineer, whose duties include eliciting the operational needs of 
stakeholders; identifying appropriate system requirements; developing a systems 
architecture from which specialized engineers can design and build the applicable 
configurable items; and integrating such configurable items to produce a system that 
meets the needs of the stakeholders.  Adding to the challenge is the understanding and 
integration of new operational concepts identified by stakeholders as necessary to meet 
their operational needs.  Network-Centric Warfare (NCW) is one such operational 
concept that has implications on the design and development of C2 systems.  
There has been much work conducted to date to enable NCW by networking 
combat and information systems and by removing the “stove-pipes” of legacy systems.  
A military C2 system, however, is more than the technology and equipment that comprise 
it.  It also includes the doctrine, organization, training, leadership, personnel, and 
facilities surrounding the material.  It is imperative for the systems engineer to understand 
the implications of each portion of DOTMLPF on the life-cycle of the system 
This thesis dissects the complex engineering process of naval tactical C2 systems 
in order to identify the points of integration between doctrine and material.  The goal was 
to better understand the influence of doctrine on the overall architecture of the material 
system in order to ensure developing net-centric systems and net-centric doctrine meet 
the command and control needs of tactical naval forces.   
To begin such study, this thesis presented concepts of command and control 
developed by military leaders and enthusiasts throughout history.  The works of Sun Tzu 
[1971, 1994], Clausewitz [1984], Van Creveld [1985], and Alberts and Hayes [2006], 
along with military publications by the U.S. Army [FM 6-0, 2003], U.S. Air Force 
[AFDD 1, 2003], U.S. Marine Corps [MCDP, 1996], U.S. Navy [NDP 6, 1995], and the 
 xxii 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NSA, 2008] were reviewed.  From the survey and 
analysis of texts and publications, the author concluded that C2 should be viewed as part 
of a function-process-system combination. 
First, when a specific entity is designated as responsible for the accomplishment 
of a mission, command is a function by which the responsible entity takes inputs (e.g., 
mission objective, assigned forces, operating environment, adversary’s capabilities, etc.) 
to produce the desired output (i.e., accomplishment of the mission objective).  Second, 
command and control is the process by which the inputs generate the outputs.  Third, a 
command and control system is the means by which the process is executed.  When there 
is no specific entity designated as responsible for the accomplishment of a mission, the 
C2 process and the C2 system can still take inputs to produce the desired output.  In such 
a case, inputs to the C2 system such as mission objective may be generated during the 







































Figure 1.   Command and Control:  Function-Process-System 
 xxiii 
Following the survey of texts and publications, the thesis progressed through the 
system architectural methodology developed by Alexander Levis as presented by Buede 
[2000] and Levis and Wagenhals [2000].  The methodology begins with the operational 
concept, moves to the co-development of functional architecture and physical 








Figure 2.   Architecture Development [from Buede, 2000: 20] 
The first phase in the architectural process was development of the operational 
concept.  The operational concept was a general vision of the system from the view of 
stakeholders [Buede, 2000].  It identified the boundaries of, inputs to, outputs from, 
objectives for, and requirements of the system.  First, several employment scenarios 
describing the operational use of a naval tactical C2 system were developed.  Next, 
incorporating NCW, a refined problem statement was defined: 
A responsive and robust command and control system which connects 
dispersed forces and enables such forces to self-synchronize and allocate 
resources to mass effects in order to meet the established intent at the 
tactical level of war. 
An external systems diagram was then developed to define the boundaries of the system 
and to describe the interactions with the system for applicable stakeholders.  The external 
systems diagram identifies interactions with external systems and the system context (i.e., 
“A set of entities that can impact the system but cannot be impacted by the system” 
[Buede, 2000: 38]). 
The function-process-system concept of C2 was also used in the development of 
the external systems diagram, which is evident in the identification of the commander as 
 xxiv 
an external system.  Since the command and control system is the means by which the 
command and control process executes the function of command for the commander, the 
commander is not a component of the system.   In addition, the the external systems 





































Figure 3.   Basic External Systems Diagram 
The refined problem statement, again in conjunction with the function-process-
system concept of C2, guided the development of a system objectives hierarchy.  The 
purpose of the systems objectives hierarchy was to organize the system’s objectives from 
the view of applicable stakeholders.  The development of the systems objectives 
 xxv 
hierarchy also included the identification of Measures of Merit (MoM) by which different 
potential designs of the C2 system could be compared.  Completion of the system 
objectives hierarchy marked the conclusion of the operational concept phase. 
 
A responsive and robust command and control system which 
connects dispersed forces and enables such forces to self-
synchronize and allocate resources to mass effects in order to meet 






































































Figure 4.   System Objectives Hierarchy 
The second phase in the architectural process was the co-development of 
functional and physical architectures.  The purpose of the functional architecture was to 
describe what the system was to do with the identified inputs to produce the desired 
outputs.  The first step, which was based on the review of texts and publications 
concerning the concept of C2, was the development of a functional hierarchy.  Six top-
level functions which a C2 system performs were identified:  Transport Information, 
Process Information, Store Information, Present Information, Generate Response 
Options, and Select Response Options.  These six functions were then decomposed into a 
hierarchy of sub-functions which were then assigned to different resources identified in 
the physical architecture to form the operational architecture.  
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The next step of the functional architecture was to detail the relationships between 
the inputs and outputs of the system (i.e., describe the sequence of functions converting 
an input into an output).  IDEF0 was selected as the method to detail these relationships.  
The relationships of the top-level functions are presented in Figure 5.   
Response; Order; 
Infeasible Response;
Incomplete Response; Unassigned Tasks;
Immoral Response; Immoral Tasks













































































Figure 5.   Relationship Diagram – A0 
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The purpose of the physical architecture was to describe the resources that 
comprised the system, with resources for every function identified in the functional 
architecture [Buede, 2000:  215-216].  In addition, the physical architecture described 
procedures by which the system was used [Buede, 2000:  218] and controls on the 
system.  Generic components, procedures, and controls are also presented above in 
Figure 5.  The final step of the physical architecture was development of instantiated 
physical architectures from which two potential alternative designs of the system could 
be built.  Differences between the second and first alternative designs of the C2 system 
was adoption and implementation of doctrine which moved from decentralized decision 
and allocation authority to distributed decision and allocation authority.  From this point 
the final phase of the architectural process, development of the operational architecture, 
began. 
The operational architecture provided a description of the system design by 
incorporating products of the operational concept, functional architecture, and physical 
architecture.  First, functions developed in the functional architecture were allocated to 
physical components developed in the physical architecture.  Again, this is presented in 
Figure 5.  Second, activations and controls of functions were described in a framework of 
the contact prosecution process, a use of a C2 system identified in the operational 
concept.  The functional flow of a portion of the contact prosecution process, for both 
alternative designs, was then modeled and simulated using Arena®, version 10.0 to 
demonstrate the ability of the architecture framework to analyze and compare system 
designs. 
The approach and results of the thesis demonstrated only a portion of the system 
engineering process (i.e., system architecture phases) focused on a small portion of the 
command and control problem (i.e., the needs of a Surface Action Group tasked to secure 
local sea control in traditional operating environments), all at a highly conceptual level.  
This thesis, however, demonstrated the significant impact of doctrine on each phase of 
the system architectural process and, subsequently, on the design of C2 systems.  NCW is 
more than a framework to view missions, strategies, tactics, techniques, procedures, and 
organizations available to a networked force; it effects more than the deployment of a C2 
 xxviii 
system.  This thesis showed how NCW affects the definition, objectives, measures, and 
functions of the C2 system; design of candidate C2 physical architectures; allocation of 
functions to selected physical components; and flow of the C2 process.  This thesis, its 
approach, and its conclusions provide future researchers with numerous areas of potential 
study and can assist in the development and integration of net-centric systems and net-
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND 
The role of the systems engineer is to elicit the operational needs of the customer; 
identify appropriate system requirements; develop a system architecture from which 
specialized engineers can design and build the applicable configurable items; and 
integrate such configurable items to produce a system which meets the needs of the 
customer.  Systems engineers must be cognizant of every phase in the system’s life-cycle.  
This includes the development, manufacturing, operations, and retirement phases. 
Network-Centric Warfare (NCW) is an operational concept the U.S. military has 
identified to meet its operational needs.  NCW has implications on the development of 
many systems the systems engineer supports, including command and control systems.  
There has been much work conducted to date to enable NCW by networking combat and 
information systems and by removing the “stove-pipes” of legacy systems.  A military 
system, however, is more than the technology and equipment which comprise it.  It also 
includes the doctrine, organization, training, leadership, personnel, and facilities 
surrounding the material.  It is imperative for the systems engineer to understand the 
implications of each portion of DOTMLPF on the life-cycle of the system. 
B. PURPOSE 
Command and control is an enigma which has been studied by military leaders 
and warfare analysts for hundreds of years.  Joining this study enables the system 
engineer to design and develop more effective command and control systems.  To this 
study systems engineers bring particular professional expertise, namely the practice of 
dividing complex problems into as many parts is as necessary to determine the solution 
and gaining greater understanding of the solution through the study and assembly of the 
simpler portions of the problem [Descartes, 1850: 61]. 
This thesis dissects the complex engineering process of naval tactical command 
and control systems in order to identify the points of integration between doctrine and 
material.  The goal was to better understand the influence of doctrine on the overall 
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architecture of the material system in order to ensure developing net-centric systems and 
net-centric doctrine meet the command and control needs of tactical naval forces. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Questions specifically addressed in the research for this thesis include: 
• What are the Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) for naval tactical command and 
control? 
• How does doctrine impact the Measures of Effectiveness? 
• How, and where, does doctrine impact the system engineering process for a naval 
tactical command and control system? 
D. BENEFITS OF STUDY 
The benefits of this thesis are: 
• to facilitate communication between the warfighter and system engineer to enable 
the integration of the net-centric doctrine written by the warfighter and the net-centric 
systems developed by the system engineer for the warfighter; 
• to provide an example for further research of the implications of organization, 
training, leadership, personnel, and facilities on the system engineering process; 
• to provide frameworks enabling modeling, simulation, and analysis of command 
and control systems for naval tactical units. 
E. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 
The focus of this thesis was on the interaction of doctrine and material (of 
DOTMLPF) and their subsequent implications during the architectural phases of the 
system engineering process.  The three primary, conceptual systems engineering life-
cycle phases are system definition, system development, and system deployment [Sage & 
Armstrong, 2000:  49].  The architectural phases of the system engineering process 
encompass the system definition and the initial portion of system development.  
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Specifically, this thesis focused on the mission needs of tactical naval units (i.e., Surface 
Action Group) in traditional operating environments in 10 to 15 years. 
 
 
Figure 6.   Conceptual Systems Engineering Life-Cycle Phases [from Sage & Armstrong, 
2000: 49] 
The methodology of architectural phases for this thesis followed the system 
engineering process developed by Alexander Levis and presented by Buede [2000] and 
Levis and Wagenhals [2000].  The process starts with the operational concept, moves to 
the co-development of the functional architecture and the physical architecture, and 
concludes with the development of the operational architecture.  The functional 
architecture defines what it is the system is required to do.  The physical architecture 
describes the physical resources and procedures for performing the system's functions.  
The operational architecture integrates the functional and physical architectures through 
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II. OVERVIEW OF COMMAND AND CONTROL 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Command and control is an enigma which has been studied by military leaders 
and warfare analysts for hundreds of years.  The oldest commonly known writings 
concerning command and control, Sun Tzu’s discussions on the balancing of the five 
fundamental factors of war, were arguably written nearly 2300 years ago [Sun Tzu, 1971: 
11].  Despite the long history of the subject, significant research concerning the principles 
of command and control only began within the past half-century [Lawson, 1981; Levis & 
Athans, 1992; Van Creveld, 1985].  With each emerging theory of warfare and every new 
communications technology, the problems concerning the design and evaluation of 
command and control systems become more daunting and complex. 
The systems engineer tasked with developing a command and control system can 
benefit greatly from joining the study and analysis of what exactly is command and 
control.  A crucial task for the system engineer is to continuously communicate with 
system stakeholders concerning their expectations for the system.  Though such 
communication may be difficult it is necessary for the design of a system which can be 
used effectively.  Researching historical and current works concerning command and 
control becomes one means of interacting with stakeholders.  Additionally, such research 
can provide the systems engineer with a better understanding of stakeholders’ points of 
view and a common vocabulary for communication.  This chapter provides a basic 
overview of stakeholders’ past, present and future concepts of command and control. 
B. CONCEPT OF COMMAND AND CONTROL 
Some experts propose that a person seeking substantially innovative concepts in 
command and control is “arguably better off approaching the subject untainted by 
traditional Command and Control concepts” [Alberts & Hayes, 2006:  31].  Such 
ignorance can be beneficial, but it can, unfortunately, be a detriment to the systems 
engineer.  Without an understanding of the vocabulary and points of view of the systems’ 
stakeholders, a systems engineer will struggle to have the necessary, effective 
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communication with the stakeholders.  A stakeholder’s point of view of command and 
control is shaped by, among other things, their educational background on the topic as 
well as their role in interacting with the system.  To highlight the similarities and possible 
differences in the points of view, the following sections present textual and doctrinal 
concepts of command and control. 
1. Textual Concepts of Command and Control 
Many historical texts discussing war primarily discussed principles of war as 
theories and methodologies of conducting warfare.  The texts contained limited content 
specifically correlated to modern concepts of command and control. Significant, 
published research specifically concerning the principles of command and control only 
began appearing within the past half-century.  This does not mean that a review of 
historical texts cannot provide the systems engineer with an understanding of 
stakeholders’ points of view concerning command and control systems.  Actually, a 
review of textual concepts of command and control may allude to certain stakeholders’ 
biases and their potential flexibility in system definition.  The period of textual writings 
will range from 2300 years ago to near present day. 
The works attributed to Sun Tzu, collected and combined to form the Art of War 
[Sun Tzu, 1971; Sun Tzu, 1994], are a military treatise on military strategy and war.  In 
the presentation of a theory of war and a description of methodologies of warfare, Sun 
Tzu discusses five factors of warfare.  Though translations differ in their analysis of the 
work, the five factors roughly correlate to 1) moral influence of the ruler, 2) 
environmental forces, 3) physical attributes of the operating environment, 4) military 
leadership, and 5) organization and regulation of the military.  Sun Tzu asserts that a 
general must understand these five factors to be successful in war [1994:  167].  Sun Tzu 
also states “Know the enemy, know yourself; your victory will never be endangered.  
Know the ground, know the weather; your victory will then be total” [1971: 129].  The 
author concludes, therefore, that successful command requires an understanding of how 
the uncontrollable factors (i.e., moral influence of the leader, environmental forces, 
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and physical attributes of the operating environment) and controllable factors (i.e., 
military leadership and the organization and regulation of the military) affect both the 
enemy and oneself. 
Clausewitz, writing arguably more than two thousand years after Sun Tzu and 
being highly influenced by Romanticism [Lynn, 2004:  Chapter 6], attributed successful 
command to his concept of military genius.  It must be acknowledged, before any specific 
portion of the work is considered, that Clausewitz’s On War is a posthumous publication 
of an unfinished manuscript written in his search for a complete theory of war.  Despite 
the unfinished nature of On War, the concept of military genius discussed in Chapter 
Three of Book One is reinforced by ideas presented in Chapter One of Book One, the 
only portion of the book known to be considered finished by Clausewitz himself 
[Clausewitz, 1984:  70].  In Chapter One he states, among other things, that a theory of 
war “must also take the human factor into account, and find room for courage, boldness, 
even foolhardiness.  Consequently, it cannot attain the absolute, or certainty; it must 
always leave a margin for uncertainty” [p. 86].  Clausewitz’s military genius is a 
“harmonious combination” [p. 100] of elements within a commander which, though not 
necessarily equally distributed, do not conflict with each other.  The elements of military 
genius Clausewitz presents include courage, strength of body and soul, intelligence, coup 
d’oeil, determination, energy of action, staunchness, endurance, strength of character, and 
imagination (in particular mental visualization) [pp. 100-112]. 
Approximately a century and a half after Clausewitz’s On War, Martin Van 
Creveld published Command in War.  Van Creveld’s work, just as Sun Tzu’s and 
Clausewitz’s, has impacted contemporary thought on command and control and is 
referenced in numerous publications on the topic, to include works on the design and 
evaluation of command and control systems.  Command in War, however, differs from 
On War and Art of War, in that it focuses primarily on command, control, and 
communications in war.  Van Creveld uses the term command to include the control and 
communications.  In his introduction on the nature of command Van Creveld states: 
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First command must arrange and coordinate everything an army needs to 
exist - its food supply, its system of military justice, and so on.  Second, 
command enables the army to carry out is proper mission, which is to 
inflict the maximum amount of death and destruction on the enemy within 
the shortest possible period of time and at a minimum loss to itself. [p. 6]  
Van Creveld’s idea of command is not limited to its associated responsibilities.  
Command, he discusses, can also be viewed by what it does [pp. 6-7].  The processes 
within command include the collection, storing, retrieval, filtering, classifying, 
distributing, and displaying of information concerning one’s forces, the enemy, and the 
environment.  The process of command also includes the formation of an estimate of the 
situation, the establishment of objectives, the making of a decision, detailed planning, the 
drafting of orders, the transmission of orders, the execution of the orders, and the 
monitoring of the execution with feedback.  Additionally, Van Creveld argues that what 
command does remains constant but, the means by which command is executed changes 
with time [p. 9]. 
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Table 1.   Command and Control Functions by Van Creveld [1985] 
One of the most recent texts concerning command and control is Understanding 
Command and Control by Alberts and Hayes [2006].  In their work, Alberts and Hayes 
present a conceptual model of command and control built, not on historical writings of 
the topic but, on the view of a system tasked with command and control.  From this 
method of study Alberts and Hayes conclude that command and control is a “means 
toward creating value (e.g., the accomplishment of a mission)” [p. 32].  Additionally, 
 9 
they conclude that there are seven functions of command and control:  establishing intent; 
determining roles, responsibilities, and relationships; establishing rules and constraint; 
monitoring and assessing the situation and progress; inspiring, motivating, and 
engendering trust; training and education; and provisioning [Chapter IV]. 
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Table 2.   Command and Control Functions by Alberts and Hayes [2006] 
A review of historical and contemporary texts on command and control in war 
enables the systems engineer to understand stakeholders’ points of view but, it is not 
sufficient.  Review of stakeholders’ published doctrine can also improve the systems 
engineer’s understanding of their points of view and enables establishment of a common 
vocabulary for communication. 
2. Doctrinal Concepts of Command and Control 
The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) and foreign militaries are key 
stakeholders in the life-cycle of military command and control systems.  Each 
organization’s point of view of command and control is shaped not only by their 
leadership’s education in historical works but also by their operating environments, core 
capabilities, and force composition.  This section provides an overview of command and 
control descriptions and definitions to assist the systems engineer with understanding 
potential factors influencing stakeholders’ views of the system.  
The DoD definition of command and control is: 
The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated 
commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of 
the mission.  Command and control functions are performed through an 
arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and 
procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, 
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coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment 
of the mission.  [JP 1-02, 2001: 102] 
Additionally, the DoD defines a command and control system as the “facilities, 
equipment, communications, procedures, and personnel essential to a commander for 
planning, directing, and controlling operations of assigned and attached forces pursuant 
to the missions assigned” [JP 1-02, 2001: 102]. 
Each military branch of the DoD, despite agreeing to the joint definition above, 
establishes separate definitions for command and control and command and control 
system in their service specific publications.  First, the U.S. Army states “Command and 
control is the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander 
over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of a mission.  Commanders 
perform command and control functions through a command and control system” [FM 6-
0, 2003: 1-1].  Additionally, the Army defines command and control system as “the 
arrangement of personnel, information management, procedures, and equipment and 
facilities essential for the commander to conduct operations” [FM 6-0, 2003:  Glossary-
4]. 
The U.S. Air Force states: 
C2 is the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated 
commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of 
the mission.  C2 includes both the process by which the commander 
decides what action is to be taken and the systems that facilitate planning, 
execution, and monitoring of those actions.  [AFDD 1, 2003: 49-50] 
The U.S. Marine Corps defines command and control as “the means by which a 
commander recognizes what needs to be done and sees to it that appropriate actions are 
taken” [MCDP 6, 1996, 37].  Additionally, the U.S. Marine Corps explains “… command 
and control encompasses all military functions and operations, giving them meaning and 
harmonizing them into a meaningful whole” [MCDP 6, 1996: 36].  The U.S. Marine 
Corps also states the “basic elements of our command and control system are people, 
information, and the command and control support structure” [MCDP 6, 1996:  52]. 
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Finally, the U.S. Navy explains: 
Command and control, therefore, refers both to the process and to the 
system by which the commander decides what must be done and sees that 
his decisions are carried out.  As defined, the process of command and 
control includes the planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling of 
forces and operations, whereas the system of command and control 
includes the personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and 
procedures employed by a commander.  [NDP 6, 1995: 6] 
In contrast to the U.S. military services, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) does not specifically define the term command and control.  The terms 
command, control, and command and control system, however, are defined by the NATO 
Standardization Agency (NSA).  First, NSA defines command as “The authority vested in 
an individual of the armed forces for the direction, coordination, and control of military 
forces” [NATO Standardization Agency, 2008: 2-C-9].  Second, NSA defines control as 
“That authority exercised by a commander over part of the activities of subordinate 
organizations, or other organizations not normally under his command, which 
encompasses the responsibility for implementing orders or directives.  All or part of this 
authority may be transferred or delegated” [NATO Standardization Agency, 2008: 2-C-
14].  Finally, NSA defines command and control system as “An assembly of equipment, 
methods and procedures and, if necessary, personnel, that enables commanders and their 
staffs to exercise command and control” [NATO Standardization Agency, 2008: 2-C-9]. 
Review of published texts and doctrine provides the systems engineer with an 
understanding of what command and control is and has been, but does not necessarily 
enable the systems engineer to understand what command and control will be when 
command and control systems being designed now become operational.  New theories 
and concepts of warfare, in conjunction with new technologies, all impact the design, use, 
and evaluation of command and control systems.  Two concepts – Network-Centric 
Warfare and Cooperative Engagement Capability – demonstrate the potential future of 
command and control and are reviewed in the following sections. 
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C. CONCEPT OF NETWORK-CENTRIC WARFARE 
Network-Centric Warfare (NCW) is a concept of warfare which emerged as a 
result of the revolution in information and communications technology which occurred in 
the 1990s.  NCW is a framework in which the missions, strategies, tactics, techniques, 
procedures, and organizations available to a networked force can be viewed [Director, 
Force Transformation, OSD, 2005: 3; Alberts, Garstka, & Stein, 1999: 87-88].  NCW 
also provides the networked force a framework in which the rules and constraints of 
warfare can be reviewed, reevaluated, and possibly redefined.  Essentially the inputs to, 
the outputs from, and the objectives of a command and control system can now be 
viewed and analyzed with this new concept of warfare. 
The concept of NCW consists of a collection of ideas such as geographically 
dispersed forces, shared awareness, speed of command, self-synchronization, and virtual 
collaboration [Alberts, Garstka, & Stein, 1999: 87-114].  A discussion of each of these 
ideas is beyond the scope of this thesis.  However, the idea with arguably the greatest 
impact on this thesis and on the traditionally accepted views of command and control is 
self-synchronization.  Self-synchronization, as discussed by Cebrowski and Garstka 
[1998], is the ability of the networked force to “organize and synchronize complex 
warfare activities from the bottom up.  The organizing principles are unity of effort, 
clearly articulated commander's intent, and carefully crafted rules of engagement.”  
Though Cebrowski and Garstka argue that self-synchronization requires unity of effort 
and commander’s intent, Alberts and Hayes contend that “Successfully accomplishing 
the functions of Command and Control does not necessarily require:  Unity of command 
(an individual in charge); Unity of intent (an intersection of goals); Hierarchical 
organizations; Explicit control” [2006:  9].  Alberts and Hayes conclude “intent may or 
may not be (1) explicitly communicated, (2) consciously or formally accepted, or (3) 
widely shared” via an example of NATO C3, where the first C refers to consultation and 
where it is common that no supreme authority can determine intent [2006:  37]. 
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D. CONCEPT OF COOPERATIVE ENGAGEMENT CAPABILITY 
Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) is a networked approach to air 
defense.  “The CEC was developed in response to the need to maintain and extend Fleet 
air defense against advanced, next-generation threats as well as to complement advances 
in sensor and weapon systems” [The Cooperative Engagement Capability, 1995:  394].  
In practice, CEC connects combat and C2 systems onboard a platform, called a net 
control unit (NCU), with a Cooperative Engagement Processor (CEP).  The CEP is then 
connected to a Data Distribution System (DDS) onboard the platform which in turn 
connects with other DDS of other platforms.  The CEC process begins when raw sensor, 
weapon, and C2 data is transmitted from the combat or C2 system to the NCU’s CEP.  
The CEP then transmits the raw data to DDS which in turn transmits the raw data to other 
connected DDSs onboard other NCUs.  Those DDSs then transmit the raw data to their 
respective CEPs.  The CEPs then process the raw data received, either from systems 
onboard the NCU or from other NCUs, and disseminate the processed data to applicable 
systems [The Cooperative Engagement Capability, 1995]. 
The power of CEC is a result of its three principles – Composite Tracking; 
Precision Cueing; and Coordinated, Cooperative Engagement.  With CEC, shared radar 
data is processed independently on each NCU into composite tracks “with input data 
appropriately weighted by the measurement accuracy of each sensor input” [The 
Cooperative Engagement Capability, 1995: 378].  Thus, if sensors onboard a NCU lose a 
contact, other NCUs can provide the necessary data for tracking.  This ability is referred 
to as Composite Tracking.  Additionally, an NCU can initiate actions for onboard 
systems to secure a local track if the received data concerning a contact meet the 
established threat requirements [The Cooperative Engagement Capability, 1995: 379].  
This capability is referred to as Precision Cueing and enables the local acquisition range 
to be greatly extended.  Finally, an NCU “may fire a missile and guide it to intercept a 
target, even a maneuvering one, using radar data from another CEC unit even if it never 
acquires the target with its own radars” [The Cooperative Engagement Capability, 1995: 
379].  “Moreover, a coordination doctrine may be activated by the designated NCU for 
automated engagement recommendations at each unit based on force-level engagement 
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calculations” [The Cooperative Engagement Capability, 1995: 380].  This capability is 
referred to as Coordinated, Cooperative Engagement. 
CEC has been developed and implemented over a period of several decades for 
use in air defense, but the concept can easily be extended to other warfare areas such as 
anti-submarine warfare, surface warfare, and ballistic missile defense.  In fact, Perry, 
Button, Bracken, Sullivan, and Mitchell [2002] present and analyze scenarios concerning 
the application of CEC to the first and last example warfare areas.  Their CEC scenarios 
highlight the impact of self-synchronization on a military force’s effectiveness. 
The textual, doctrinal, and near-future concepts reviewed in this and previous 
sections have presented a small set of the influences on stakeholders’ view of command 
and control.  The review, however, has not necessarily brought the reader closer to any 
true understanding of the topic and may have in fact induced more confusion in the 
process.  Given that an aim of this thesis is to reduce the confusion, it becomes necessary 
to discuss the view of command and control, no matter how rudimentary, derived from 
the above review and utilized during research. 
E. NAVAL TACTICAL COMMAND AND CONTROL 
When a specific entity is designated responsible for the accomplishment of a 
mission, command is a function by which the responsible entity takes inputs (e.g., 
mission objective, assigned forces, operating environment, adversary’s capabilities) to 
produce the desired output (e.g., accomplishment of the mission objective).  Command 
and control is the process by which the inputs generate the outputs.  A command and 
control system is the means by which the process is executed.  When there is no specific 
entity designated responsible for the accomplishment of a mission, the command and 
control process and the command and control system can still take inputs to produce the 
desired output.  In such a case, inputs such as mission objective may be generated during 

































Figure 8.   Command and Control:  Function-Process-System 
Such concept of function-process-system is similar to that presented by Sweeney 
[2002].  Sweeney contends that command is a function implemented via the command 
and control process supported by command and control systems.  In particular, he 
describes the command and control process as consisting of people, information, and 
structure (e.g., organization).  Unfortunately, his view of command and control, primarily 
the process, is inconsistent with common definition and his references.  First, a process is 
“a series of actions or operations conducing to an end” [Mish, 1994: 929].  Of people, 
information, and organization, only organization could be considered a component of the 
command and control process and then only if the concept of organization included 
procedures.  Second, Van Creveld argues that what command does remains constant, but 
the means by which command is executed changes with time [1985: 9].  In other words, 
the command and control process remains constant but command and control systems are 
subject to change.  People, information, and organization do not remain constant and 
therefore cannot be components of the command and control process.  Third, including 
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people, information, and organization within the command and control process blatantly 
contradicts the U.S. Marine Corps [MCDP 6, 1996: 52] and the U.S. Navy [NDP 6, 1995: 
6] view that such things are components of the command and control system. 
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Command and control is an enigma.  It is comprised of physical, measurable 
factors as well as moral, immeasurable factors.  It is a function.  It is a process.  It is a 
system.  Portions of it remain constant throughout time while other portions are 
constantly subject to change.  Successful command and control requires mastery, or at 
least a deep understanding, of the controllable and uncontrollable forces of war.  
Ignorance of what command and control is considered to be can be a detriment to the 
systems engineer. 
The purpose of the preceding chapter was to provide a basic overview of 
stakeholders’ past, present, and future concepts of command and control in order to 
facilitate communication between systems engineers and system stakeholders.  The 
review serves as one means of interaction with stakeholders.  The review also provides a 
common vocabulary for discussion.  Though the value of the review may not be apparent 
to the reader at this time, many of the concepts presented in this chapter will impact the 
systems engineering process presented in subsequent chapters. 
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III. OVERVIEW OF SYSTEMS ARCHITECTURE PROCESS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The three primary, conceptual systems engineering life-cycle phases are system 
definition, system development, and system deployment [Sage & Armstrong, 2000:  49].  
The architectural phases of the system engineering process encompass the system 
definition and the initial portion of system development.  The methodology of 
architectural phases for this thesis followed the system engineering process developed by 
Alexander Levis and presented by Buede [2000] and Levis and Wagenhals [2000].  The 
process starts with the operational concept, moves to the co-development of the 
functional architecture and the physical architecture, and concludes with the development 








Figure 9.   Architecture Development [from Buede, 2000: 20] 
B. OPERATIONAL CONCEPT 
The operational concept, as presented in Buede [2000], is a general vision of the 
system from the view of the system's stakeholders and includes a collection of scenarios 
(both employment and life scenarios); a graphical model describing the system, its 
boundaries, and its inputs and outputs; objectives for the system; and requirements of the 
system.  To begin the development of the operational concept, a collection of scenarios is 
generated.  The collection of the scenarios should span the entire life cycle of the system 
and should include all relevant stakeholders during each phase of the system’s life cycle.  
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Buede [2000: 140] explains that scenarios should include “the relevant inputs to and 
outputs from the system and the other systems that are responsible for those inputs and 
outputs.” 
The initial scenarios developed should be as simple as possible and from the view 
of the key stakeholder, then expanding the collection to include more stakeholders, 
complexity of interactions, and phases of the system’s life cycle [Buede, 2000: 141].  
Generated scenarios should fall into two general categories – life scenarios and 
employment scenarios.  Employment scenarios describe the employment of the system, 
the operational use of the system.  Life scenarios encompass all of the non-operational 
facets of the system throughout its life-cycle.  These two categories are akin to the life 
and sortie missions developed by Hunger, as presented in Buede [2000], and align with 
Van Creveld’s discussion on the types of responsibilities of command. 
First command must arrange and coordinate everything an army needs to 
exist - its food supply, its system of military justice, and so on.  Second, 
command enables the army to carry out is proper mission, which is to 
inflict the maximum amount of death and destruction on the enemy within 
the shortest possible period of time and at a minimum loss to itself. [Van 
Creveld, 1985: 6] 
In addition to employment and life scenarios, the systems engineer should also develop 
scenarios describing the validation and acceptance testing of the system throughout its 
life-cycle. 
Development of scenarios is done to assist in defining the system, which includes 
establishing external systems which interact with the system and identifying those 
portions of the context which impact the system and the associated external systems.  
Even if initial scenario development is focused on key stakeholders, the system engineer 
is still faced with determining the extent of the system.  Developing scenarios assists in 
defining the system and, to a degree, an understanding of what the system is assists in 
developing the scenarios.  A refined problem statement, effective need, or intended 
design goal of the system in question may assist the further development of scenarios. 
The collection of developed scenarios and the refined problem statement, when 
applicable, serve as inputs for the development of the external systems diagram.  The 
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scenarios and problem statement need not be in final form, for the entire systems 
engineering process is iterative.  Input is taken from stakeholders throughout the process 
and the operational concept is updated accordingly.  Just as the refined problem statement 
assists scenario development by better defining what the system is, so too does the 
external systems diagram. 
The purpose of the external systems diagram is to define the boundaries of the 
system for all stakeholders of the system.  First, a basic external systems diagram is 
developed based on the work of Levis, as presented by Buede [2000: 124-125].  The 
basic external systems diagram is composed of three parts - the system, the external 
system(s), and the context.  External systems interact with one or more of the system’s 
subsystems by providing inputs, receiving outputs, or both.  The context is the collection 
of entities which can influence the system but not be influenced by the system. 
Details concerning the inputs and outputs of the system as well as the interfaces 
between parts are not included in the basic external systems diagram.  The basic external 
systems diagram is meant to assist visualization and communication between 
stakeholders and the systems engineer and to develop a common definition of the system.  












Context Entity Context Entity
 
Figure 10.   Basic External Systems Diagram [after Buede, 2000: 124] 
During scenario development and the drawing of the basic external systems 
diagram, several key interactions of the system with external systems and contexts are 
identified but are not detailed.  Details concerning such interactions are necessary before 
an explicit external systems diagram can be completed.  There are multiple methods for 
detailing the interactions of the system with external systems and contexts [Buede, 2000: 
141-143; Bruegge and Dutoit, 2004: 59-62].  The system engineer then combines the 
details of the interaction diagrams, no matter the type chosen, with the basic external 
systems diagram to form the external systems diagram.  An example of an interaction 
diagram is presented in Figure 11.   
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Figure 11.   Example Interaction Diagram [after Bruegge & Dutoit, 2004: 60] 
From the developed scenarios and refined problem statement, and concurrently 
with the development of the external systems diagram, the systems engineer develops the 
systems objectives hierarchy.  The purpose of the systems objectives hierarchy is to 
organize the system’s objectives from the view of value to the stakeholders [Buede, 2000: 
147].  Care must be taken to understand when a particular objective serves as a means to 
obtain a higher objective and when its value is fulfilled by lower means objectives.  
Understanding these interactions enables the system engineer to properly organize the 
system’s objectives to develop the fundamental objective.  The process is continued with 
further inputs from the system’s stakeholders concerning the desired values of the 
pertinent objectives.  These inputs enable the system engineer to develop system 
measures of merit to finalize the objectives hierarchy [Buede, 2000: 146-149]. 
Requirements are developed with the operational scenarios, external systems 
diagram, and the system objectives hierarchy providing inputs.  Buede [2000] organizes 
requirements into four groups: input/output requirements, system-wide and technology 
requirements, trade-off requirements, and qualification requirements.  First, each input 
and output identified during the development of and included in the external systems 
diagram must have one or more requirements.  Rules and constraints pertaining to 
interface constraints are included as input/output requirements.  Second, system-wide and 
technology requirements pertain “to the system as a whole and not to specific inputs or 
outputs” [Buede, 2000: 154].  This group of requirements includes technology, 
suitability, cost, and schedule requirements.  Third, trade-off requirements are based 
solely on the value judgments of stakeholders.  Qualification requirements address how 
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the requirements are observed, verified, validated, and accepted [Buede, 2000:  155-157] 
and are developed to ensure the system which is built is properly designed and is 
acceptable. 
After verifying the feasibility and testability of the requirements developed, the 
operational concept is detailed enough to enable the co-development of the functional 
architecture and the physical architecture.  This does not serve as the final form of the 
operational concept, for it will be repeatedly refined and updated during the 
developments of the functional, physical, and operational architectures.  The operational 
concept, in whatever form, has described the system from an external view by defining 
boundaries of the system and identifying inputs to and outputs from the system.  The 
purpose of the next phase of the system architecture process is to describe how the 
system converts the inputs into the desired outputs and then to define the means by which 
it does so. 
C. FUNCTIONAL ARCHITECTURE 
A function is a process that takes inputs and transforms them into outputs [Buede, 
2000:  178].  Recall that a system is “a set of components (subsystems, segments) acting 
together to achieve a set of common objectives via the accomplishment of a set of tasks” 
[Buede, 2000: 38].  A system, therefore, is defined by 1) its set of objectives and 2) the 
functions required for it to achieve such set of objectives.  The purpose of the functional 
architecture is to describe what the system is to do with the identified inputs to produces 
the desired outputs.  The functional architecture is developed in an iterative process of 
five phases.  First, the functions of the system are organized into a hierarchy through a 
combination of decomposition and composition approaches [Buede, 2000:  182-183].  
Second, the relationships between the inputs and outputs which were identified during the 
development of the operational concept are described.  The first and second steps are 
conducted in conjunction with the development of the physical architecture.  Third, 
system stakeholders are solicited for opinions concerning the draft functional 
decomposition.  Fourth, the input and output requirements determined in the operational 
concept are traced to functions and data elements in the functional architecture.  The third 
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and fourth phases are conducted during the operational architecture development.  
Finally, as the operational architecture is finalized, fault tolerance and security functions 
are incorporated with the functional architecture.  
The first phase in developing the functional architecture is to develop a hierarchy 
of the system’s functions.  This phase is conducted in conjunction with the development 
of the initial generic physical architecture.  To develop the functional hierarchy the 
system engineer can use a decomposition approach, composition approach, or a 
combination of both decomposition and composition.  Functions of subsystems identified 
during the development of the physical architecture, or potentially identified in the 
external systems diagram development, can be synthesized to develop the top-level 
functions of the system.  Top-level functions identified during the development of certain 
scenarios can be analyzed and decomposed as well.  Buede [2000: 183] strongly advises 
the system engineer to combine both approaches, composition and decomposition, to 
develop the functional hierarchy. 
The second phase in developing the functional architecture is to describe the 
relationships between inputs and outputs of the system.  During the operational concept, 
interaction diagrams are developed demonstrating the relationship between certain inputs, 
outputs, and the system.  During this phase, these relationships are further detailed to 
explain the process (i.e., sequence of functions) by which the inputs become the outputs.  
The system engineer combines the details of the interaction diagrams and the functional 
hierarchy.  There are various methods which the system engineer can utilize to detail or 
model these relationships.  Such methods include functional flow block diagrams, data 
flow diagrams, N2 charts, or IEDF0 diagrams.  An example relationship diagram [after 

















Figure 12.   Example Relationship Diagram  
[after Buede, 2000: Chapter 3; Sage & Armstrong 2000: 133-134] 
The third phase of the functional architecture development is to seek feedback 
from system stakeholders concerning the functional decomposition.  Opinions concerning 
the generic physical architecture should also be solicited given its simultaneous 
development with the functional hierarchy.  Also during this phase the system engineer 
should begin the development of the operational architecture [Buede, 2000: 180].  A 
primary purpose of the stakeholder feedback is to ensure there is not an absence of 
functionality or a redundancy of functionality in the functional hierarchy. 
The fourth phase of the functional architecture development is to trace the 
input/output requirements.  The engineer, through the systems design process, seeks to 
develop a set of specifications for the development of each subsystem, component, and 
configurable item.  The purpose of this phase is to ensure each of the requirements 
developed in the operational concept are associated with all of their applicable functions.  
With the development of the operational architecture, each function’s associated 
requirements will form specifications for the resources identified in the physical 
architecture. 
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The final phase of the functional architecture development is the incorporation of 
fault tolerance and security functions.  All systems can have faults which can cause errors 
leading to failures in the system.  However, as Buede [2000: 205] states, functions to 
detect errors “are typically not part of the initial drafts of the functional architecture 
because they depend to a significant degree on the physical architecture; as a result these 
functions are often added once the operational architecture is taking shape.”  Just as with 
fault tolerance functions, security functions depend largely on the physical architecture 
and should be added once the operational architecture has taken shape.  Thus the 
feedback from stakeholders in the third phase and feedback from the operational 
architecture, which includes fault tolerance and security functions, is what causes the 
functional architecture development to be iterative.  Additionally, fault tolerance and 
security functions may highlight additional input/output requirements which need to be 
traced. 
D. PHYSICAL ARCHITECTURE 
The physical architecture, as presented by Buede [2000], is a hierarchical 
description of the resources which comprise the system.  A purpose of the physical 
architecture is to provide “resources for every function identified in the functional 
architecture” [Buede, 2000: 216].  The development of the physical architecture is done 
in parallel with the functional architecture development.  The first phase, then, is to 
develop a generic physical architecture to partition resources into common categories 
based on the functions identified in the functional architecture.  Once this is 
accomplished, a set of instantiated physical architectures is developed to assist the 
development of the operational architecture.  As Buede [2000: 218] explains, an 
instantiated physical architecture is a generic physical architecture with performance 
characteristics of the system resources included. 
To understand the difference between generic and instantiated physical 
architectures assume the system under consideration is a wrist watch.  One generic 
component of the wrist-watch is a time presentation component.  The instantiated 
physical architecture would include details concerning the time presentation component 
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such as whether it is an audio presentation or visual display, it is analog or digital, or 
whether it displayed 12-hour notation or 24-hour notation.  The level of detail for the 
attributes and performance characteristics is pertinent to the system under design. 
Once the generic physical components are identified, the next step is to specify 
attributes and performance characteristics for each of the generic components from which 
alternative instantiated physical architectures can be designed and selected.  There are 
many techniques for generating numerous physical architecture alternatives.  The 
morphological box technique, suggested by Buede [2000: 222-226], is one method for 
developing the physical architecture alternatives.  “In the two-dimensional version a table 
is created with columns (or sometimes the rows) pertaining to the generic components of 
the physical architecture.  Then the elements of each column are filled with competing 
specific instantiations of each component” [Buede, 2000: 223].  An example 
morphological box for a wrist watch is presented in Table 3.   
Wrist Band Time of Day Presentation
Chronograph 
Presentation Alarm Power Controls
Metal Links Digital Digital Audio Replaceable Battery Buttons
Metal w/ Clasp Analog Analog Alarm Solar-Charge Battery Infra-red
Plastic w/ Clasp Audio Motion-Charge Battery Blue-tooth
Velcro Braile Wound Spring
 
Table 3.   Example Morphological Box – Wrist Watch 
In addition to describing the physical resources which comprise the system, the 
physical architecture also describes the procedures by which the system is used [Buede, 
2000, 218].  Similar to the physical components, procedures and controls for the system 
can have multiple instantiations.  When feasible, the system engineer should use 
creativity techniques such as the morphological box to generate multiple instantiations.  
Once multiple instantiations are created for all generic physical components and all 
applicable procedures of the system, the system engineer should develop multiple 
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alternative physical architectures.  These candidate physical architectures will serve as an 
input for the operational architecture development. 
E. OPERATIONAL ARCHITECTURE 
The operational architecture provides a description of the system design, 
incorporating the products of the operational concept, functional architecture, and 
physical architecture.  The major phases of the operational architecture development for 
this thesis were to allocate functions and requirements to the physical components, 
describe the activation and control of functions, and to conduct an analysis of the design. 
The first step in the development of the operational architecture is the allocation 
of functions from the functional architecture to components from the physical 
architecture.  The initial phases of this process are conducted in conjunction with the co-
development of the functional hierarchy and the generic physical architecture.  The 
collection of relationship diagrams developed for the functional architecture account for 
this step if generic physical components were identified in the diagrams.  If they were 
not, the systems engineer should accomplish such during the first step of the operational 
architecture development. 
The second step in the development of the operational architecture is to define 
and analyze functional activation and control structures.  The collection of relationship 
diagrams is refined for each of the alternative physical architectures, incorporating the 
instantiated physical components and procedures for each.  The functional activation and 
control can be further detailed through the generation table.  An example functional 
activation and control table for the relationship diagram presented in Figure 12.  is shown 
below in Table 4.   
Function Output Required Inputs Required Controls 
Function 1 
Output 1 - Output 3 - Control 2 
Output 2 - Input 1 - Control 1 - Control 2 
Function 2 Output 3 - Output 2 - Input 2 - Control 3 
Table 4.   Example Functional Activation and Control Table 
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The third step in the development of the operational architecture is to conduct an 
analysis of the proposed design or set of designs.  The system analysis consists of both 
performance analyses and risk analyses [Buede, 2000: 267].  In many cases these 
analyses are conducted through modeling and simulation.  Once the system analysis is 
completed, the systems engineer then documents the architectures for approval by 
stakeholders.  
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The methodology of architectural phases for this thesis followed the system 
engineering process developed by Alexander Levis and presented by Buede [2000] and 
Levis and Wagenhals [2000].  The process starts with the operational concept, moves to 
the co-development of the functional architecture and the physical architecture, and 
concludes with the development of the operational architecture. 
The operational concept is a general vision of the system from the view of the 
system's stakeholders.  The functional architecture describes what the system is to do 
with the identified inputs to produce the desired outputs.  The physical architecture 
describes the resources which comprise the system and the associated procedures.  
Finally, the operational architecture provides a description of the system design, 
incorporating the products of the operational concept, functional architecture, and 
physical architecture.  The following chapters present the architectural phases conducted 
for defining and developing a conceptual command and control system for tactical naval 
units. 
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IV. OPERATIONAL CONCEPT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The operational concept, as presented in Buede [2000], is a general vision of the 
system from the view of the system's stakeholders and includes a collection of scenarios 
(both employment and life scenarios); a graphical model describing the system, its 
boundaries, and its inputs and outputs; objectives for the system; and requirements of the 
system.  Development of the operational concept also produces a common vocabulary to 
facilitate communication between the systems engineer and stakeholders.  During 
development of the operational concept, the system should be viewed as a black-box.  
How the system converts inputs to desired outputs and the means by which this is done 
will be considered during the functional architecture and physical architecture 
development.  This chapter presents the key phases and products within the operational 
concept development.  Appendix A: Scenario Development, Appendix C: External 
Systems Diagram, and Appendix D:  System Objectives  provide more details of the 
operational concept development process outside those presented in this section.  
B. SCENARIOS 
To begin the development of the operational concept, a collection of scenarios 
was generated.  Scenario development serves as the initial step for stakeholders and 
engineers to come to a common definition of the system.  In practice, the collection of the 
scenarios should span the entire life cycle of the system and should include all relevant 
stakeholders during each phase of the system’s life cycle.  Additionally, the collection of 
generated scenarios should fall into two general categories—life scenarios and 
employment scenarios.  Employment scenarios describe the operational use of the 
system.  Life scenarios encompass all of the non-operational facets of the system 
throughout its life-cycle. 
Since the focus of this thesis was on the operational employment of a naval 
tactical command and control system, only employment scenarios were developed.  Life 
scenarios, validation scenarios, and acceptance testing scenarios were not developed.  
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Potential employment scenarios for naval tactical forces, however, are numerous.  Hayes, 
Krulisch, and White [2008] conducted an analysis of historical and current naval texts 
and strategies to develop a list of potential objectives for future naval forces.  A further 
decomposition of the analysis was conducted to generate missions for which future naval 
forces may be employed.  These missions, or employment scenarios, include: 
1. Secure local sea control 
1.1. Gain and maintain local sea access 
1.1.1. Conduct Mine Sweeping Operations 
1.1.2. Conduct Anti-submarine Operations 
1.2. Deny local sea access 
1.2.1. Conduct Mine Laying Operations 
1.2.2. Conduct undersea, surface, and air patrols of local sea 
1.3. Defeat adversary’s fleet 
1.3.1. Provide defense of forces 
1.3.1.1. Maneuver Forces 
1.3.1.2. Prosecute Contacts 
1.3.1.3. Engage Threats 
1.3.2. Conduct attack on adversary’s forces 
1.3.2.1. Maneuver Forces 
1.3.2.2. Prosecute Contacts 
1.3.2.3. Engage Targets 
1.3.2.3.1. Engage Planned Targets 
1.3.2.3.2. Engage Dynamic Targets 
1.4. Gain intelligence of the local sea 
1.4.1. Collect information concerning the local sea 
1.4.1.1. Conduct surveillance of the local sea 
1.4.1.2. Conduct reconnaissance of the local sea 
1.4.2. Process/integrate/evaluate/analyze/interpret information to 
produce intelligence of the local sea 
2. Patrol Sea Lines of Communication 
3. Seabed Defense 
4. Escort 
4.1. Commerce Convoy Escort 
4.2. Military Convoy Escort 
5. Provide land defense 
5.1. Maritime Ballistic Missile Defense 
5.2. Mine Defense 
6. Conduct land attack 
6.1. Naval Fires Support 
6.2. Strategic Missile Deployment 
7. Maritime Interdiction 
8. Maritime Security 
9. Maritime Domain Awareness 
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9.1.1. Collect information concerning the global seas which may 
impact U.S. security, safety, economy, or environment 
9.1.1.1. Conduct surveillance of the global seas which may impact 
U.S. security, safety, economy, or environment 
9.1.1.2. Conduct reconnaissance of the global seas which may 
impact U.S. security, safety, economy, or environment 
9.1.2. Process/integrate/evaluate/analyze/interpret information to 
produce intelligence of the global seas which may impact U.S. 
security, safety, economy, or environment 
10. Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response 
10.1. Provide heavy lift support 
10.2. Provide ship-to-shore lift 
10.3. Provide search and rescue support 
Given the range of missions future naval tactical forces face, the employment 
scenario development was further narrowed to encompass only the mission of securing 
local sea control.  The composition of naval tactical forces employed in securing local sea 
control can vary from operation to operation and has a significant impact on the scope of 
developed scenarios.  A single submarine and a large Carrier Strike Group can both be 
used to secure local sea control, though the capabilities and methods of both are vastly 
different.  Therefore, the development of the employment scenarios focused on those 
actions a Surface Action Group (SAG) would conduct in order to secure local sea control.   
1. Settings 
Once the focus of the scenario development had sufficiently been narrowed, three 
settings were created.  Each of the settings included at least two warfare or operational 
tasks (air defense, antisubmarine warfare, etc.) which a SAG could be expected to 
conduct while securing local sea control.  The settings served as foundations on which 
the remaining portions of the scenarios were developed.  The three settings are presented 
in Appendix A:  Scenario Development. 
2. Scenarios 
Once the three settings were finished, scenario development continued by 
identifying system stakeholders, including interacting systems.  A key stakeholder was 
identified from the initial set of stakeholders which, for all of the settings, was the Officer 
in Tactical Command (OTC) of the SAG.  Initial scenario development was conducted 
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from the viewpoint of the OTC and included the flow of events as seen by the OTC as 
well as the pertinent inputs to and outputs from the command and control system.  As 
suggested by Buede [2000: 141], the focus was not on the details of how the system 
worked but rather how the system was used by or served stakeholders.  The process was 
continued for all of the identified stakeholders and interacting systems to ensure all 
possible inputs to and outputs from the command and control system were identified.  A 
template for scenario development is shown in Table 5.  A collection of the developed 
scenarios is presented in Appendix A:  Scenario Development.  A majority of the settings 
developed included dynamic and time-sensitive targets.  Appendix B:  Target 
Engagement presents the engagement process model used during scenario development 










Table 5.   Scenario Development Template 
3. Refined Problem Statement  
The “system” in question was the command and control system for naval forces at 
the tactical level of war.  Since a goal of this thesis was to assist in the integration of net-
centric systems and net-centric doctrine to meet the command and control needs of 
tactical naval forces, a review of publications concerning NCW and Network-Centric 
Operations (NCO) was conducted to determine potential attributes of the command and 
control system.  From this review, a refined problem statement was developed, which is: 
A responsive and robust command and control system which connects 
dispersed forces and enables such forces to self-synchronize and allocate 
resources to mass effects in order to meet the established intent at the 
tactical level of war. 
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By responsive it is meant the timeliness in which the command and control 
system can identify changing circumstances (e.g., threats from different functional areas, 
connectivity of the forces, etc.), determine the impact of the changing circumstances, and 
enact an appropriate response [after Alberts & Hayes, 2006: 45].  By robust it is meant 
the ability of the command and control system to identify a range of changing 
circumstances, determine the impact of the changing circumstances, and enact an 
appropriate response [after JP 6-0, 2006: Ch I, 10].  The traditional view of dispersed 
forces, primarily in early NCW writings, focused on geographically dispersed forces.  
With the increased discussion in the general press on “cyber-warfare” and information 
operations, the view of dispersed forces must also include dispersion on the “network” 
which connects the forces. 
Self-synchronization is the ability of a force to “organize and synchronize 
complex warfare activities from the bottom up” [Cebrowski & Garstka, 1998].  This self-
synchronization must also include the ability for the forces to allocate resources at their 
disposal to mass effects to meet the established intent.  Massing effects need not require 
the massing of forces.  It must also be noted that the effects emphasized exclude strategic 
effects (i.e., nuclear weapons).   
Established intent is used instead of the traditional “commander’s intent” since 
self-synchronizing forces, which may not be connected with their commander or may 
have no commander (e.g., coalition forces), may be capable identifying and responding to 
emerging circumstances which alter the operating environment and their purpose.  As 
Alberts and Hayes [2006: 37] discuss “intent may or may not be (1) explicitly 
communicated, (2) consciously or formally accepted, or (3) widely shared.”  Finally, the 
tactical level of war is intended to be the traditional functional warfare areas/missions 
(e.g., air defense, surface warfare, anti-submarine warfare, strike warfare, maritime 
interception, etc.).  It also re-establishes the exclusion of strategic weapons from the 
problem. 
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C. EXTERNAL SYSTEMS DIAGRAM 
The initial collection of developed scenarios and the refined problem statement 
served as inputs for the development of the external systems diagram.  The purpose of an 
external systems diagram is to define the boundaries of the system and describe the 
interactions with the system for all applicable stakeholders.  A basic external systems 
diagram is developed to assist in the definition of the boundaries of the system and 
interaction diagrams are developed to describe stakeholder interactions with the system.  
The products of these steps enable the development of the external systems diagram.  
Details concerning the development of the external systems diagram are presented in 
Appendix C: External Systems Diagram. 
1. Basic External Systems Diagram 
The first step in developing the external systems diagram was the drawing of a 
basic external systems diagram.  The purpose of the basic external systems diagram is to 
assist visualization and communication between stakeholders and the systems engineer as 
well as for developing a common definition of the system.  The format of the basic 
external systems diagram used in this thesis is based on the work of Levis, as presented 
by Buede [2000: 38].  The basic external systems diagram is composed of three parts - 
the system, the external system(s), and the context.   
• System:  "A set of components (subsystems, segments) acting together to 
achieve a set of common objectives via the accomplishment of a set of 
tasks" [Buede, 2000: 38]. 
• External Systems: "A set of entities that interact with the system via the 
system's external interfaces" [Buede, 2000: 38]. 
• Context:  "A set of entities that can impact the system but cannot be 
impacted by the system" [Buede, 2000: 38]. 
Details concerning the inputs and outputs of the system as well as the interfaces between 
parts are described in the interaction diagrams and are therefore not included in the basic 
external systems diagram.   
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As in discussed in Chapter II, the author adopted the concept of function-process-
system for command and control.  First, command is a function by which a responsible 
entity takes inputs to produce the desired output.  Second, command and control is the 
process by which the inputs generate the outputs.  Finally, a command and control system 
is the means by which the process is executed.   
The author posits that people are a component of the command and control 
system, information is what flows within the system, and organization is a rule or 
constraint on the system.  This version of the concept incorporates ideas of Van Creveld 
[1985], the U.S. Marine Corps [MCDP 6, 1996], and the U.S. Navy [NDP 6, 1995] 
among many.  This can be seen with the two major component categories - People and 
the Communications & Information Systems.  The inputs to and outputs from the system, 
along with the cross-communication between subsystems, are Information.  The 
developed basic external systems diagram is presented in Figure 13.   
The commander, in this case the OTC, is not considered a part of the command 
and control system.  Since the command and control system is the means by which the 
command and control process executes the function of command for the commander, the 
commander is not a component of system.  The commander is an external system which 
affects the command and control process and interacts with the command and control 
system.  If during the command and control process a decision by the commander is 
needed, such decision is an input to the command and control system.  Additional 
discussion concerning the basic external systems diagram is presented in Appendix C:  






































Figure 13.   Basic External Systems Diagram 
2. Interaction Diagrams 
During scenario development and the drawing of the basic external systems 
diagram, several key interactions of the system with external systems and contexts are 
identified but are not detailed.  Details concerning such interactions are necessary before 
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an explicit external systems diagram can be completed.  There are multiple methods for 
detailing the interactions of the system with external systems and contexts.  Buede [2000: 
141-143] presents the input/output trace which provides a sequential representation of 
one stakeholder’s or one external system’s interaction with the system.  Bruegge and 
Dutoit [2004: 59-62] present two other types of interaction diagrams, namely sequence 
diagrams and collaboration diagrams.  Sequence diagrams are essentially input/output 
traces which can depict multiple stakeholders and/or external systems, when necessary.  
Collaboration diagrams present the interactions numerically (i.e., 1, 2, 3, etc.) rather than 
graphically.   
Due to the complexities of scenarios developed, an expanded input/output trace 
akin to the sequence diagram presented by Bruegge & Dutoit was used to describe 
interactions with the system.  As described earlier, the basic external systems diagram 
presented in Figure 13.  is a result of the function-process-system concept of command 
and control adopted by the author.  Additionally, the collection of interaction diagrams 
presented in Appendix C: External Systems Diagram extends this concept and show 
that Information serves as the inputs to and outputs from the system as well as the cross-
communication between subsystems.  The details described in interaction diagrams are 
then combined with the basic external systems diagram to form the external systems 
diagram. 
3. External Systems Diagram 
The external systems diagram expands the basic external systems diagram to 
include the inputs and outputs detailed in interaction diagrams.  The purpose of the 
external systems diagram is to model the “interaction of the system with other (external) 
systems in the relevant contexts, thus providing a definition of the system’s boundaries in 
terms of the system’s inputs and outputs” [Buede, 2000: 144].  The external systems 











































































































































































































































































































































Figure 14.   External Systems Diagram 
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D. SYSTEM OBJECTIVES HIERARCHY 
The purpose of the systems objectives hierarchy is to organize the system’s 
objectives from the view of value to the stakeholders [Buede, 2000: 147].  Objectives 
exist in every phase of the system’s life-cycle.  Types of objectives can include 
operational performance, technical performance, operational suitability, cost, schedule, 
and risk.  The focus of this thesis was on the operational employment of a naval tactical 
command and control system.  Subsequently, system objective development focused on 
operational performance and suitability.  Cost, schedule, and risk were not included. 
The system objectives development process began with the refined problem 
statement, developed during scenario development, serving as a guide.  Keeney [1992: 
56] proposes that “The most obvious way to identify objectives is to engage in a 
discussion of the decision situation.”  Since publication research is a form of discussion, 
as Booth, Colomb and Williams contend [2008: 11], numerous publications concerning 
measures of effectiveness, operational suitability, C4ISR system capabilities, 
communications, information theory, and network-centric warfare were reviewed to 
determine qualities pertinent to a network-centric naval tactical command and control 
system.  In conjunction with the publication review, inputs from stakeholders were 
solicited to assist the author in developing and organizing the system’s objectives and 
their associated measures of merit (i.e., measures of effectiveness and their associated 
measures of performance) [Buede, 2000: 146-149]. 
The system objectives generated were reorganized over several iterations, each 
time reviewing the refined problem statement to ensure stated properties were accounted 
for in the objectives hierarchy.  The top-level of the system objective hierarchy developed 
is shown in Figure 15.  The full system objective hierarchy and description are presented 
in Appendix D:  System Objectives . 
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A responsive and robust command and control system which 
connects dispersed forces and enables such forces to self-
synchronize and allocate resources to mass effects in order to meet 


























Figure 15.   Top-level of System Objectives Hierarchy 
Defoe [1993: 7-8] presents seven principles for developing system objectives.  
Three of Defoe’s principles were of particular importance during this phase of the system 
development.  First, the objectives should have “demonstrable links to 
customer/consumer needs and system requirements” [DeFoe, 1993: 7].  This principle 
aligns with the essential and operational attributes identified by Keeney [1992, 82-83].  
The publication review, in conjunction with stakeholder solicitation via online 
discussions and personal communications, served as the methods for accomplishing this 
principle.  Whenever possible, references to the objectives and measures were retained to 
maintain the traceability of stakeholder need.  The stakeholder solicitation also served as 
the method for accomplishing the second important principle:  stakeholders must be 
allowed to “modify requirements and participate in developing the solution” [Defoe, 
1993: 8].  The third important principle is that objectives should be measurable and 
understandable [DeFoe, 1993: 7, Keeney, 1992:  82, 85].  In alignment with the principle 
of developing measurable and easily understandable objectives, the concept of Measures 
of Merit (MoM) [after NATO Research and Technology Organization, 2002: Chapter 5], 
was adopted. 
1. Measures of Merit 
Measures of Merit (MoM) are a hierarchy of measures which serve as a base to 
compare different options.  Since the focus of this thesis was on naval tactical forces 
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tasked with securing local sea control, MoM of the highest level, Measures of Policy 
Effectiveness (MoPE), were not considered.  Additionally, Measures of Force 
Effectiveness (MoFE) were not considered.   
MoFE measure the force’s performance in a mission or the extent to which the 
force meets its objectives.  Mission accomplishment is not a measure of the command 
and control system but rather the force.  A command and control system can provide the 
best possible situational awareness for the commander, the commander can make the best 
possible decisions, and the command and control system can perfectly convey such 
decisions to the force but, the mission can still fail if the force executes the decision 
poorly.  To illustrate, consider an air-defense example.  A commander, with the 
assistance of a command and control system, can make the best decision for engaging the 
air threats based on weapons effectiveness data collected during testing.  If, however, the 
weapons selected fail to perform at the effectiveness level determined in testing, mission 
failure cannot necessarily be attributed to failure in the command and control system or 
failure by the commander.  The removal of mission accomplishment from the quality 
measure of a command and control system is a concept further discussed by Alberts and 
Hayes [2006: Chapter 4]. 
The MoM levels considered for this thesis included Measures of C2 Effectiveness 
(MoCE), Measures of Performance (MoP), and Dimensional Parameters (DP).  MoCE 
focus on the impact of C2 systems within the operational context.  MoP measure the 
performance within the system structure.  Finally, the lowest level, Dimensional 
Parameters (DP), measure the properties or characteristics inherent in the physical parts 
of the C2 systems.  For example, the capacity of a particular data link could be a DP 
whereas the capacity of a network of data links could be a MoP.  Continuing, the 
difference between needed capacity and available capacity of a network of data links in a 
given situation could be a MoCE.  Finally, percentage of targets successfully engaged 
could be a MoFE.  It is a general rule that a measure higher in the MoM hierarchy tends 
to be more context, task, or mission specific [NATO Research and Technology 
Organization, 2002: 96].   
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2. Selected Measures of Merit 
Appendix D:  System Objectives  presents the full system objective hierarchy.  
Measuring, evaluating, and integrating the results of all of the objectives is important in 
the development of a command and control system, but is beyond the scope of this thesis.  
Therefore, with the refined problem statement as a guide, particular MoM were selected 
as key measures for the remaining phases of the network-centric naval tactical command 
and control system development.  The key MoM selected from the system objectives 
hierarchy are presented in Table 6.  Further discussions concerning the selection process 
are detailed in Appendix D:  System Objectives . 
1.2.1 MoP Number of sources confirming information 
1.3.1 MoP Time between changing circumstances and observation 
1.3.2 MoP Time between the observation and the completion of processing the data into 
information 
1.3.4.4 MoP Probability of shelf-life is less than time between updates 
1.4.1.2 MoP Percentage of nodes which are capable of viewing information 
1.4.2.2 MoP Percentage of nodes which are capable of acting on information 
1.5.2.4 MoP Percentage of Essential Elements of Information (EEI) met 
1.5.2.5 MoP Percentage of commander’s Essential Elements of Friendly Information (EEFI) met 
1.8.1.1 DP Spatial resolution of observation capability 
1.8.1.2 DP Temporal resolution of observation capability 
1.9.2 MoP Number of nodes in the life of the information to which it can be attributed 
1.9.1 MoP Differential between time information is received by a node and when information can 
be attributed 
2.1.1.2 MoP Percentage of total decision-authorized entities that are available via existing 
relationships and connections 
2.1.1.3 MoP Percentage of total allocation-authorized entities that are available via existing 
relationships and connections 
2.1.1.4 MoP Percentage of total action-authorized entities that are available via existing relationships 
and connections 
2.1.2.1.2 MoP Time between operational failures for the network of connections 
2.1.2.2.2 MoP Probability of operational failure for network of connections 
2.3.3.1.2 MoP Quantity of overflow beyond capacity for the network of relationships and connections 
2.4.1.1.4 MoP Total geographical volume of relationships and connections 
2.4.2.1.3 MoP Median time required to reconfigure relationships and connections to meet changing 
circumstances and/or necessary responses 
2.4.2.2 MoP Number of possible solutions for required reconfiguration to meet changing 
circumstances and/or necessary responses 
2.4.3.1.4 MoP Median percentage of nodes which each relationship or connection is capable of 
connecting with 
2.4.4.1.3 MoP Number of nodes the network of connections are capable of adding 
2.4.4.2.7 MoP Median time required to add all relationships and connections to meet changing 
circumstances and/or necessary responses 
2.4.5.1.3 MoP Median geographical range nodes can maneuver while maintaining needed relationships 
or connections 
3.2 MoP Consistency of established intent between forces 
4.2 MoP Consistency of awareness between forces of rules and constraints which are applicable 
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to such forces 
5.1.2 MoP Consistency of response with established intent 
5.1.4 MoP Consistency of response with rules and constraints 
5.2.1 MoP Time between receipt of information concerning changing circumstances and 
acknowledgement of receipt 
5.2.2.1 MoP Time between acknowledgement of receipt of information concerning changing 
circumstances and response option being developed 
5.2.2.2 MoP Time between response option being developed and response decision 
5.2.3 MoP Time between response decision and order of response execution by decision-
authorized entity 
5.3.2 MoP Median number of connections between decision-authorized entity and action-
authorized entity 
5.3.4 MoP Percentage of entities connected by existing relationships and connections which are 
authorized to make a specific decision concerning a specific change in circumstances 
5.4.1 MoP Number of distinct response solutions generated by decision-authorized entities 
concerning a specific change in circumstances 
5.5.2 MoP Percentage of action-authorized entities with conflicting orders from decision-
authorized entities 
6.1.3.3 MoP Percentage of action-authorized entities which are allocated a role or responsibility 
which they cannot accomplish 
6.2.1 MoP Time between order of response execution by decision-authorized entity and completion 
of allocations by allocation-authorized entity 
6.2.2 MoP Time between allocation of role or responsibility and commencement of role or 
responsibility by action-authorized entity 
6.3.2 MoP Median number of connections between allocation-authorized entity and action-
authorized entity 
6.3.4 MoP Percentage of entities connected by existing relationships and connections which are 
authorized to make allocations concerning a specific decision 
6.4.2 MoP Percentage of roles and responsibilities which are required for the specific decision 
which are not allocated 
Table 6.   Selected Measures of Merit 
E. REQUIREMENTS 
Requirements are developed with the operational concept, external systems 
diagram, and the system objectives hierarchy providing inputs.  The following sections 
discuss each type of requirement and the applicable requirements identified during this 
thesis. 
1. Types of Requirements 
Buede [2000] organizes requirements into four groups: input/output requirements, 
system-wide requirements, trade-off requirements, and qualification requirements.  
Originating requirements are the collection of these requirements which were developed 

























Figure 16.   Requirements Development [after Buede, 2000:  159] 
a. Input/output Requirements  
The external systems diagram is the “primary tool used to support the 
development of input/output requirements” [Buede, 2000: 153].  Each input and output 
identified during the development of and included in the external systems diagram must 
have one or more requirements.  For example, a weapon system may require an order 
with different characteristics than another weapon system.  The differences between the 
orders should then be captured by the output requirements of the command and control 
system.  Rules and constraints for the system, which can be procedural rules or interface 
constraints, are included as input/output requirements.  Rules or constraints which require 
knowledge of the entire system to determine whether they are met should be included in 
system-wide and technology requirements.  Federal regulations or laws pertaining to the 
system are an example. 
 45 
b. System-wide Requirements 
System-wide requirements pertain “to the system as a whole and not to 
specific inputs or outputs” [Buede, 2000: 154].  This group of requirements includes 
technology, suitability, cost, and schedule requirements.  Technology requirements may 
limit potential solutions for the system design, but are usually included to ensure 
interoperability or compatibility with external systems [Buede, 2000: 154].  Suitability 
requirements address such issues as usability, survivability, availability, reliability, 
maintainability, and testability.  Cost and schedule requirements are self-explanatory and 
are applicable to every phase of the system’s life-cycle.  For the purposes of this thesis, 
only technology and suitability requirements were considered. 
c. Trade-off Requirements 
Trade-off requirements are based solely on the value judgments of 
stakeholders.  Categories of trade-off requirements can include performance trade-offs, 
cost trade-offs, and cost-performance trade-offs.  The techniques for elicitation of trade-
off requirements and the set of stakeholders solicited can greatly affect the development 
of trade-off requirements and subsequently the system.  As Buede [2000:  155] warns, 
“Care must be taken to define a sufficiently large and representative sample of these 
users.” 
d. Qualification Requirements 
Qualification requirements are developed to ensure the system which is 
built is properly designed and is acceptable.  Qualification requirements must address 
how the requirements are observed, verified, validated, and accepted [Buede, 2000:  155-
157].  Observation refers to how the qualification data is obtained (e.g., testing, analysis, 
simulation, inspection, or demonstration).  Verification refers to how it is determined if 
the built system complies with the designed system.  Validation refers to how it is 
determined built system complies with the originating requirements.  Finally, acceptance 
refers to how it is determined that the built system is acceptable to the stakeholders. 
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2. Applicable Requirements 
As described in scenario development, and since the focus of this thesis was on 
the architectural phase of the system engineering process, qualification and trade-off 
requirements were not developed.  Only input/output requirements and system-wide 
requirements were considered.  Requirements generation, however, does not end with the 
conclusion of the operational concept development.  Requirements may, and often times 
will, become apparent throughout the remaining phases of the system engineering 
process.  Those input/output requirements and system-wide requirements identified 
during thesis research are shown in Table 7.  Given the conceptual nature of this thesis, 
requirements identified were few and contained little specificity. 
Input/Output Requirements Reference 
All inputs to the C2 system are in the form of data Appendix E:  Functional 
Decomposition 
All outputs from the C2 system must be in the form of data Appendix E:  Functional 
Decomposition 
System-wide Requirements Reference 
N/A  
Table 7.   Applicable Requirements 
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The operational concept is a general vision of the system from the view of the 
system's stakeholders and is developed to facilitate the co-development of the functional 
architecture and the physical architecture.  Development of the operational concept is not 
complete until the system engineering process is complete for it is be repeatedly refined 
and updated during the developments of the functional, physical, and operational 
architectures.  The operational concept describes the system from an external view by 
defining boundaries of the system and identifying inputs to and outputs from the system.  
The purpose of the next phases of the system engineering process, functional architecture 
development and physical architecture development, is to describe how the system 
converts the inputs into the desired outputs and to define the means by which it does so. 
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V. FUNCTIONAL ARCHITECTURE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
A function is a process that takes inputs and transforms them into outputs [Buede, 
2000: 178].  Recall that a system is “a set of components (subsystems, segments) acting 
together to achieve a set of common objectives via the accomplishment of a set of tasks” 
[Buede, 2000: 38].  A system, therefore, is defined by 1) its set of objectives and 2) the 
functions required for it to achieve such set of objectives.  One purpose of the operational 
concept is to describe the objectives of the system.  The purpose of the functional 
architecture is to describe what the system is to do with the identified inputs to produces 
the desired outputs.   
The first phase in developing the functional architecture, which was conducted in 
conjunction with the development of the initial generic physical architecture, was to 
organize the system’s functions into a hierarchy.  The next phase was to detail the 
relationships between the inputs and outputs of the system (i.e., describe the sequence of 
functions converting an input into an output).  The third phase of the functional 
architecture development was to seek feedback from system stakeholders concerning the 
functional decomposition.  A primary purpose of the stakeholder feedback is to ensure 
there was not an absence of functionality or a redundancy of functionality in the 
functional hierarchy.  The fourth and fifth phases of the functional architecture 
development, tracing of input/output requirements and incorporation of fault tolerance 
and security functions respectively, were not conducted during this thesis. 
This chapter presents the key phases and products derived within the functional 
architecture development.  Appendix E:  Functional Decomposition and Appendix F:  
Input-Output Relationships provide more details of the functional architecture 
development process outside those presented in this section. 
B. FUNCTIONAL HIERARCHY 
Developing a hierarchy of the system’s functions was the first phase in 
developing the functional architecture and was conducted in conjunction with the 
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development of the initial generic physical architecture.  To develop the functional 
hierarchy the system engineer can use a decomposition approach, composition approach, 
or a combination of both decomposition and composition.  Per the recommendation of 
Buede [2000: 183] a combination of both approaches was used to develop the functional 
hierarchy. 
As during the development of the operational concept, a publication review was 
first conducted to provide the author with foundational knowledge of the functions of 
command and control.  This served as a starting point for the composition approach.  In 
addition, comparison of the alternative C2 functions served as the first step of the 
stakeholder feedback process.  Appendix E:  Functional Decomposition provides a 
summary of the publication review.  Work conducted during the operational concept 
development was reviewed as the next step in developing a set of system functions.  First, 
recall the refined problem statement: 
A responsive and robust command and control system which connects 
dispersed forces and enables such forces to self-synchronize and allocate 
resources to mass effects in order to meet the established intent at the 
tactical level of war. 
Therefore, three objectives of the command and control system are to connect dispersed 
forces, enable forces to self-synchronize, and enable forces to allocate resources to mass 
effects.  Second, recall from the discussions concerning the external systems diagram, 
that the inputs to and outputs from the command and control system are information. 
During the development of the operational concept, the system is viewed as a 
black box [Buede, 2000: 180].  In other words, the operational concept defines the inputs 
to and outputs from the system but does not describe what the system does to transform 
the inputs into the outputs.  It is during the functional architecture development that the 
system engineer describes what the system does and in effect shines the light into the 
black box that is the system [Buede, 2000: 180].  So, from above, if a C2 system takes 
information as inputs and gives information as outputs, then if the C2 system does 
nothing else, it at least moves information from one portion of the dispersed force to 
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another.  In effect, it is at least a communication system.  Not coincidentally, 
communication system is a subsystem of the C2 system as detailed in the external 
systems diagram. 
Since communication system is a subsystem of the C2 system, the functions of 
communications systems are candidates for functions of a C2 system.  JP 6-0 [2006: Ch I, 
6-8], presents eight functions of communication systems, as delineated in Appendix E:  
Functional Decomposition – Acquire Information, Process Information, Store 
Information, Transport Information, Control Other Communications Functions, Protect 
Information, Disseminate Information, and Present Information.  Dissemination of 
information is simply the transport of information from the C2 system to a stakeholder or 
an external system.  Acquisition of information is simply the transport of information 
from a stakeholder or an external system to the C2 system.  Therefore, Acquire 
Information and Disseminate Information are simply special cases of Transport 
Information. 
Control other communication functions is removed as a function of a C2 system 
for it is implicit in the design of a system.  By the mathematical definition, which is the 
basis of Buede’s [2000] definition of a function, a function transforms any element of its 
domain (i.e., particular input) to one and only one element of its range (i.e., to one and 
only one particular output).  Of course the output from a function may not be the desired 
output, but by definition of a function the output can be known.  This leads one to the 
topic of fault tolerance.  All systems can have faults which can cause errors which can 
lead to failures in the system.  However, as Buede [2000: 205] states, functions to detect 
errors “are typically not part of the initial drafts of the functional architecture because 
they depend to a significant degree on the physical architecture; as a result these 
functions are often added once the operational architecture is taking shape.”  This is what 
is meant by implicit in design, for the systems engineer will have a fault tolerance 
placeholder in their mind when defining system functions.  Protect Information is 
removed as a function of a C2 system for similar argument.  In essence, protecting 
information is preventing a system failure of an unwanted entity obtaining or modifying 
information within the C2 system.  In other words, protecting information in a C2 system 
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is not allowing an interface with an unwanted external system or stakeholder.  A fault in 
the system can cause an error of allowing an unwanted interface.  This can lead to a 
failure of the system with an actual unwanted interface.  Security is always an objective 
of a system where a system is to be used in an environment with an adversary.  Just as 
with fault tolerance functions, security functions depend largely on the physical 
architecture and should be added once the operational architecture has taken shape.  Four 
functions of communication systems remain as candidates for a C2 system:  Transport 
Information, Process Information, Store Information, and Present Information.   
Another function of a C2 system, as detailed in Appendix C:  External Systems 
Diagram, is to connect, or link, the phases of the C2 process.  A phase of the C2 process 
can be conducted, partially or wholly, by external systems.  For example, most of the 
conceptual models of the C2 process present a phase akin to decide.  Given the traditional 
military view that a decision is made by a commander and that the commander is viewed 
as an external system for this thesis, the phase of decision is partially fulfilled by an 
external system.  Since a decision requires two options, even if one option is to do 
nothing, at some time an option must be generated.  Of course the option can be 
generated by the commander; however, this does not enable forces to self-synchronize.   
Recall that self-synchronization is the ability of a force to “organize and 
synchronize complex warfare activities from the bottom up” [Cebrowski & Garstka, 
1998].  At this point in defining a C2 system it is not obviously apparent that a C2 system 
needs to generate options.  However, given the increasing tempo of warfare due to 
automated combat systems and faster weapons, the ability to generate options within the 
system, instead of aggregating options from external systems such as the commander, 
may become crucial.  In fact, weapon-target pairing is a form of generating options that is 
currently considered a function of a C2 system.  A C2 system need not be the only entity 
which generates options, but providing the ability should be a function of the system.  
Following similar reasoning, selecting an option, especially with automated combat 
systems, should also be a function of a C2 system.  In combination, generating and 
selecting options encompass allocating resources.  Generating options includes 
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determining which available resources can be used, while selecting options includes 
determining what resources, if any, will be used. 
Starting from the refined problem statement, a C2 system should connect 
dispersed forces, enable forces to self-synchronize, and enable forces to allocate 
resources to mass effects.  To achieve these objectives, a C2 system performs six 
functions:  Transport Information, Process Information, Store Information, Present 
Information, Generate Response Options, and Select Response Options.  These six 
functions must be decomposed into a hierarchy of sub-functions which then can be 
assigned to different resources identified in the physical architecture to form the 
operational architecture. 
 
Figure 17.   Top-level Command and Control System Functions 
The following sections will discuss basic concepts helpful for the functional 
decomposition, discuss the functional decomposition process, and present the full 
functional decomposition of the C2 system.  The decomposition of some functions 
incorporate concepts from  information theory and human decision making.  Appendix E:  
Functional Decomposition discusses the cognitive hierarchy and certain conceptual 
models of human decision making which influenced the functional decomposition. 
1. Transport Information 
The first top-level function, transport information, is the moving of information 
from one place to another.  Recall that transport information encompasses dissemination 
of information and acquisition of information.  Corresponding to the International 
Standards Organization (ISO) Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) model, the first level 
of decomposition for transport information relates to the transmission medium.   
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The second level of decomposition describes the connection type, whether a 
physical connection or remote connection.  Physical connection accounts for those 
instances when the information traverses through some sort of guide, which physically 
connects points.  Remote addresses those instances when the connected points are not 
physically connected by a guide.  A physical connection requires the two, or more, 
connected points to either be stationary or move together.  Remote allows the two, or 
more, connected points to move independent of each other.  Examples of physical and 
remote connection methods for each type of transmission medium are presented in the 
discussion below but are not included in the functional decomposition.  The specific 
methods are, rather, a part of the physical architecture. 
The first type of transmission media considered is physical matter, which is 
further subdivided, as described above, into physical and remote connection.  Physical 
matter transmission media are those instances when the information is stored in matter.  
An example of a physical connection using physical matter to transmit information is 
line-pull signals for divers.  In such instances divers can communicate with persons, 
using a predetermined communication scheme, by tugging on a rope or line.  Remote 
connections using physical matter are those instances when the information is stored in 
matter and such matter is physically transported from place to place.  Per the function 
store information discussion below, the storage media can be either human or non-
human.  A human messenger, a book, a compact disc, and a hard disk drive are all 
examples of physical matter storage which can contain information and be transported.   
The second type of transmission media considered is acoustic.  Acoustic is further 
subdivided into physically connected and remote systems.  For example, a sound tube on 
a ship is a physically connected system while shouting between ships is a remote system. 
The third type of transmission media considered is electromagnetic radiation, and, 
as above, is further divided into physical connection and remote connection.  Physical 
connection accounts for those instances when the electromagnetic radiation traverses 
through some sort of guide which physically connects points.  Examples of physical 
connection include metal wires, wave guides, or fiber-optic cables.  The other methods of 
electromagnetic transmission account for those instances when the connected points are 
 53 
not physically connected.  These methods include line-of-sight, ionospheric reflection, 
tropospheric scattering, and satellite communications [Rice & Sammes, 1989:  108].  The 






























Figure 18.   Functional Decomposition – Transport Information 
2. Process Information 
The second top-level function is process information.  The means (i.e., resources) 
by which the other functions of the C2 system are executed often require information in 
different forms (i.e., different levels in the cognitive hierarchy) or different formats (i.e., 
different versions of the same level in the cognitive hierarchy).  For example, storing 
information may require a different form or format of information than presenting 
information.  Therefore, the first three sub-functions of process information entail 
transforming information into another form or format.   
Transport processing entails transforming the information into the data form for 
transport.  It also entails converting the data into a format necessary for transport by a 
particular resource or set of resources.  Similarly, storage processing entails transforming 
information into the data form for storage and converting the data into a format necessary 
for storage by a particular storage resource or set of resources.  Input Conversion and 
Output Conversion are concerned with inputs from and outputs to external systems, 
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respectively.  They entail converting the data from the form and format used by the 
external systems to one useful by the C2 system’s components, and vice versa. 
Process information, however, includes three other sub-functions.  It includes 
evaluate data, which is to determine the accuracy and completeness of the data.  Process 
information also includes analyze information and synthesize information.  Analysis is 
the dividing of information into different parts.  Synthesis is the combining of different 
information to produce new information.  The decomposition of process information is 






























Figure 19.   Functional Decomposition – Process Information 
3. Store Information 
Store information is the third top-level function.  It is first divided, as alluded to in 
the discussion of physical transport of information, into human storage and non-human 
storage.  Human storage is considered the biological composition of a human.  If a non-
human storage device is located in a human (e.g., a micro-chip embedded in the skin) it is 
considered non-human storage.  Non-human storage of information is divided into short-
term storage and long-term storage.  Short-term storage is the storing of information in a 
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component external to the processing component for use only within the operating 
lifetime of the C2 system.  Storing of information within the component processing the 
information is not considered a sub-function of store information, but rather process 
information.  Long-term storage is the storing of information which can be used beyond 
the operating lifetime of the C2 system.   
Human storage, as in non-human storage, could be sub-divided into short-term 
and long-term storage however, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to determine and 
describe the differences between each.  It is for this reason that human and non-human 
storage was separated in the functional architecture, even though such separation is 
similar to divisions made in the physical architecture.  The decomposition of store 
















Figure 20.   Functional Decomposition – Store Information 
4. Present Information 
The fourth top-level function is present information.  As discussed previously, 
dissemination of information is the transport of information from the C2 system to a 
stakeholder or an external system.  Present information is portraying information to those 
stakeholders, external systems, or subsystems which are comprised of humans.  In many 
cases when information is transported to an external system or stakeholder, the 
information needs to be processed into a form useful to such external system or 
stakeholder.  Human systems, however, differ from non-human systems in their ability to 
use cognition.  Cognition uses more than the processed information to create knowledge 
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and understanding for the human.  Human cognition, as Boyd discusses in his 
Orientation phase of the OODA loop, also uses genetic heritage and cultural traditions as 
inputs.  These inputs to a human stakeholder, external system, or subsystem are beyond 
the purview of the C2 system.  Of course non-human external systems may have inputs 
beyond the purview of the C2 system, but such systems can be designed to account for 
such inputs.  However, in the cases of genetic heritage and cultural traditions, humans 
cannot be designed without considerable ethical considerations.  The notion of past 
experiences, from Boyd’s Orientation phase, was not included since training is a means 
of establishing a base for past experiences and thus, in effect, designing the human 
system.   
Present information entails portraying information to human stakeholders, 
external systems, or subsystem for cognition.  The next level of decomposition for 
present information follows the methods of input to a human.  A human, when viewed as 
a system, can absorb inputs from an external system in six ways.  The first five forms of 
inputs follow the five traditionally accepted forms of human senses.  The sense of motion 
and pressure are included with the sense of touch.  The sixth form of input to a human is 
direct connection with the brain and nervous system.  For ethical reasons, the sixth form 
of input was not considered as a feasible function for the C2 system.  Additionally, 
olfactory and gustatory inputs were not decomposed.  Present information, therefore, is 
decomposed into visual presentation, aural presentation, physical presentation, olfactory 
presentation, and gustatory presentation.  Some of these sub-functions were further 
decomposed by their respective methods.  Visual presentation can be in the form of text, 
symbols, or pictures.  The time varying nature is an attribute of these functions.  
Therefore, video is considered a picture which varies with time.  Aural presentation 
consists of voice and sounds.  Physical presentation can be in the form of touch or 
motion.  Finally, olfactory presentation and gustatory presentation were not decomposed 
because they were presumed to only have one method each for presentation.  The 
































Figure 21.   Functional Decomposition – Present Information 
Present information is concerned with output of the C2 system at the human-
system interface.  The input to the C2 system at the human-system interface was not 
neglected in the top-level functions; it was accounted for in process information.  Of 
course humans may be better able to portray certain cognitive information using certain 
methods (e.g., it may be easier to “speak your mind” than to “draw your mind”).  
However, engineers have designed many standard input interface systems (e.g., 
keyboards, joysticks, levers, buttons, and microphones) and humans have been trained to 
convey their cognitive information via these interface systems.  A top-level function 
addressing the inputs from humans could have easily been included similarly to present 
information.  However, the notion of standard input interfaces and the human system 
processing the information into a form which the C2 system can process led the author to 
view the input at the human-system interface as part of process information. 
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5. Generate Response Options 
Generate response options is the fifth top-level function.  To better understand 
generate response options and its sub-functions, terminology should be reviewed.  First, 
intent, whether it is an input to the C2 system by the commander or is established by the 
C2 system, is comprised of a purpose and an objective.  A mission is an assignment to a 
force with a purpose, determined by the intent, and consists of a set of tasks.  “The 
mission establishes the requirement to perform tasks and provides the context for each 
task performance” [CJCSM 3500.04D, 2005: Enclosure A, 7].  A task is an action or 
activity assigned to a resource and is determined by analysis of the mission, doctrine, 
and/or standard operating procedures.  Finally, a response option is a set of tasks, with 
associated resources, which is a solution to achieve the mission objective given the 
changing circumstances. 
First, to generate response options the C2 system must determine changing 
circumstances.  This sub-function is further divided into detecting, identifying, 
classifying, and confirming the changing circumstances.  Detecting is discovering 
differences between current and past or expected circumstances.  Identifying is 
recognizing the detected changing circumstances as a specific type.  Classifying is 
categorizing the detected changing circumstances by level of danger they present.  
Confirming is verifying the identification and classification of the detected changing 
circumstances. 
Second, the C2 system must determine the required tasks.  In the cases where the 
intent or mission is an input to the C2 system certain tasks are specified and certain tasks 
are implied.  Therefore, two sub-functions of determine required tasks are to identify the 
specified tasks and hypothesize implied tasks.  When the intent is established within the 
C2 system, there is possibly no explicit intent or mission.  Therefore, tasks emerge as a 
result of the changing circumstances.  The C2 system must then hypothesize emergent 
tasks.  Additionally, when refining response options, the C2 system must also confirm 
required tasks. 
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Third, since a task is an action or activity assigned to a resource, the C2 system 
must identify resources for required tasks.  Finally, allocate resources for required tasks 
is another sub-function.  The decomposition of generate response options is presented in 















































Figure 22.   Functional Decomposition – Generate Response Options 
6. Select Response Options 
The sixth and final top-level function is select response options, which is 
comprised of three sub-functions.  First, the C2 system should be capable of evaluating 
response options generated.  At a minimum, the C2 system should evaluate feasibility, 
evaluate completeness, evaluate legality, and estimate effectiveness.  Feasibility addresses 
whether the resources allocated tasks are capable of accomplishing the task.  
Completeness addresses whether all of the required tasks of the response option are 
allocated to resources.  Legality addresses whether the required tasks are legal or the 
resources allocated to a task can legally execute the task.  Note a response option need 
not be feasible, complete, or effective to be selected.  A response option in which all 
tasks are assigned to resources but with at least one task assigned to a resource incapable 
of accomplishing it is deemed infeasible; it can also be deemed incomplete if such task is 
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viewed as unassigned.  In either view of such response options, it is conceivable that a C2 
system may, in some cases, select an infeasible or incomplete response option.  
Effectiveness is determined through hypothesizing expected circumstances and 
estimating the expected effects of a response option.  Therefore, an infeasible or 
incomplete response option is likely to be ineffective, but it is also possible for feasible 
and complete responses to be so as well.  Not allowing a C2 system to select an 
ineffective response option may result in a situation where no response options are 
available, which may be worse than having poor response options to choose from.  In 
addition, it is assumed that a response option evaluated to be illegal would not be 
selected.   
Second, a C2 system, when containing human components with decision-making 
authority, should judge response options.  The purpose of this function is to determine the 
morality of a specific response option.  Finally, to complete the response selection the C2 
system must assign tasks to resources.  The decomposition of select response options is 




























Figure 23.   Functional Decomposition – Select Response Options 
C. FULL FUNCTIONAL DECOMPOSITION 
All functions and sub-functions discussed in this thesis are collected and 
presented below in Table 8.  Functions which were identified as possible for the C2 
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system but were deemed infeasible or beyond the bounds of this thesis are listed with 
strike-through font.  Additionally, the top-levels of the functional decomposition are 
presented in diagram form in Figure 24.  Further discussion of the functional 
decomposition is presented in Appendix E:  Functional Decomposition.  Fault-tolerance 
and security functions are not included below since they are not identified until the 
development of the operational architecture begins to take shape.  As discussed 
previously, comparison of the alternative C2 functions served as the first step of the 
stakeholder feedback process.  In addition, feedback was solicited from C2 researchers 
and military officers via an online discussion board and personal correspondence.   
1.0 Transport information 
1.1. Physical matter 
1.1.1. Physical connection 
1.1.2. Remote connection 
1.2. Acoustic waves 
1.2.1. Physical connection 
1.2.2. Remote connection 
1.3. Electromagnetic 
1.3.1. Physical connection 
1.3.2. Remote connection 
2.0 Process information 
2.1. Convert Data 
2.1.1. Transport conversion 
2.1.2. Storage conversion 
2.1.3. Input conversion 
2.1.4. Output conversion 
2.2. Evaluate data 
2.2.1. Evaluate accuracy of data 
2.2.2. Evaluate completeness of data 
2.3. Analyze information 
2.4. Synthesize information 
3.0 Store information 
3.1. Human 
3.2. Non-human 
3.2.1. Short-term Storage 
3.2.2. Long-term Storage 















5.0 Generate response options 
5.1. Determine changing circumstances 
5.1.1. Detect changing circumstances 
5.1.1.1. Detect differences between present and past circumstances 
5.1.1.2. Detect differences between present and expected circumstances 
5.1.2. Identify changing circumstances 
5.1.3. Classify changing circumstances 
5.1.4. Confirm changing circumstances 
5.2. Determine required tasks 
5.2.1. Identify specified tasks 
5.2.2. Hypothesize implicit tasks 
5.2.3. Hypothesize emergent tasks 
5.2.4. Confirm required tasks 
5.3. Identify resources for required tasks 
5.4. Allocate resources for required tasks 
6.0 Select response options 
6.1. Evaluate response options 
6.1.1. Evaluate feasibility of options 
6.1.2. Evaluate completeness of options 
6.1.3. Evaluate legality of options 
6.1.3.1. Compare assigned tasks with law of armed conflict 
6.1.3.2. Compare assigned tasks with rules of engagement 
6.1.4. Estimate effectiveness of option 
6.1.4.1. Hypothesize expected circumstances 
6.1.4.2. Estimate measures of effectiveness 
6.2. Judge response options 
6.3. Assign tasks to resources 












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 24.   Functional Decomposition – Top Three Levels 
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D. INPUT/OUTPUT RELATIONSHIPS 
After the functional hierarchy was detailed sufficiently, two to four levels as 
suggested by Buede [2000: 204], the next phase of the functional architecture 
development was to describe the relationships between inputs and outputs of the system.  
During the operational concept, interaction diagrams were developed demonstrating the 
relationship between certain inputs, outputs, and the system.  These relationships were 
further detailed to explain the process (i.e., sequence of functions) by which the inputs 
become the outputs.  In other words, the purpose of this phase was to describe or model 
the sequence of functions which convert inputs into outputs.   
There are multiple methods which the system engineer can utilize to detail these 
relationships including functional flow block diagrams, data flow diagrams, N2 charts, or 
IEDF0 diagrams.  IDEF0 diagrams were chosen to remain consistent with the work in the 
operational concept.  Figure 25.  presents the A-0 diagram, the highest level of the C2 
system relationship diagrams; a black-box visualization of the system.  It is akin to the 
external systems diagram and the basic external systems diagram developed in the 
operational concept.  The primary difference, however, is the A-0 IDEF0 diagram does 
not specify the external systems from which inputs are received and to which outputs are 
sent.  Figure 25.  also shows that the A0 diagram presented in Figure 26.  that is a sub-
diagram of the A-0.  The A0 diagram in Figure 26.  presents the interactions of the 
system’s top level functions.  The A0 diagram is the apex of the collection of relationship 
diagrams which shine light into the black-box system.  The mechanisms shown in both 
diagrams were determined during the development of the physical architecture, which is 
discussed in Chapter VI.  The remaining collection of developed relationship diagrams is 
presented in Appendix F:  Input-Output Relationships. 
The color selection of lines and font in the relationship diagrams is not standard 
for IDEF0, but were implemented for readability.  Red lines and red, italic, sans-serif 
fonts denote procedures and controls, which will be discussed in the physical 
architecture.  Blue lines and blue, bold, serif fonts denote mechanisms, again which will 
be discussed in the physical architecture.  Black lines and black, sans serif fonts denote 
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inputs and outputs.  In those instances where an output of one function was a control for 
another function, the line and font was drawn in red. 
Response; Order; 
Infeasible Response;
Incomplete Response; Unassigned Tasks;
Immoral Response; Immoral Tasks






























































































(   ) (   ) (   )










Incomplete Response; Unassigned Tasks;
Immoral Response; Immoral Tasks













































































Figure 26.   Relationship Diagram – A0 
The A0 diagram in Figure 26.  presents the interactions of the system’s top level 
functions.  The diagram demonstrates the internal process to take inputs to produce 
desired outputs.  First, the C2 system accepts inputs from external sensor systems, 
weapon systems, platforms, and people (e.g., established intent).  The C2 system then 
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processes the inputs for transport, storage, or presentation.  The transported and stored 
information are then processed to produce information on current and past circumstances.  
The system then takes current and past circumstances along with established intent, when 
it is available, to produce a response option.  The response option is then processed, 
transported, and/or stored.  If the response option is selected, it becomes a response that is 
processed, transported, and/or stored once again.  From the response, an executable 
response is created that is processed, transported, and/or stored to finally produce an 
assignment and/or warning to external systems and people.  If the response option was 
not selected, it would be processed, transported, and/or stored and used as input to 
generate a new response option. 
One key idea demonstrated in the diagram is the centrality of the function Process 
Information.  It is the first function of the C2 system for all inputs.  In addition, it 
provides input to all of the other top-level functions.  By no means is Process Information 
the only critical function.  All of the top-level functions are critical functions of the 
system.  Rather, the systems engineer should realize in developing the physical 
architecture, that the procedures for and controls on Process Information will have 
substantial impact on all of the sub-functions and the C2 system as a whole. 
E. INPUT/OUTPUT REQUIREMENTS TRACE, FAULT TOLERANCE 
FUNCTIONS, AND SECURITY FUNCTIONS 
The final two phases of the functional architecture development are the trace of 
input/output requirements and the inclusion of fault tolerance and security functions.  
Given, as discussed in Chapter IV, the limited number and general requirements 
identified, a trace of input/output requirements was not formally conducted.  
Additionally, as Buede [2000: 205] discusses, fault tolerance and security functions 
depend significantly on the physical architecture and are not typically included in the 
functional architecture until the operational architecture takes form.  Given the scope of 
this thesis and the conceptual nature of the physical and operational architectures, 
identification and development of fault tolerance and security functions were not 
conducted. 
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F. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The purpose of the functional architecture was to describe what the system was to 
do with the identified inputs to produces the desired outputs.  Key phases of the 
functional architecture development were conducted simultaneously with the 
development of the physical architecture, as presented in the following chapter.  First, the 
functions of the proposed C2 system were identified and organized into a hierarchy.  
Second the relationships between inputs and outputs of the system were detailed through 
relationship diagrams.  In addition, informal stakeholder feedback was conducted through 
a survey of C2 functions and solicitation from C2 researchers and military officers via an 
online discussion board and personal correspondence.  The following chapter presents the 
physical architecture development process conducted simultaneously with the functional 
architecture.  The products of the physical architecture along with those of the operational 
concept and functional architecture are incorporated in the operational architecture. 
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VI. PHYSICAL ARCHITECTURE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of the physical architecture is to describe the resources that comprise 
the system, with resources for every function identified during the development of the 
functional architecture [Buede, 2000:  215-216].  In addition, the physical architecture 
also describes the procedures by which the system is used [Buede, 2000:  218].   
Physical architectures are either generic or instantiated.  A generic physical 
architecture is developed in parallel with the functional architecture [Buede, 2000: 221] 
and partitions the resources into common categories without performance characteristics 
for the resources.  The generic physical architecture also identifies procedures and 
controls affecting the system without specified attributes.  An instantiated physical 
architecture is a generic physical architecture with performance characteristics or 
specified attributes of the system resources, procedures, and controls.  This chapter 
presents the key phases and products within the physical architecture development. 
B. GENERIC PHYSICAL ARCHITECTURE COMPONENTS 
The first step of the physical architecture development is to identify the generic 
subsystems, components, and configuration items.  A subsystem is a set of components 
which is less than the system itself.  A component is a subset of physical resources of the 
system to which a subset of the system’s functions have been allocated [after Buede, 
2000:  Glossary].  A configuration item is the lowest level of components.  As an 
example of these levels of components, recall the two subsystem categories identified 
during the external systems diagram development - people and communication and 
information systems.  One of the identified people subsystems was staff.  Components of 
a commander’s staff can be operations, logistics, and legal staffs.  The configuration 
items, in this case, are the individuals which comprise the various levels of staffs.  In fact, 
decomposing and reorganizing the two subsystem categories serves as an opportune 
starting point for describing the generic physical architecture. 
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1. People 
The people subsystem category is comprised of three generic components, namely 
commanders (subordinate), staff, and personnel.  All three types of the people 
components are subordinate to a commander, when one is designated.  Recall that 
command is comprised of both the authority over subordinates and the responsibility for 
subordinates.  Also recall that authority can be delegated.  Differences between each of 
the three people components are primarily authority and responsibility. 
a. Commanders (Subordinate) 
When there is no specific entity designated responsible for the 
accomplishment of a mission, the commanders of the forces involved in the mission fall 
within the C2 system.  When there is a specific entity designated responsible for the 
accomplishment of a mission, such senior commander falls outside the C2 system while 
subordinate commanders fall within the system.  Subordinate commanders are 
responsible for and have authority over a portion of a senior commander’s forces 
b. Staff 
As discussed previously, the staff subsystem can be comprised of several 
component staffs.  Traditional staff divisions have been between administrative, 
intelligence, operations, logistics, plans, communications, and training [Mack, 1998: 172-
176].  Given the purpose of the staff is to support the commander, staff organization is 
often tailored to meet the commander’s needs or desires.  In some cases commanders 
have joined traditionally separate component staffs just as operations and plans.  These 
component staffs, in some cases, are further divided.  In all cases, the configurable item 
for the staff is the individual person. 
c. Personnel 
Personnel are those persons who are assigned to a commander who are not 
subordinate commanders or staff.  Specifically, personnel do not have authority over or 
responsibility for a portion of a commander’s forces.  A personal aide, a person standing 
watch, and a contractor are examples of personnel. 
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Figure 27.   People Components 
2. Communications and Information Systems 
The second subsystem category, communications and information systems, 
consists of numerous generic components.  Rice and Sammes [1989] present the basic 
components of a communications and information system.  First, an information 
processing system requires an input component, an output component, a processor, and a 
memory component (sub-divided, potentially, into short-term and long-term storage) 
[Rice & Sammes, 1998: 37].  The information processing system is then connected by a 
communications system.  The communications system can also connect other subsystems 
of the C2 system, namely people.  In fact, the decomposition of a C2 system by Rice and 
Sammes is consistent with this thesis and doctrinal concepts presented in Chapter II.  A 
C2 system, they state, “describes the combination of information systems (including 
communications systems), procedures and personnel used to effect the command and 
control process” [1989: 4].  Therefore, the major components of the communications and 
information subsystem are input interfaces, output interfaces, processors, 
memory/storage, and links. 
a. Input Interface and Output Interface 
The first two types of components of an information system are input and 
output interfaces.  An interface is a resource for connecting two or more distinct systems 
or subsystems.  The connection can be between the system, or subsystems, and external 
systems (external interface) or between subsystems (internal interface).  When an 
interface is for accepting an input from an external system to the C2 system or subsystem, 
it is deemed an input interface.  Conversely, when the function of the interface is for 
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disseminating an output to an external system from the C2 system or subsystem it is 
deemed an output interface.  In the case of an internal interface, the interface can be 
designed to serve as both an input interface for one subsystem and an output interface of 
another subsystem.  Input and output interfaces can be common electronic systems such 
as keyboards and video displays but can also be human actions such as spoken word. 
b. Processor 
The third type of component of an information system is processor.  The 
purpose of the processor is either to transform information or convert data.  First, through 
a combination of evaluation, synthesis, and analysis, a processor can transform data to 
information or information to data.  Second, a processor can convert data from one 
format to another format.  A human can serve as a processor for both transformation and 
data conversion, as well.  Transforming information to or from knowledge, 
understanding, or wisdom requires a combination of functions, in particular processing 
and storing, and is therefore beyond the capabilities of a processor.  Though a human can 
serve as a processor, when they transform information to or from knowledge, 
understanding, or wisdom they are not deemed a processor for purposes of this thesis.  
The distinctions between different forms of information is discussed in Appendix E:  
Functional Decomposition 
c. Memory/Storage 
Memory or storage is the fourth type of component of an information 
system.  For the purpose of this thesis, memory is a component for storing information 
within the operating lifetime of the C2 system while storage is a component for storing 
information beyond the operating lifetime of the C2 system.  As highlighted in the 
functional architecture, individual humans can be considered as memory and storage. 
d. Link 
Links are the final type of component for communication and information 
systems.  A link connects the output interface of a subsystem with the input interface of 
another subsystem.  The link can either be a physical connection via a designed system or 
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a remote connection.  Remote connections allow the connected entities to be 
independently mobile while physical connections require the connected entities to move 
with each other. 
As alluded to in the functional architecture, links can also be described by 
the method in which the information is transported.  The information can be stored in 
physical matter such as a compact disk or human and transported between two 
geographically separate nodes.  Additionally, the information can be transmitted through 
a medium, whether through a physical connection such as a waveguide or a remote 
connection such as acoustic waves.  Links can differ in geographical size from a fraction 
of an inch on a circuit board to thousands of miles in the case of satellite 
communications. 
 
Figure 28.   Communication and Information System Components 
C. PHYSICAL ARCHITECTURE PROCEDURES AND CONTROLS 
In addition to describing the physical resources which comprise the system, the 
physical architecture also describes the procedures by which the system is used [Buede, 
2000:  218].  Similar to the physical components, procedures and controls also have 
attributes which affect the performance of the system and can have multiple 
instantiations.  During the development of the physical architecture, at least six 
procedures and controls of the C2 system were identified with multiple instantiations.  
These generic procedures and controls include ethics, rules of engagement, weapons 
control status, and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) for C2. 
Ethics are a set of moral principles or a system of moral values [Misch, 1994: 
398].  For the purpose of this thesis, ethics are the basis by which the morality of an 
option or decision is judged.  Rules of engagement are procedures and controls which 
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specify how and to what limit forces will initiate or continue combat engagement with 
other forces.  Weapons control status denotes how and on which classification of targets 
weapons systems can be used.  For purposes of this thesis, C2 TTPs were decomposed 
into three primary categories – situational awareness, decision authority, and allocation 
authority.  Situational awareness is a category to group TTPs and controls that affect the 
sharing and dissemination of situational information within the networked force.  
Decision authority is a category to group TTPs and controls that affect the decisions 
within the networked force, which are applicable to the changing circumstances of the 
situation.  Allocation authority is a category to group applicable TTPs and controls that 
affect the allocation of roles and responsibilities of the networked force. 
D. INSTANTIATED PHYSICAL ARCHITECTURE 
Once the generic components, procedures, and controls of the physical 
architecture were identified, the next step was to specify attributes and performance 
characteristics for each, from which alternative instantiated physical architectures could 
be designed and selected.  There are many techniques for generating numerous physical 
architecture alternatives.  The morphological box technique, suggested by Buede [2000: 
222-226], was used for developing the physical architecture alternatives.  “In the two-
dimensional version a table is created with columns (or sometimes the rows) pertaining to 
the generic components of the physical architecture.  Then the elements of each column 
are filled with competing specific instantiations of each component” [Buede, 2000: 223]. 
As in the functional architecture, there are varying levels within the 
morphological box.  From the top-level morphological box to lower level boxes, the 
systems engineer describes alternative physical components with greater and greater 
detail.  Taking the wrist watch example of a system, a generic component of the system 
would be a time presenter.  The highest level of the morphological box for such 
component could list visual display and audio presentation as two alternatives.  The next 
lower level for visual display could list analog display, digital display, and combination 
display.  The next lower level for digital display could list 12-hour notation and 24-hour 
notation.  This decomposition can be continued as is pertinent to the system under design.  
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The following sections present the top-level morphological boxes developed and discuss 
the instantiations of the components, procedures, and controls. 
1. Physical Architecture Components 
The top level morphological box for the physical components is presented in 
Table 9.  This is by no means an exhaustive list of alternatives.  Rather, this box served as 
a tool by which alternative physical architectures could be generated.  The first row 
presents the generic components with the remaining entries in each column denoting the 
specific instantiations.  Details concerning each of the alternatives for the generic 






















































































































   
   
   
   



































































































































































































































Table 9.   Physical Components Morphological Box 
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a. Commanders (Subordinate) 
Subordinate commanders are responsible for and have authority over a 
portion of a force.  Commanders, whether subordinate or not, can be delineated in at least 
three possible ways.  First, commanders’ responsibilities can be divided functionally.  For 
example, one commander can be responsible for airspace, while another is responsible for 
the subsurface of the ocean, while another is responsible for amphibious operations.  
Second, commanders’ responsibilities can be divided geographically, that is each 
commander is responsible for everything which occurs within a geographic region.  
Third, commanders’ responsibilities can be divided by the resources which they 
command.  For example, in a joint operation a commander can be responsible for all of 
the service component forces, or in a multi-national operation a commander can be 
responsible for all of his or hers nation’s forces, despite the functional capability or 
geographic location of the forces.  Fourth and fifth, commanders’ responsibilities can be 
divided through a combination of functional and resource or functional and geographic. 
b. Staff  
Staff may have authority over a portion of a senior commander’s forces 
but do not have responsibility for such portion of forces.  Staffs can be organized 
according to at least three major methods.  First, a staff can be organized functionally.  In 
this method staffs are organized according to services which they provide, such as 
intelligence, logistics, and personnel.  This is a traditionally accepted method for staff 
organization, having been used extensively by the Prussian military [Hurley, 2005: 91-
96].  Second, a staff can be organized by project or mission, or cross-functionally as 
Hurley [2005: 91-96] describes.  In this method, the staff is organized into separate 
autonomous units, each for a particular task or mission [Forsberg, Mooz, & Cotterman, 
2005:  171].  Each unit would be comprised of members with expertise in the different 
functional areas required for the project or mission.  The members of the project/mission 
staff would report only to the project/mission leader and once the project/mission was 
accomplished, the staff would be disbanded.  Third, a staff can be organized according to 
a matrix method, in other words a combination of functional and project/mission.  In this 
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method there are leaders or managers defined for both projects/missions and functions.  
Staff personnel are assigned to leaders from both categories.  The project/mission leader 
defines what the staff personnel should do while the functional leader defines how the 
staff personnel should executed their work [Forsberg, Mooz, & Cotterman, 2005:  173]. 
c. Personnel 
Personnel are persons who do not have authority over or responsibility for 
a portion of a senior commander’s forces.  Personnel can be delineated in at least two 
ways.  First, personnel can be divided by the functions they perform.  Second, personnel 
can be divided by their status (e.g., Navy, Military, DoD Civilian, Contractor, Active 
Duty, Reserve, National Guard). 
d. Input Interface 
An input interface is a resource which connects an external system with 
the C2 system.  As discussed in Appendix E:  Functional Decomposition, communication 
of information is based on the exchange of data through observation.  A C2 system input 
interface, therefore, transforms inputs, which are in the form of data, into useful 
information.  C2 system input interfaces can therefore organized by the medium in which 
the data is received.  Examples of medium divisions are electromagnetic, voice, acoustic 
sound, electromechanical, mechanical, scent, and taste.  
 e. Output Interface 
A C2 system output interface transforms internal information into the form 
of data which then can be transported or transmitted to a subsystem or an external system.  
Therefore, C2 system output interfaces can be organized by the medium in which the data 
is transported or transmitted.  Similar to input interfaces, examples of medium divisions 




The purpose of the processor is either to transform information or convert 
data.  Example instantiations of processors include human, mechanical analog, 
electromechanical analog, electromechanical digital, and electronic digital. 
g. Memory/Storage 
Memory is a component for storing information within the operating 
lifetime of the C2 system while storage is a component for storing information beyond 
the operating lifetime of the C2 system.  Example instantiations of memory and storage 
include human, mechanical, electromechanical, and electromagnetic. 
h. Link 
Links connect the output interface of a subsystem with the input interface 
of another subsystem.  As discussed in the body of the thesis, instantiations of links can 
be described by the type of connection (i.e., physical or remote) and by the medium in 
which the information is imbedded (e.g., physical matter, acoustic, electromagnetic). 
2. Physical Architecture Procedures and Controls 
As with the generic physical components, the morphological box technique was 
used to generate and describe the multiple instantiations of a few of the applicable 
procedures and controls.  The top-level morphological box for procedures and controls is 
presented in Table 10.  The first column presents the generic procedures and controls 
with the remaining entries in each row denoting the specific instantiations.  Details 
concerning each of the alternatives for each of the procedures and controls of the physical 
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Table 10.   Procedures and Controls Morphological Box 
a. Ethics 
Ethics are a set of moral principles or a system of moral values [Misch, 
1994: 398].  For the purpose of this thesis, ethics are the basis by which the morality of 
an option or decision is judged.  In particular, ethics are used as a procedure for or as a 
control on the function Judge Response Options.  As will be shown in the development of 
the operational architecture, the resource assigned Judge Response Options is human.  In 
essence, this thesis took the approach that a human is always within the command and 
control process.  It is, therefore, the ethics and morals of such human that is a procedure 
for and control on the C2 system. 
There are at least three general approaches to ethics, as described by 
Ackoff [1989:  6].  First, there is the absolute approach in which the judgment of morality 
is determined by compliance to a rule.  Unfortunately, as Ackoff [1989:  6] states, “No 
set of ethical-moral rules has yet been formulated which does not lead to unresolvable 
problems.”  Second, there is the relativistic approach in which the judgment of morality is 
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determined by the situation and entities involved.  This approach also raises difficulties 
when “what is ‘good’ for one person is ‘bad’ for another” [Ackoff, 1989: 8] that is 
involved.  The final approach to ethics is a combination of both of the previous 
approaches. 
b. Rules of Engagement 
Rules of engagement (ROE) are procedures and controls which specify 
how and to what limit forces will initiate or continue combat engagement with other 
forces.  The two instantiations of rules of engagement are command by negation and 
positive command.  Command by negation accounts for those instances where the ROE 
allow actions to be taken “at the discretion of different levels of command unless negated 
by countermanding orders by higher command or by political authorities” [George, 1984:  
227].  Positive command accounts for those instances where the ROE allow actions to 
“taken by military units only if expressly authorized by higher command or by political 
authorities at some point in the development of the crisis” [George, 1984:  227]. 
c. Weapons Control Status 
Weapons control status is another control of a C2 system.  It denotes how 
and on which classification of targets weapons systems can be used.  Three instantiations 
of weapons control status are Free, Tight, and Hold [after NATO Standardization 
Agency, 2008:  2-W-2].  Free denotes that weapons systems may be fired at any target 
not positively recognized as friendly.  Tight denotes that weapons systems may be fired 
only at targets recognized as hostile.  Hold denotes that weapons systems may be fired 
only in self-defense or by formal order from higher authority. 
d. Command and Control Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 
Tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) for C2, though a bit more 
descriptive than the concept of C2 doctrine, is still a broad topic.  For purposes of this 
thesis, C2 TTPs were decomposed into three primary categories each of which were 
comprised of four conceptual instantiations.  The three primary categories were 
situational awareness, decision authority, and allocation authority.  The first three 
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conceptual instantiations of each follow Baran’s [1964] description of centralized, 
decentralized, and distributed networks, which is presented visually in Figure 29.  Baran 
did not describe the fourth instantiation of the categories since he was attempting to 
describe a connected network for communications.  The final conceptual instantiation for 
situational awareness equates roughly to solitariness while the final instantiation for 
decision authority and allocation authority is anarchic. 
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Figure 29.   Centralized, Decentralized, Distributed, and Isolated 
[after Baran, 1964:  2] 
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e. Situational Awareness 
Situational awareness is a category to group TTPs and controls which 
affect the sharing and dissemination of situational information within the networked 
force.  Centralized situational awareness describes the instances where a single entity or a 
single system collects and disseminates information pertaining to the situation.  
Decentralized situational awareness describes those instances where the sharing of 
situational information is divided into multiple levels with single line of communication.  
In other words, an entity or system at one level shares situational information with a 
portion of entities or systems at a lower level and with one entity or system at a higher 
level.  Centralized situational awareness is divided into only two levels with the central 
entity or system comprising the highest level which shares information with all lower 
level entities or systems. 
Distributed situational awareness describes those instances where 
situational information from one entity or systems is shared with two or more entities or 
systems, for every entity or system in the networked force.  Finally, isolated situational 
awareness describes those instances where situational information is not shared between 
any entities or systems. 
f. Decision Authority 
Decision authority is a category to group TTPs and controls that affect the 
decisions within the networked force, which are applicable to the changing circumstances 
of the situation.  Centralized decision authority describes the instances where a single 
entity or a single system is authorized to make decisions for the networked force.  
Decentralized decision authority describes those instances where the authority to make 
decisions concerning a portion of the network force follows a line of direct superiors.  
That is, decision authority is divided into levels where an entity at one level has authority 
over a portion of the entities at a lower level but in turn receives such authority by one 
entity at a higher level.  Distributed decision authority describes those instances where 
the authority to make decisions follows multiple lines of superiors.  In other words, 
decision authority over an entity resides in two or more entities which have a direct 
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connection with such entity.  Anarchy is the absence of any authority [Mish, 1994:  42].  
Therefore, anarchic decision authority describes those instances where the decision 
authority resides only in the entity itself, for all entities in the force. 
The use of a distributed communications system to transport a decision 
and distributed decision authority are not equivalent.  When a junior relies upon the 
decision of one superior, even if the decision can be communicated via many different 
means and methods, decision authority is not distributed.  Decision authority in such case 
would be decentralized or centralized, but not distributed.  The same holds for allocation 
authority. 
g. Allocation Authority 
Allocating authority is a category to group applicable TTPs and controls 
which affect the allocation of roles and responsibilities of the networked force.  
Centralized allocation authority describes the instances where a single entity or a single 
system is authorized to allocate roles and responsibilities to the networked force.  
Decentralized allocation authority describes those instance where the authority to allocate 
roles and responsibilities is divided into levels where an entity at one level has authority 
over a portion of the entities at a lower level but in turn receives such authority by one 
entity at a higher level.  Distributed allocation authority describes those instances where 
the authority to allocate roles and responsibilities to an entity resides in two or more 
entities which have a direct connection with such entity.  Anarchic allocation authority 
describes those instances where the authority to allocate a role or responsibility to an 
entity resides only in the entity itself, for all entities in the force. 
 
E. ALTERNATIVE PHYSICAL ARCHITECTURES 
Once instantiations for the generic components, procedures, and controls are 
identified the next step was to generate multiple physical architectures from which one or 
more could be selected to serve as an input to the operational architecture.  Recall that a 
goal of this thesis was to better understand the influence of doctrine on the overall 
architecture of the material system in order to ensure developing net-centric systems and 
 86 
net-centric doctrine meet the command and control needs of tactical naval forces.  For 
this thesis, two alternative physical architectures were developed with varying 
instantiations of doctrine.  When possible, all other components (i.e., communications 
and information systems), procedures, and controls were kept the same between the 
alternative architectures to highlight the impact of doctrine.  Discussions of the two 
alternative architectures are presented in the following sections. 
1. Alternative Physical Architecture #1 
As presented previously, the focus of this thesis has been on those actions a future 
(i.e., ten to fifteen years from present) Surface Action Group would conduct to secure 
local sea control in traditional operating environments.  Currently, U.S. tactical naval 
forces operate under Composite Warfare Commander (CWC) doctrine [Jane’s 
Information Group, 2008].  Use of CWC doctrine dictates several of the physical 
architecture instantiations.  First, the OTC’s subordinate commanders are organized using 
a functional-resource combination.  This is seen in the division of Principle and 
Functional Warfare Commanders and Coordinators.  The Warfare Commanders (both 
Principle and Functional) can be delegated decision authority to respond with assigned 
assets.  Coordinators are delegated allocation authority.  Therefore, both decision 
authority and allocation authority are decentralized.  The Composite Warfare 
Commander structure is presented in Figure 30.   
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Composite Warfare Commander Structure
 
Figure 30.     Composite Warfare Commander Structure  
[from Jane’s Information Group, 2008] 
For the first physical architecture, CWC doctrine as currently written is used.  
Instantiations of commanders, decision authority, and allocation authority follow 
accordingly.  In addition, the concept of Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC), 
discussed in Chapter II, was assumed to have been designed and implemented not only 
for air defense but for surface and undersea warfare as well.  The concept of CEC, as 
discussed in The Cooperative Engagement Capability [1995], with such expansion would 
dictate distributed situational awareness.  Other physical architecture instantiations 
include the functional organization traditionally used for staff and personnel, absolute 
approach to ethics, adoption of command by negation, and a weapons control status of 
tight.  Key physical architecture instantiations described above for the first physical 
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Table 11.   Alternative Physical Architecture #1 
2. Alternative Physical Architecture #2 
For the second physical architecture the use of CWC doctrine as currently written 
is not used.  The replacement “doctrine” under consideration for this thesis dictates 
subordinate commanders to be organized functionally and decision and allocation 
authority to be distributed.  An expanded concept of CEC is still assumed, making 
situational awareness distributed.  The remaining physical architecture instantiations 
remain consistent with the first alternative physical architecture (selection of functional 
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organization traditionally used for staff and personnel, absolute approach to ethics, the 
adoption of command by negation, and a weapons control status of tight).   
Distributed decision authority describes those instances where the authority to 
make decisions follows multiple lines of superiors.  Distributed allocation authority 
describes those instances where the authority to allocate roles and responsibilities to an 
entity resides in two or more entities which have a direct connection with such entity.  
The key physical architecture instantiations described above for the second physical 
architecture are highlighted with bold, italic font in Table 12.   
Commanders 





Staff Functional Project/Task 
Cross-
functional/ 
Matrix     
Personnel Functional Status     
  







Command   




Free Tight Hold 




Centralized Decentralized Distributed Isolated 
  
C2 TTP:  
Decision 
Authority 





Centralized Decentralized Distributed  Anarchic 
  
Table 12.   Alternative Physical Architecture #2 
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F. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The physical architecture describes the resources which comprise the system, the 
procedures by which the system is used, and the controls on the system.  During the 
development of the physical architecture, which is done concurrently with the 
development of the functional architecture, generic physical components and generic 
procedures and controls are identified.  A set of instantiations is developed for each 
component, procedure, and control from which alternative physical architectures are 
developed.  Such alternative physical architectures and other products of the first three 




VII. OPERATIONAL ARCHITECTURE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The operational architecture provides a description of the system design, 
incorporating the products of the operational concept, functional architecture, and 
physical architecture.  Major phases of the operational architecture development for this 
thesis were to allocate functions and requirements to the physical components and to 
describe the activation and control of functions.  Analysis of the designs and full 
documentation of the architectures are subsequent phases of the operational architecture 
which were omitted due to the scope of this thesis.  The feasibility of an analysis of 
designs using the architectural framework developed, however, was demonstrated using 
modeling and simulation. 
B. GENERIC PHYSICAL COMPONENT FUNCTIONAL ALLOCATION 
The first step in the development of the operational architecture is the allocation 
of functions from the functional architecture to components from the physical 
architecture.  The initial phases of this process are conducted in conjunction with the co-
development of the functional hierarchy and the generic physical architecture.  These 
allocations are represented in Figure 51.  through Figure 63.  in Appendix F:  Input-
Output Relationships. 
C. FUNCTIONAL FLOW, ACTIVATION, AND CONTROL 
The second step in the development of the operational architecture is to define 
and analyze functional activation and control structures.  Recall that the focus of this 
thesis has been on those actions a future (i.e., ten to fifteen years from present) Surface 
Action Group would conduct to secure local sea control in traditional operating 
environments.  As delineated in the operational concept, one task a SAG securing local 
sea control must be capable of executing is contact prosecution.  Modeling the functional 
flow, activation, and control of contact prosecution is necessary in the development of the 
operational architecture.  Modeling the remaining sub-tasks and tasks, as well as the other 
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missions and their respective tasks and sub-tasks, would be required for the operational 
architecture development.  Given the scope of this thesis and the magnitude of effort 
required to model all missions, tasks, and sub-tasks of a C2 system, the sub-task of 
contact prosecution was modeled to serve as an example for future development of the 
operational architecture. 
The contact prosecution process was detailed for both of the alternative physical 
architectures developed.  The contact prosecution functional flow for both physical 
architectures was the same and is presented in Figure 31.  and continued in Figure 32.  
The remaining collection of contact prosecution process diagrams are presented in 
Appendix G:  Operational Architecture. 
The CP0 diagrams present the interactions of the system’s top level functions 
from the functional architecture, the selected mechanisms from the physical architecture, 
and the procedures and controls identified in the physical architecture.  First, starting in 
Figure 31.  , the C2 system accepts inputs from external sensor systems, weapon systems, 
platforms, and people (e.g., established intent).  The C2 system then processes the inputs, 
transports the resulting information, and reprocesses the information for presentation and 
response option generation.  The current and past circumstances, as well as established 
intent when available, serve as inputs for generating a response option.  The response 
option is then processed, transported, and reprocessed for selection, which begins in 
Figure 32.   
If the response option is selected it becomes a response which is then processed, 
transported, and processed again.  From the response an executable response is created 
which is processed, transported, and reprocessed to finally produce an assignment and/or 
warning to external systems and people; the flow through the figures is complete.  If the 
response option was not selected, it would be processed, transported, and reprocessed to 
serve as input to generate a new response option, as shown at the bottom-left of Figure 















































































































































































   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   


















































































   
   
   
   
   
   
   





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 32.   Contact Prosecution - Continued (CP0b) 
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Further detail of the functional activation and control for the top-level functions in 
the contact prosecution process is presented below in Table 13.  The table is organized by 
function, output, required inputs, and required controls.  Functions with multiple outputs 
are described with multiple lines in the output column.  Outputs that can be generated by 
different, independent inputs are described with multiple lines in the input column.  
Outputs that require two or more inputs are described by listing all the required inputs in 
one line in the input column.  For example, the Response Option output from Generate 
Response Option can be generated by multiple combinations of inputs.  Response Option 
can be generated by the function with Current Circumstances, Past Circumstances, and 
Established Intent.  Response Option can also be generated by the function with only 
Infeasible Response.  Response Option can be generated by many other combinations of 
inputs, as well.  Appendix G:  Operational Architecture includes the complete table of the 
activation and controls, which includes sub-functions of the contact prosecution process.   
Function Output Required Inputs Required Controls 
Transport 
Information - Transported Data - Transport Data N/A 
Process 
Information 
- Transport Data 
- Response Option - Communication Protocols 
- Response - Communication Protocols 
- Order - Communication Protocols 
- Expected Circumstances - Communication Protocols 
- Infeasible Response - Communication Protocols 
- Incomplete Response - Communication Protocols 
- Unassigned Tasks - Communication Protocols 
- Illegal Response - Communication Protocols 
- Immoral Response - Communication Protocols 
- Immoral Tasks - Communication Protocols 
- Past Experiences - Stored Data - Communication Protocols 
- Resources' Capabilities - Stored Data - Communication Protocols 
- Response Option Output - Response Option - Communication Protocols - Response Option Data - Communication Protocols 
- Assignment - Transported Data - Communication Protocols 
- Warning - Transported Data - Communication Protocols 
- Assignment Output - Transported Data - Communication Protocols 
- Warning Output - Transported Data - Communication Protocols 
- Circumstance Output - Transported Data - Communication Protocols 
- Intent Output - Transported Data - Communication Protocols 
- Response - Transported Data - Past Experiences 
- Infeasible Response - Transported Data - Past Experiences 
- Incomplete Response - Transported Data - Past Experiences 
- Illegal Response - Transported Data - Past Experiences 
- Immoral Response - Transported Data - Past Experiences 
- Unassigned Tasks - Transported Data - Past Experiences 
- Immoral Tasks - Transported Data - Past Experiences 
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- Expected Circumstances - Transported Data - Past Experiences 
- Response Option - Transported Data - Past Experiences 
- Order - Order - Past Experiences 
- Current Circumstances - Transported Data - Past Experiences 
- Past Circumstances - Transported Data - Past Experiences 
- Established Intent - Transported Data - Past Experiences 
Store 
Information - Stored Data - Storage Data N/A 
Present 
Information - Presented Data 
- Assignment Output - HSI Requirements 
- Warning Output - HSI Requirements 
- Circumstance Output - HSI Requirements 
- Intent Output - HSI Requirements 




- Response Option 
- Current Circumstances 
- Past Circumstances 
- Established Intent 
- Past Experiences 
- Law of Armed Conflict 
- Rules of Engagement 
- Weapons Control Status 
- No Strike List 
- Restricted Target List 
- Tactics, Techniques, and 
Procedures 
- Pre-planned Responses 
- Resources' Capabilities 
- Current Circumstances 
- Expected Circumstances 
- Established Intent 
- Response 
- Past Experiences 
- Law of Armed Conflict 
- Rules of Engagement 
- Weapons Control Status 
- No Strike List 
- Restricted Target List 
- Tactics, Techniques, and 
Procedures 
- Pre-planned Responses 
- Resources' Capabilities 
- Established Intent 
- Infeasible Response 
- Past Experiences 
- Law of Armed Conflict 
- Rules of Engagement 
- Weapons Control Status 
- No Strike List 
- Restricted Target List 
- Tactics, Techniques, and 
Procedures 
- Pre-planned Responses 
- Resources' Capabilities 
- Infeasible Response 
- Past Experiences 
- Law of Armed Conflict 
- Rules of Engagement 
- Weapons Control Status 
- No Strike List 
- Restricted Target List 
- Tactics, Techniques, and 
Procedures 
- Pre-planned Responses 
- Resources' Capabilities 
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- Established Intent 
- Incomplete Response 
- Unassigned Tasks 
- Past Experiences 
- Law of Armed Conflict 
- Rules of Engagement 
- Weapons Control Status 
- No Strike List 
- Restricted Target List 
- Tactics, Techniques, and 
Procedures 
- Pre-planned Responses - 
Resources' Capabilities 
- Incomplete Response 
- Unassigned Tasks 
- Past Experiences 
- Law of Armed Conflict 
- Rules of Engagement 
- Weapons Control Status 
- No Strike List 
- Restricted Target List 
- Tactics, Techniques, and 
Procedures 
- Pre-planned Responses 
- Resources' Capabilities 
- Illegal Response 
- Past Experiences 
- Law of Armed Conflict 
- Rules of Engagement 
- Weapons Control Status 
- No Strike List 
- Restricted Target List 
- Tactics, Techniques, and 
Procedures 
- Pre-planned Responses 
- Resources' Capabilities 
- Established Intent 
- Immoral Response 
- Immoral Tasks 
- Past Experiences 
- Law of Armed Conflict 
- Rules of Engagement 
- Weapons Control Status 
- No Strike List 
- Restricted Target List 
- Tactics, Techniques, and 
Procedures 
- Pre-planned Responses 
- Resources' Capabilities 
- Immoral Response 
- Immoral Tasks 
- Past Experiences 
- Law of Armed Conflict 
- Rules of Engagement 
- Weapons Control Status 
- No Strike List 
- Restricted Target List 
- Tactics, Techniques, and 
Procedures 
- Pre-planned Responses 
- Resources' Capabilities 
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- Required Tasks 
- Current Circumstances 
- Past Circumstances 
- Established Intent 
- Past Experiences 
- Law of Armed Conflict 
- Rules of Engagement 
- Weapons Control Status 
- No Strike List 
- Restricted Target List 
- Tactics, Techniques, and 
Procedures 
- Pre-planned Responses 
- Current Circumstances 
- Expected Circumstances 
- Established Intent 
- Past Experiences 
- Law of Armed Conflict 
- Rules of Engagement 
- Weapons Control Status 
- No Strike List 
- Restricted Target List 
- Tactics, Techniques, and 
Procedures 
- Pre-planned Responses 
- Established Intent 
- Infeasible Response 
- Past Experiences 
- Tactics, Techniques, and 
Procedures 
- Pre-planned Responses 
- Established Intent 
- Incomplete Response 
- Unassigned Tasks 
- Past Experiences 
- Established Intent 
- Immoral Response 
- Immoral Tasks 
- Past Experiences 
- Unassigned Tasks 
- Incomplete Response 
- Past Experiences 
- Law of Armed Conflict 
- Rules of Engagement 
- Weapons Control Status 
- No Strike List 
- Restricted Target List 
- Tactics, Techniques, and 
Procedures 
- Pre-planned Responses 
- Resources' Capabilities 
- Illegal Response 
- Past Experiences 
- Law of Armed Conflict 
- Rules of Engagement 
- Weapons Control Status 
- No Strike List 
- Restricted Target List 
- Tactics, Techniques, and 
Procedures 
- Pre-planned Responses 
- Resources' Capabilities 
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- Immoral Response 
- Past Experiences- Law of 
Armed Conflict- Rules of 
Engagement- Weapons 
Control Status- No Strike 
List- Restricted Target 







Executable Response - Response Option - Resources' Capabilities 
- Past Experiences 
- Established Intent 
- Required Tasks 
- Law of Armed Conflict 
- Rules of Engagement 
- Weapons Control Status 
- No Strike List 
- Restricted Target List 
- Tactics, Techniques, and 
Procedures 
- Pre-planned Responses 
- Ethics 
Expected Circumstances 
- Complete Response 
- Resources’ Capabilities 
- Current Circumstances 
- Past Experiences 
- Required Tasks 
- Law of Armed Conflict 
- Rules of Engagement 
- Weapons Control Status 
- No Strike List 
- Restricted Target List 
Table 13.   Activation and Control of Top-level Functions 
Since the contact prosecution functional flow for both physical architectures is the 
same, it is imperative for the systems engineer to describe the differences in the 
subsequent operational architectures through some means.  Figure 33.  presents a notional 
flow using the first alternative physical architecture while Figure 34.  presents a notional 
flow using the second alternative physical architecture.  Many of the details developed 
during the previous systems engineer process (e.g., inputs, outputs, controls, etc.) are 
omitted to emphasize the differences in operational architectures.  The key changes in the 
notational flow from the first alternative to the second alternative are highlighted with 
yellow and bold boxes in Figure 34.  The change from decentralized to distributed 
decision authority and from decentralized to distributed allocation authority is accounted 
for by including multiple entities which Select Response Options in parallel.  The 
distributed situational awareness, in both architectures, is denoted by the multiple links in 
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Transport Information and their associated processors in Process Information.  The 




Figure 33.   Notional Contact Prosecution Flow – Alternative #1 
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Figure 34.   Notional Contact Prosecution Flow – Alternative #2 
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D. ANALYSIS OF DESIGNS 
Analyses of the system designs include performance analyses and risk analyses.  
Performance analyses are conducted to discover “the range of performance that can be 
expected from a specific design or a set of designs that are quite similar” [Buede, 2000: 
267] and to determine if a particular design or set of designs can achieve a related 
objective from the objectives hierarchy and its associated performance parameters.  Risk 
analyses examine the ability of the design or set of designs to meet the desired level of 
performance in a diverse set of operational scenarios [Buede, 2000: 267].  In many cases, 
these analyses are conducted through modeling and simulation. 
To demonstrate the feasibility of using the developed architectural framework to 
analyze and compare alternative designs, Arena®, version 10.0, was used.  Arena® is a 
discrete-event modeling and simulation software developed by Rockwell Automation, 
Inc.  A portion of the notional contact prosecution flow for both alternatives was 
modeled; the portion occurring between the red exclamation points as shown in Figure 
























Figure 35.   Top-level of Arena® Contact Prosecution Model 
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In both models, the first step is the creation of a response option.  In the 
Alternative #1 model, three copies of the response option are created and transported 
using three different links.  The first response option to be converted and processed for 
use is then used as input for the first time through Select Response Options.  Once a 
response is selected, three copies are made and are then transported using three different 
links.  The first response to be converted and processed for use is then used as an input 
for the second time through Select Response Options.  Finally, an executable response is 
generated which marks the end of the Alternative #1 Arena® model. 
In Alternative #2 model, nine copies of the response option are created and 
transported using nine different links; three links associated with each of three lines of 
mechanisms (e.g., subordinate commanders) to Select Response Option.  The first 
response option to be converted and processed in each line is used as input to the first 
Select Response Option (i.e., Evaluate Response Options and Judge Response Options).  
The remaining response options are discarded.  Once a response is selected by each line 
of entities, nine copies are made and are transported using nine different links; three links 
associated with each of three lines of mechanisms to Select Response Option a second 
time (i.e., Assign Tasks to Resources).  Again, the first response to be converted and 
processed in each line is used while the remaining responses are discarded.  Finally, an 
executable response is generated in each line of Select Response Option, which marks the 
end of the Alternative #2 Arena® model. 
Response options were created with inter-arrival times following an exponential 
distribution.  Characteristics and attributes of processes and resources were kept constant 
whenever possible.  For example, the time for a subordinate commander to judge the 
morality of a response option followed the same distribution (i.e., a normal distribution 
with the same mean and variance) for all subordinate commanders in both models.  
Further details concerning characteristics and attributes of processes and resources, and 
further discussions of the simulation and results, is presented in Appendix G:  
Operational Architecture. 
Performance of each alternative system designs should be unique and it is the 
objective of discrete-event modeling and simulation to identify those differences.  
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Differences in performance, as Buede [2000: 267] states, are almost always related to an 
objective in the systems objective hierarchy and its related performance parameters.  
Given that a significant difference between the two alternative system designs was the 
change from decentralized to distributed decision authority and allocation authority, 
differences in performance of the alternatives should be apparent in the quality of 
response (i.e., the fundamental objectives quality of response decision and quality of 
allocations).   
In particular, a combination of three MoMs were selected to highlight differences 
in performance.  First, the sum of MoP 5.2.2.2, time between response option being 
developed and response decision, and MoP 6.2.1, time between order of response 
execution by decision-authorized entity and completion of allocations by allocation-
authorized entity, was recorded for each alternative design.  Second, MoCE 5.5, 
consistency of response between decision-authorized entities, was also recorded.  These 
MoMs were selected, in part, because of the ability of Arena® to capture the statistics. 
Thirty replications were conducted for each alternative model.  Each replication 
began with a warm-up time of three simulation-minutes to fill queues and task resources 
followed by ten simulation-minutes in which data was collected.  For both alternative 
models approximately 100+ response options were created and served as input during the 
ten operational simulation-minutes.  The minimum time from response option creation 
until the generation of an associated executable response, the sum of MoP 5.2.2.2 and 
MoP 6.2.1, was recorded for each response option and, in the case of Alternative #2, for 
each line of Select Response Option mechanisms.  In addition, for Alternative #2, the 
executable responses for each response option were compared to determine consistency 
(i.e., MoCE 5.5).  An overview of the simulation results is presented in Table 14.   
 Alternative #1 Alternative #2 
Sample Mean of Minimum Time (sec) 16.313 14.955 
Sample Standard Deviation of Minimum Time 1.382 2.630 
Mean percentage of grouped Executable 
Responses which are consistent 100% 86.6% 
Table 14.   Arena® Simulation Results - Overview 
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A box plot of the simulation results data is presented in Figure 36.  Circles denote mild 
outliers and asterices denote extreme outliers.  Further results of the simulations are 
presented in Appendix G:  Operational Architecture. 
 
Figure 36.   Arena® Simulation Results – Box Plot 
Alternative #2 generates executable responses, on average, in less time than 
Alternative #1, but with more variance.  In addition, Alternative #2 generates consistent 
executable responses approximately 87% of the time.  Since Alternative #1 generates 
only one executable response for each response option, the consistency of response is 
100% by default.  Through hypothesis testing of the data collected, difference in the 
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mean minimum time was determined to be statistically significant.  This demonstrates the 
possible performance differences between the two alternative designs.   
The reader is warned not to draw specific conclusions on performance of the 
alternative system designs from the modeling and simulation results presented above.  
The objective of the modeling and simulation was not to conduct an analysis of design, 
but rather demonstrate the feasibility of using the developed architectural framework to 
conduct such analyses and compare alternative designs.  Asserting performance 
superiority of one alternative over another should not be done for several reasons.   
First and foremost, characteristics and attributes of the processes and resources 
were determined by the author and not by data collection or experimentation.  For this 
reason statistically significant differences between designs apply only to the models 
developed and operationally significant differences cannot be assessed.  Second, the 
modeling method used omitted many of the procedures and controls on the system 
identified in the architectural development.  In other words, the models were a further 
abstraction of an already conceptual process.   
Third, the Alternative #2 model developed was only one instance of the design 
solution space (i.e., the selection of three subordinated commanders and three processors 
in Select Response Options) possible from the operational architecture.  Fourth, a value 
structure of value curves and weights for the systems objective hierarchy [Buede, 2000: 
Chapter 6], upon which trade-off decisions should be based, was not developed.  Fifth, 
and finally, the above modeling and simulation represents only a few MoMs for only one 
sub-task out of numerous tasks and missions required of a Surface Action Group (SAG) 
to secure local sea control. 
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The operational architecture presented provides a description of the system design 
by incorporating the products of the operational concept, functional architecture, and 
physical architecture.  First, functions were allocated to the physical components.  
Second, the activation and control of the functions were described.  Finally, the feasibility 
of an analysis of designs, using the architectural framework developed, was demonstrated 
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using modeling and simulation.  Further research to complete the operational architecture 




This thesis dissected the complex engineering process of naval tactical command 
and control systems to identify the points of integration between doctrine and material.  
The goal was to better understand the influence of doctrine on the overall architecture of 
the material system to ensure developing net-centric systems and net-centric doctrine 
meet the command and control needs of tactical naval forces.  To begin such study, this 
thesis presented concepts of command and control developed by military leaders and 
enthusiasts throughout history.  Following this historical review, the thesis progressed 
through the system architectural methodology developed by Alexander Levis as 
presented by Buede [2000] and Levis and Wagenhals [2000]. 
The first phase in the architectural process was the development of the operational 
concept.  The operational concept was a general vision of the system from the view of 
stakeholders [Buede, 2000].  It identified the boundaries of, inputs to, outputs from, 
objectives for, and requirements of the system.  The second phase in the architectural 
process was the co-development of the functional architecture and the physical 
architecture.   
The purpose of the functional architecture was to describe what the system was to 
do with the identified inputs to produce the desired outputs.  The functional architecture 
described a hierarchy of the system’s functions and detailed the relationships between the 
inputs and outputs of the system (i.e., described the sequence of functions converting an 
input into an output).  The purpose of the physical architecture was to describe the 
resources that comprised the system, with resources for every function identified in the 
functional architecture [Buede, 2000:  215-216].  In addition, the physical architecture 
described the procedures by which the system was used [Buede, 2000:  218] and the 
controls on the system.  Alternative, instantiated physical architectures were also 
developed as potential designs of the system.  From such point the final phase of the 
architectural process, the development of the operational architecture, began. 
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The operational architecture provided a description of the system design by 
incorporating the products of the operational concept, functional architecture, and 
physical architecture.  First, the functions developed in the functional architecture were 
allocated to the physical components developed in the physical architecture.  Second, the 
activations and controls of the functions were described in a framework of the contact 
prosecution process, a use of a C2 system identified in the operational concept.  The 
following sections of this chapter present key points and recommendations identified 
during the process of this thesis as well as potential areas for further research. 
B. KEY POINTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
During the process of this thesis, several key points were identified which are 
crucial for understanding the influence of doctrine on the overall architecture of a naval 
tactical command and control system.  The first key point, identified in Chapter II, was 
that the overall process of command and control and the process internal to the C2 system 
are not the same.  Rather, a C2 system is the means by which the C2 process is executed.  
This had implications at several points in the architectural process.  First, it impacted the 
view of what was internal and what was external to the C2 system (described in the 
operational concept).  The view of what was internal to the C2 system impacted the 
identified resources of the C2 system (detailed in the physical architecture).  The view of 
what was external to the C2 system impacted the identified inputs and outputs and 
subsequently the functions of a C2 system (detailed in the functional architecture).  
The second key point, following from the first, is that doctrine has significant 
impact on each phase of the system architectural process.  In the operational concept, 
doctrine impacts which missions and tasks a naval force is expected to execute.  It also 
impacts, as discussed above, the view of the system’s boundaries.  In the functional 
architecture, doctrine impacts what functions a C2 system must accomplish.  In the 
physical architecture, doctrine impacts the resources, or mechanisms, available and how 
they are assigned to functions.  Additionally, doctrine impacts controls on mechanisms 
and the types of resources which execute a function (e.g., only humans can determine 
morality of a response).  Finally, in the operational architecture, doctrine impacts what 
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alternative physical architectures are considered for combination with the functional 
architecture (e.g., whether a single commander or multiple commanders have decision 
making and/or allocation authority). 
The author recommends that systems engineers and analysts adopt the conceptual 
view that the commander is outside of the command and control system during design, 
development, and simulation.  First, this view addresses the function-process-system 
view presented in historical and doctrinal publications; command is a function by which a 
responsible entity takes inputs (e.g., mission objective, assigned forces, operating 
environment, adversary’s capabilities, etc.) to produce the desired output (i.e., 
accomplishment of the mission objective), command and control is the process by which 
the inputs generate the outputs, and a C2 system is the means by which the process is 
executed.  Second, this view enables the use of a C2 system and the execution of the C2 
process despite those situations when no specific entity is designated responsible for the 







































Figure 37.   Command and Control:  Function-Process-System 
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The author also recommends the use of the selected measures of merit, developed 
in the operational concept, for measuring the effectiveness of network-centric command 
and control systems.  These measures of merit were an aggregation of measures and 
concepts presented in numerous publications and were selected due to their alignment 
with the network-centric refined problem statement: 
A responsive and robust command and control system which connects 
dispersed forces and enables such forces to self-synchronize and allocate 
resources to mass effects in order to meet the established intent at the 
tactical level of war. 
These selected measures of merit are presented, again, in Table 15.   
1.2.1 MoP Number of sources confirming information 
1.3.1 MoP Time between changing circumstances and observation 
1.3.2 MoP Time between the observation and the completion of processing the data into 
information 
1.3.4.4 MoP Probability of shelf-life is less than time between updates 
1.4.1.2 MoP Percentage of nodes which are capable of viewing information 
1.4.2.2 MoP Percentage of nodes which are capable of acting on information 
1.5.2.4 MoP Percentage of Essential Elements of Information (EEI) met 
1.5.2.5 MoP Percentage of commander’s Essential Elements of Friendly Information (EEFI) met 
1.8.1.1 DP Spatial resolution of observation capability 
1.8.1.2 DP Temporal resolution of observation capability 
1.9.2 MoP Number of nodes in the life of the information to which it can be attributed 
1.9.1 MoP Differential between time information is received by a node and when information can 
be attributed 
2.1.1.2 MoP Percentage of total decision-authorized entities that are available via existing 
relationships and connections 
2.1.1.3 MoP Percentage of total allocation-authorized entities that are available via existing 
relationships and connections 
2.1.1.4 MoP Percentage of total action-authorized entities that are available via existing relationships 
and connections 
2.1.2.1.2 MoP Time between operational failures for the network of connections 
2.1.2.2.2 MoP Probability of operational failure for network of connections 
2.3.3.1.2 MoP Quantity of overflow beyond capacity for the network of relationships and connections 
2.4.1.1.4 MoP Total geographical volume of relationships and connections 
2.4.2.1.3 MoP Median time required to reconfigure relationships and connections to meet changing 
circumstances and/or necessary responses 
2.4.2.2 MoP Number of possible solutions for required reconfiguration to meet changing 
circumstances and/or necessary responses 
2.4.3.1.4 MoP Median percentage of nodes which each relationship or connection is capable of 
connecting with 
2.4.4.1.3 MoP Number of nodes the network of connections are capable of adding 
2.4.4.2.7 MoP Median time required to add all relationships and connections to meet changing 
circumstances and/or necessary responses 
2.4.5.1.3 MoP Median geographical range nodes can maneuver while maintaining needed relationships 
or connections 
3.2 MoP Consistency of established intent between forces 
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4.2 MoP Consistency of awareness between forces of rules and constraints which are applicable 
to such forces 
5.1.2 MoP Consistency of response with established intent 
5.1.4 MoP Consistency of response with rules and constraints 
5.2.1 MoP Time between receipt of information concerning changing circumstances and 
acknowledgement of receipt 
5.2.2.1 MoP Time between acknowledgement of receipt of information concerning changing 
circumstances and response option being developed 
5.2.2.2 MoP Time between response option being developed and response decision 
5.2.3 MoP Time between response decision and order of response execution by decision-
authorized entity 
5.3.2 MoP Median number of connections between decision-authorized entity and action-
authorized entity 
5.3.4 MoP Percentage of entities connected by existing relationships and connections which are 
authorized to make a specific decision concerning a specific change in circumstances 
5.4.1 MoP Number of distinct response solutions generated by decision-authorized entities 
concerning a specific change in circumstances 
5.5.2 MoP Percentage of action-authorized entities with conflicting orders from decision-
authorized entities 
6.1.3.3 MoP Percentage of action-authorized entities which are allocated a role or responsibility 
which they cannot accomplish 
6.2.1 MoP Time between order of response execution by decision-authorized entity and completion 
of allocations by allocation-authorized entity 
6.2.2 MoP Time between allocation of role or responsibility and commencement of role or 
responsibility by action-authorized entity 
6.3.2 MoP Median number of connections between allocation-authorized entity and action-
authorized entity 
6.3.4 MoP Percentage of entities connected by existing relationships and connections which are 
authorized to make allocations concerning a specific decision 
6.4.2 MoP Percentage of roles and responsibilities which are required for the specific decision 
which are not allocated 
Table 15.   Selected Measures of Merit 
C. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
The approach and results of the thesis demonstrated only a portion of the system 
engineering process (i.e., system architecture phases) focused on a small portion of the 
command and control problem (i.e., the needs of a Surface Action Group tasked to secure 
local sea control in traditional operating environments), all at a highly conceptual level.  
This thesis, its approach, and its conclusions provide future researchers with numerous 
areas of potential study. 
  First, given that the focus of this thesis was on the interaction of doctrine and 
material in the system architecture process, this thesis can serve as an example for further 
research on the implications of organization, training, leadership, personnel, and facilities 
on the system engineering process.  Second, future researchers could expand the 
 114 
presented architectural products to include other missions, tasks, forces, and scenarios.  
Third, future researchers may consider validating the proposed hierarchy of systems 
objectives.  This can be done through a survey of potential stakeholders or through an 
analysis of alternatives.   
Fourth, future researchers may consider identifying the best method to model the 
architecture framework presented in this thesis in order to simulate the alternative C2 
systems.  Though this thesis presented one method for modeling and simulating the 
system (i.e., discrete-event modeling and simulation using Arena®) it should not be 
accepted as the best method.  Future researchers could conduct a trade-off study of 
methods and tools to model and then simulate the architectural framework developed.  
Fifth, future researches could develop additional alternative system architectures using 
the framework developed.  Sixth, and finally, future researchers could analyze the two 
alternative architectures presented, or any additionally developed, using either the models 
presented or other models developed in the future. 
D. FINAL SUMMARY 
The systems engineer, among other things, must elicit the operational needs of the 
customer and develop a system architecture from which specialized engineers can design 
and build the applicable configurable items.  Network-Centric Warfare (NCW) is an 
operational concept the U.S. military has identified to meet its operational needs which 
has major implications on the development of command and control systems.  This thesis 
was conducted in part to provide a better understanding of the influence of doctrine on 
the overall architecture of command and control system.  In addition, it was intended to 
assist in the development and integration of net-centric systems and net-centric doctrine 
to meet the command and control needs of future tactical naval forces. 
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APPENDIX A: SCENARIO DEVELOPMENT 
The three settings and a collection of associated scenarios developed are 
presented below.  Some scenarios, and portions of particular scenarios, are omitted due to 
dissemination limitations on information from references used in development. 
ALPHA  Anti-submarine Warfare (ASW) + Surface Warfare (SUW) 
Setting The year is 2020.  Country BROWN (a U.S. adversary) 
submarines are suspected to be operating in the vicinity of the 
STRAIT OF CONCERN, which lies between Country GREEN (a 
U.S. ally) and BROWN.  A U.S. Navy Surface Action Group 
(SAG) is tasked with maintaining local sea control of the STRAIT 
OF CONCERN for the potential transit of high value units.  While 
conducting anti-submarine operations in the strait, the SAG is 
confronted with a threatening swarm of small boats emanating 
from BROWN’s national waters.  The SAG must continue anti-
submarine operations while addressing the swarm of small boats. 
The year is 2020.  The SAG consists of 1 CG and 2 DDG. 
Actors – Systems 
& Stakeholders 






Common Tactical Picture (CTP) system 
Weapon System 
Flow of events 1. Combatant Commander issues OPORD to OTC 
2. OTC assigns sensor systems to search for undersea targets 
3. OTC assigns sensor systems to search for surface targets 
4. OTC assigns sensor systems to search for air targets 
5. OTC assigns sensor systems to search for electronic warfare 
targets 
6. CTP system alerts OTC of probable undersea target and 
location [a, b]. 
7. OTC assigns additional sensor systems to probable undersea 
target for confirmation [a, b]. 
8. CTP system provides confirmation of undersea target to OTC 
[a, b]. 
9. OTC assigns sensor system(s) to continually track the 
confirmed undersea targets [a, b]. 
10. OTC validates confirmed undersea target complies with 
guidance, LOAC, ROE, and other restrictions [a, b]. 
11. OTC determines desired effect (DETERRENCE) against 
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confirmed undersea target [a, b]. 
12. Potential deterrence options are generated and are presented to 
OTC [a, b]. 
13. OTC conducts risk assessment of deterrence options [a]. 
14. OTC orders ASW platform to proceed to confirmed undersea 
target as a deterrence [a, b]. 
15. OTC reviews status of the confirmed undersea target noted in 
CTP system [a, b]. 
16. OTC assesses deterrence effectiveness of confirmed undersea 
target and determines whether to engage confirmed undersea 
target [a, b]. 
17. CTP system alerts OTC of probable surface targets and 
location [a]. 
18. OTC assigns additional sensor systems to probable surface 
targets for confirmation [a]. 
19. CTP system provides confirmation of surface targets to OTC 
[a]. 
20. OTC assigns sensor system(s) to continually track the 
confirmed surface targets[a]. 
21. OTC validates confirmed surface targets comply with 
guidance, LOAC, ROE, and other restrictions [a]. 
22. OTC determines desired effect(s) against confirmed surface 
targets [a]. 
23. Potential engagement options are generated through weapon-
target pairings (WTPs) and are presented to OTC [a]. 
24. OTC conducts risk assessment of engagement options [a]. 
25. OTC orders confirmed surface targets to be engaged with 
selected engagement option [a]. 
26. OTC reviews status of the confirmed surface targets noted in 
CTP system [a]. 
27. OTC assesses status of the confirmed surface targets and 
determines whether to re-engage [a]. 
Inputs … 
Probable Target Detection 
Probable Target Location 
Target Confirmation 
Precise Location of Confirmed Target 
Confirmed Target Window of Vulnerability 
Refined Window of Vulnerability for Confirmed Target 
Engagement Options 
Deterrence Options 
Outputs Deterrence Order 
Engagement Order 
Re-engagement Order 
References a. JP 3-60: Joint Targeting (2007) 
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b. Bindi, V.C., Baker, J., Billington, R., Gallassero, T., Gueary, 
J., Harts, et al. (1997). 
Table 16.   Scenario ALPHA – 1 
BRAVO Anti-submarine Warfare (ASW) + Air Defense (AD) 
Setting Country BROWN (a U.S. adversary) submarines are suspected to 
be operating in the vicinity of the STRAIT OF CONCERN, which 
lies between Country GREEN (a U.S. ally) and BROWN.  A U.S. 
Navy Surface Action Group (SAG) is tasked with maintaining 
local sea control of the STRAIT OF CONCERN for the potential 
transit of high value units.  While conducting anti-submarine 
operations in the strait, the SAG is confronted with several 
incoming cruise missiles emanating from BROWN’s national air 
space.  The SAG must continue anti-submarine operations while 
addressing the cruise missiles. 
The year is 2020.  The SAG consists of 1 CG and 2 DDG. 
Actors – Systems 
& Stakeholders 






Common Tactical Picture (CTP) system 
Weapon System 
Flow of events 1. Combatant Commander issues OPORD to OTC 
2. OTC assigns sensor systems to search for undersea targets 
3. OTC assigns sensor systems to search for surface targets 
4. OTC assigns sensor systems to search for air targets 
5. OTC assigns sensor systems to search for electronic warfare 
targets 
6. CTP system alerts OTC of probable undersea target and 
location [a, a]. 
7. OTC assigns additional sensor systems to probable undersea 
target for confirmation [a, a]. 
8. CTP system provides confirmation of undersea target to OTC 
[a, a]. 
9. OTC assigns sensor system(s) to continually track the 
confirmed undersea targets [a, a]. 
10. OTC validates confirmed undersea target complies with 
guidance, LOAC, ROE, and other restrictions [a, a]. 
11. OTC determines desired effect(s) against confirmed undersea 
target [a, a]. 
12. Potential deterrence options are generated and are presented to 
OTC [a, a]. 
13. OTC conducts risk assessment of deterrence options [a, a]. 
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14. OTC orders ASW platform to proceed to confirmed undersea 
target as a deterrence [a, a]. 
15. OTC reviews status of the confirmed undersea target noted in 
CTP system [a, a]. 
16. OTC assesses deterrence effectiveness of confirmed undersea 
target and determines whether to engage confirmed undersea 
target [a, a]. 
17. CTP system alerts OTC of probable air targets[a]. 
18. OTC assigns additional sensor systems to probable air targets 
for confirmation [a]. 
19. CTP system provides confirmation of air targets to OTC [a]. 
20. OTC assigns sensor system(s) to continually track the 
confirmed air targets[a]. 
21. OTC validates air targets comply with guidance, LOAC, ROE, 
and other restrictions [a]. 
22. OTC determines desired effect(s) against the confirmed air 
targets [a]. 
23. Potential engagement options are generated through weapon-
target pairings (WTPs) and are presented to OTC [a]. 
24. OTC conducts risk assessment of engagement options [a]. 
25. OTC orders to engage confirmed air targets with selected 
engagement option [a]. 
26. OTC reviews status of the air targets noted in CTP system [a]. 
27. OTC assesses status of the air targets and determines whether 
to re-engage [a]. 
Inputs … 
Probable Target Detection 
Probable Target Location 
Target Confirmation 
Precise Location of Confirmed Target 
Confirmed Target Window of Vulnerability 
Refined Window of Vulnerability for Confirmed Target 
Engagement Options 
Deterrence Options 
Outputs Deterrence Order 
Engagement Order 
Re-engagement Order 
References a. JP 3-60: Joint Targeting (2007) 
b. Bindi, V.C., Baker, J., Billington, R., Gallassero, T., Gueary, J., 
Harts, et al. (1997). 





CHARLIE Maritime Interception Operations (MIO) + Surface Warfare (SUW) 
Setting Country BLACK is suspected of harboring anti-U.S. terrorist.  The 
anti-U.S. terrorists are suspected of attempting to smuggle weapons 
of mass destruction through the STRAIT OF CONCERN, which 
lies between country GREEN (a U.S. ally) and country BROWN (a 
U.S. ally), via commercial shipping carriers.  A U.S. Navy Surface 
Action Group (SAG) is tasked with conducting maritime 
interception operations (MIO) in the vicinity of the STRAIT OF 
CONCERN in response to the threat.  While conducting MIO of a 
target of interest, the SAG is confronted with a threatening swarm 
of small boats emanating from BROWN’s national waters.  The 
SAG must continue current MIO of the target of interest while 
addressing the swarm of small boats. 
The year is 2020.  The SAG consists of 1 CG, 1 DDG, and 1 LCS. 
Actors – Systems 
& Stakeholders 






Common Tactical Picture (CTP) system 
Weapon System 
Flow of events 1. … 
2. Sensor system reports probable surface targets and location to 
CTP system [a]. 
3. OTC assigns additional sensor systems to probable surface 
targets for confirmation [a]. 
4. Data from sensor system(s) is correlated and fused to determine 
probable surface targets precise location.  Sensor System(s) 
report precise location of probable surface targets to CTP 
system [a]. 
5. Sensor system(s) provide confirmation of surface targets – 
swarm boats – to CTP system [a]. 
6. Sensor system(s) provide swarm boats’ window of vulnerability 
to CTP system [a]. 
7. OTC assigns sensor system(s) to continually track the swarm 
boats. 
8. Sensor system(s) provide refined window of vulnerability of 
swarm boats to CTP system [a]. 
9. OTC validates swarm boats comply with guidance, LOAC, 
ROE, and other restrictions [a]. 
10. OTC determines desired effect(s) against swarm boats [a]. 
11. Potential engagement options are generated through weapon-
target pairings (WTPs) and are presented to OTC [a]. 
12. OTC conducts risk assessment of engagement options [a]. 
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13. OTC orders swarm boats to be engaged with selected 
engagement option [a]. 
14. Weapon system engages swarm boats [a]. 
15. OTC reviews status of the swarm boats noted in Common 
Tactical Picture system [a]. 
16. OTC assesses status of the swarm boats and determines whether 
to re-engage [a]. 
Inputs … 
Rules of Engagement (ROE) 
Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) 
Probable Target Detection 
Probable Target Location 
Target Confirmation 
Precise Location of Confirmed Target 
Confirmed Target Window of Vulnerability 





References a. JP 3-60: Joint Targeting (2007) 
Table 18.   Scenario CHARLIE - 1 
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APPENDIX B: TARGET ENGAGEMENT 
Several target engagement process models have been developed and presented in 
service documents.  The detect-to-engage sequence for prosecuting threats, as described 
by Athans [1986] and Payne [2006], is a model used for the training of future officers in 
the U.S. Navy.  Conversely, the Find-Fix-Track-Target-Engage-Assess (F2T2EA) 
process model has been used with respect to time-sensitive targeting [Committee on 
C4ISR for Future Naval Strike Groups, 2006: 42; Hunerwadel, 2006].  F2T2EA has been 
adopted by all services for dynamic and time-sensitive targeting [JP 3-60, 2007] at the 
operational level of war.   
Though the detect-to-engage sequence, F2T2EA, and the general targeting 
process presented in JP 3-60 [2007] are all similar, differences in terminology can 
confound a reader.  Therefore, the F2T2EA engagement process model and associated 
terminology as detailed in JP 3-60 [2007: Ch II], was selected by the author to serve as a 
foundation for the development of the tactical threat and target engagement scenarios.  
The steps of F2T2EA [JP 3-60, 2007] are explained in below and presented in Figure 38.  
and Figure 39.   
FIND 
Input:  Inputs to the find step are clear priorities and guidance from the Joint 
Force Commander, intelligence of the battlespace to include areas of interest, and 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) collection plans. 
Phase:  The intelligence collection process is the primary driver of the find step.  
Detections which meet predetermined criteria are deemed emerging targets.  An 
emerging target’s criticality, time-sensitivity, and probability of being a target is further 
refined in the find phase.  Emerging targets which are considered potential targets are 
moved to subsequent steps.  Those deemed not to be a potential target are dropped from 
the process.  If it is not known whether a emerging target is a potential target or not, the 
detection remains in the find step.   
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Output:  The output of the find step is potential targets “detected and nominated 
for further development” [JP 3-60, 2007: Ch II, 15]. 
FIX 
Input:  The inputs to the fix step include potential targets from the find step and 
sensor information on the target. 
Phase:   In the fix step, the identification of potential targets is confirmed and the 
target’s precise location is determined through means of data correlation and fusion.  
Also during the fix step, the target’s window of vulnerability is established for 
prosecution and prioritization. 
Output:  The output of the fix step is the identification, classification, and 
confirmation of the target, the location of the target accurate enough for target 
engagement, and the target window of vulnerability. 
TRACK  
Input:  Inputs to the track step are a confirmed target with location accurate 
enough for target engagement. 
Phase:   In the track step, sensors are selected to continually track the confirmed 
target.  The sensors are selected according to prosecution needs and prioritization based 
on all targets’ window of vulnerability.  The targets’ window of vulnerability is further 
refined by the data collected from the assigned sensors. 
Output:  The output of the track step is a continuous track of the confirmed 
target, the sensor prioritization scheme, and updated target window of vulnerability. 
TARGET 
Input:  The inputs for the target step include: 
1. Identified, classified, located, and prioritized target 
2. Collateral damage guidance 
3. Rules of Engagement (ROE) 
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4. Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) 
5. No-strike List (NSL) 
6. Restricted Target List (RTL) 
7. Fire Support Coordinating Measures (FSCMs) 
8. Situational awareness (SA) on available assets 
Phase:   The target step begins with validating the confirmed target complies with 
guidance, LOAC, ROE, and other restrictions.  The desired effect against the confirmed 
target is finalized, restrictions are resolved, and risk assessment is performed.  De-
confliction of sensors and weapon systems enables weapon-target pairings (WTPs) and 
generation of potential engagement option.  Once the target approval decision is made, an 
engagement option is selected.  Assessment requirements are determined and the 
consequences of executing the engagement option are also predicted. 
Output:  The outputs of the target step include the validated desired effect, target 
data finalized in a format for use by the engaging system, asset deconfliction and 
resolved target area clearance, and target execution approval, assessment collection 
requirements, and consequences of execution. 
ENGAGE  
Input:  Inputs to the engage step are the target approval decision, the selected 
engagement option, and the finalized data of the confirmed target. 
Phase:   During the engage step, engagement of the confirmed target is ordered 
and passed to the selected weapon system(s). 
Output:  The output of the engage step is the engagement of the confirmed target. 
ASSESS  
Input:  The inputs to the assess phase are the combat assessment requirements, 
the validated desired effect, and the prediction of the consequences of execution. 
Phase:   During the assess phase information concerning the information is 
collected in accordance with the combat assessment requirements.  The information is 
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used to estimate or confirm whether the results of the engagement match the desired 
effect(s).  Information is also collected to determine if any consequences of the 
engagement require warning friendly forces. 
Output:  Outputs of the assess phase are engagement results; re-attack (re-strike) 
recommendations, as appropriate; and any warnings to friendly forces based on 
engagement results. 
 
Figure 38.   Dynamic Targeting Process [from JP 3-60, 2007: Ch II, 14]  
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Figure 39.   Dynamic Targeting Process – IDEF0 
[after JP 3-60, 2007: Ch II, 14] 
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APPENDIX C: EXTERNAL SYSTEMS DIAGRAM 
The discussions within this appendix are divided into four sections.  The first 
section is devoted to discussing the challenge in developing the basic external systems 
diagram.  The second section presents the basic external systems diagram and the reasons 
behind key contents of the diagram.  The third section is a collection of the interaction 
diagrams developed during research.  Finally, the fourth section is a presentation of the 
external systems diagram. 
A. THE PHILOSOPHICAL CHALLENGE 
Recall from the body of the thesis that the basic external systems diagram is 
comprised of three parts:  the system, the external systems, and the system context.  The 
system is "a set of components (subsystems, segments) acting together to achieve a set of 
common objectives via the accomplishment of a set of tasks" [Buede, 2000: 38].  
External Systems are "entities that interact with the system via the system's external 
interfaces" [Buede, 2000: 38].  Finally, the context is "a set of entities that can impact the 
system but cannot be impacted by the system" [Buede, 2000: 38]. 
Since the purpose of the external systems diagram, and therefore the basic 
external systems diagram, is to define the boundaries of the system for all stakeholders of 
the system, the author was faced with the question of “What comprises a C2 system?”  
This question is critical in the development of the operational concept.  The question also 
exemplifies how the key phases of the operational concept development (e.g., scenario 
development, external systems diagram, systems objective hierarchy, and requirements 
generation) are intertwined.   
Describing the inputs and outputs in the scenario development demonstrates the 
stakeholders’ and systems engineers’ preconceived notions of the system’s boundaries.  
Additionally, as the stakeholders and systems engineers communicate concerning the 
“value” of the system during the system objective hierarchy development, the common 
view of the system’s boundaries may change.  Each phase of the operational concept 
development serves as feedback to previous phases.  With sufficient iterations and 
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communication, the systems engineers can eventually reach a stable (though not 
necessarily constant) view of the system.  For example, during the communication 
deriving the “value” of the system in the system objective hierarchy certain subsystems 
became viewed as external systems and vice versa in a new version of the external 
systems diagram.  This reorganization of components then drove the scenarios and 
interaction diagrams to be redrafted since the inputs and outputs of the system changed.  
But, the question still remains, “What comprises a C2 system?” 
To answer this question the author conducted an extensive, but by no means 
exhaustive, literature review.  Historical texts, recent articles and books, and service 
publications were read and analyzed.  Much of the historical texts contained discussions 
on war and its principles as well as theories and methodologies of conducting warfare.  
The texts, however, contained limited content devoted specifically to topics correlating to 
the modern concept command and control.  Significant research concerning the principles 
of command and control only began within the past half-century.  Much of this early 
work on a theory of command and control was based on models of the C2 process such as 
Lawson’s [1981] Sense-Process-Compare-Decide-Act model or Boyd’s Observe-Orient-
Decide-Act model.  To start the definition of a C2 system with a C2 process, whether 
adopted or modified from previous researchers or developed separately, may seem logical 
but contains consequences. 
Recall that a system is “a set of components (subsystems, segments) acting 
together to achieve a set of common objectives via the accomplishment of a set of tasks” 
[Buede, 2000: 38].  A system, therefore, is defined by 1) its set of objectives and 2) the 
tasks required to achieve such set of objectives.  The execution of the C2 process 
becomes the objective of a C2 system and the tasks required to achieve this objective are 
at least the phases of the C2 process.  For example, the tasks required to achieve the 
objective in Lawson’s model are at least to sense, process, compare, decide, and act. 
Continuing the Lawson model example, since one task of the C2 system would be 
to decide, a component or a combination of components of the C2 system must fulfill this 
task.  Therefore, the decision entity – which in most military situations is the commander 
– is a component of the system.  Similarly the sensor which senses should be considered 
 129 
a component of the system.  Then should the entity which acts also be considered a 
component?  If so, then the entire military force involved in a situation is the C2 system.  
The C2 systems engineer is then faced with designing the best military force for a given 
set of situations, which incidentally is the responsibility of senior military leadership.  Of 
course a commander-in-chief can view himself or herself as a systems engineer but, a 
subsystem within a military force with the objective of accomplishing the C2 process 
would then not exist. 
The next logical step would then be to consider reversing the previous step and 
remove those entities which act from the concept of the C2 system definition.  In other 
words, the C2 system’s purpose would remain the accomplishment of the C2 process but, 
the task of acting would be fulfilled by a system external to the C2 system.  Similarly 
those sensors which sense, and those decision-making entities which decide, could be 
removed from the concept of a C2 system for the same reason and their tasks could be 
fulfilled by external systems.  Continuing this process generates a C2 system with the 
task of connecting the tasks (i.e., sense, process, compare, decide, and act) of the external 
systems.  A C2 system, therefore, is at least a communication system (a system which 
connects) and at most the entire military force.   
As is evident in the above discussion, the definition of a C2 system has now 
become detached from the C2 process.  The system is at least comprised of components 
which connect but may or may not include those components which perform the tasks 
associated with the C2 process.  This logical discussion has achieved a lower bound to 
the question, “What comprises a C2 system?”  It, however, has not achieved a realistic 
upper bound.  An astute reader may have, at this point, realized that the entire discussion 
above for determining the boundaries of the C2 system progressed through the tasks (or 
functions) of the system.  How can this be?  The operational concept is supposed to be an 
input to the functional architecture.  The reader is then plagued by the philosophical 
question of “How does one define the boundaries of a system in ignorance of what the 
system does?”  The fact of the matter is one does not. 
What, then, comprises a C2 system?  The answer to the question is confusingly 
simple – what the systems engineer and stakeholders determine.  As systems engineers 
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communicate with stakeholders, as stakeholders are added and dropped, and as the 
system engineering process is followed from the birth to the death of the system, the 
definition of what the system is changes.  Therefore, the basic external systems diagram 
below, and the subsequent work of this thesis, presents a C2 system from the view of the 
author and those solicited stakeholders whom interacted with the author.  It is by no 
means a definitive solution.  As readers join the study and analysis of C2, the definition 
of what a C2 system is will invariably change. 
B. BASIC EXTERNAL SYSTEMS DIAGRAM 
The basic external systems diagram developed, as of the submittal of this thesis, is 
presented in Figure 40.  Also presented in this section are key thoughts of the author and 
ideas gleaned from the author’s communication with stakeholders.  Though by no means 
comprehensive, the author has attempted to address the major concerns of potential 
readers. 
As in discussed in Chapter II, the author adopted the concept of function-process-
system for command and control.  First, command is a function by which a responsible 
entity takes inputs to produce the desired output.  Second, command and control is the 
process by which the inputs generate the outputs.  Finally, a command and control system 
is the means by which the process is executed.  This function-process-system concept is 
similar to that presented by Sweeney [2002] but, with at least one major modification.  
Sweeney posits that the command and control process is comprised of people, 
information, and organization.  The author, instead, posits that people are a component of 
the command and control system, information is what flows within the system, and 
organization is a rule or constraint on the system.  This version of the concept 
incorporates ideas of Van Creveld [1985], the U.S. Marine Corps [MCDP 6, 1996], and 
the U.S. Navy [NDP 6, 1995] among many.  This can be seen with the two major 
subsystem categories in Figure 40.  , People and the Communications & Information 
Systems.  The inputs to and outputs from the system, along with the cross-communication 






































Figure 40.   Basic External Systems Diagram 
The commander, in this case the OTC, is not considered a part of the command 
and control system.  Since the command and control system is the means by which the 
command and control process executes the function of command for the commander, the 
commander is not a component of system.  The commander is an external system which 
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affects the command and control process and interacts with the command and control 
system.  If during the command and control process a decision by the commander is 
needed, such decision is an input to the command and control system. 
Sensors, weapons, and platforms are considered external systems.  These external 
systems provide inputs such as their geographical position, readiness, and in the case of 
sensors information concerning contacts, targets, threats, and the adversary.  During the 
command and control process a sensation by a sensor is needed, such sensation is an 
input to the command and control system.  Similarly, during the command and control 
process an action by a weapon or platform is needed, the order for the action is an output 
from the system to the weapon or platform.  Additionally, contacts, targets, threats, and 
the adversary interact with external systems such as sensors and weapons, which then 
report to the command and control system information of such interaction.  Other context 
entities produce inputs to the system but are not affected by the command and control 
system, at least in the time-frame considered for this thesis.  Such context entities include 
meteorological factors, the political situation, and the international legal system. 
C. INTERACTION DIAGRAMS 









Figure 42.   Interaction Diagram – Legal Constraints 
 
Figure 43.   Interaction Diagram – Information and Intelligence Requests 
D. EXTERNAL SYSTEMS DIAGRAM 
The external systems diagram expands the basic external systems diagram to 
include the inputs and outputs detailed in interaction diagrams.  The purpose of the 
external systems diagram is to model the “interaction of the system with other (external) 
systems in the relevant contexts, thus providing a definition of the system’s boundaries in 
terms of the system’s inputs and outputs” [Buede, 2000: 144].  The external systems 





















































































































































































































































































































Figure 44.   External Systems Diagram 
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APPENDIX D: SYSTEM OBJECTIVES HIERARCHY 
The purpose of the systems objectives hierarchy is to organize the system’s 
objectives from the view of value to the stakeholders [Buede, 2000: 147].  Objectives 
exist in every phase of the system’s life-cycle.  Types of objectives can include 
operational performance objectives, technical performance objectives, operational 
suitability objectives, cost objectives, schedule objectives, and risk objectives.  The 
discussions within this appendix are divided into three sections.  The first section is 
devoted to discussing the process of developing the system objectives hierarchy.  The 
second section presents the system objectives.  Finally, the third section presents the 
selected measures of merit.   
A. SYSTEM OBJECTIVES DEVELOPMENT 
The purpose of the system engineering process is to design and develop a system 
which takes inputs to produce desired outputs or to avoid undesirable consequence.  The 
entire notion of desirability is one of value [Keeney, 1992].  The purpose of system 
objectives is to explicitly describe the value of the system as determined by the system’s 
stakeholders.  The top-level of the hierarchy of objectives are fundamental objectives 
which describe the values of the system which are essential.  The fundamental objectives 
are composed of subordinate objectives which serve as measures of merit of the system. 
The system objective development process began with the refined problem 
statement, developed during scenario development, serving as a guide.  Keeney [1992: 
56] proposes that “The most obvious way to identify objectives is to engage in a 
discussion of the decision situation.”  Since publication research is a form of discussion, 
as Booth, Colomb and Williams contend [2008: 11], numerous publications concerning 
measures of effectiveness, operational suitability, C4ISR system capabilities, 
communications, information theory, and network-centric warfare were reviewed to 
determine qualities pertinent to a network-centric naval tactical command and control 
system.  In conjunction with the publication review, inputs from stakeholders were 
solicited to assist the author developing and organizing the system’s objectives and their 
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associated measures of merit (i.e., measures of effectiveness and their associated 
measures of performance) [Buede, 2000: 146-149].  Objective development during the 
early stages of the systems engineering process is important.  By developing a set of 
system objectives prior to the functional architecture and physical architecture 
development phases, the system engineer identifies the value of the system outside the 
constraints of any particular design.  The reader is encouraged to review Keeney [1992] 
for more discussion on this topic. 
Reviewing a variety of publications, and with stakeholder input, the author 
determined there were six fundamental objectives: quality of information; quality of 
relationships/connections; awareness of established intent; awareness of rules and 
constraints; quality of response; and quality of allocations.  The first four fundamental 
objectives, together, address the concept the quality of situational awareness.  Likewise, 
the last two fundamental objectives, together, address the concept of quality of response.  
The top-level of the system objectives hierarchy, which is comprised of the fundamental 
objectives (FO) and the measures of C2 effectiveness (MoCE), is presented in Figure 45.   
Each of the fundamental objectives is an aggregation of several measures of merit 
(MoM) [NATO Research and Technology Organization, 2002] collected from and 
developed during the publication review and stakeholder solicitation.  Since the focus of 
this thesis was on naval tactical forces tasked with securing local sea control, Measures of 
Policy Effectiveness (MoPE), were not considered.  Additionally, Measures of Force 
Effectiveness (MoFE) were not considered since mission accomplishment is not a 
measure of the C2 system but rather the force.  The removal of mission accomplishment 
from the quality measure of a C2 system is an idea further discussed by Alberts and 
Hayes [2006: Chapter 4]. 
The MoM levels considered for this thesis included Measures of C2 Effectiveness 
(MoCE), Measures of Performance (MoP), and Dimensional Parameters (DP).  MoCE 
focus on the impact of C2 systems within the operational context.  MoP measure the 
performance within the system structure.  Finally, the lowest level, Dimensional 
Parameters (DP), measure the properties or characteristics inherent in the physical parts  
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and configuration items of the C2 systems.  It is a general rule that a measure higher in 
the MoM hierarchy tends to be more context, task, or mission specific [NATO Research 
and Technology Organization, 2002: 96]. 
 
A responsive and robust command and control system which 
connects dispersed forces and enables such forces to self-
synchronize and allocate resources to mass effects in order to meet 






































































Figure 45.   System Objectives Hierarchy 
To ensure the system objectives hierarchy did not become an ad hoc collection of 
objectives and measures gleaned from various sources, the nine desirable attributes of 
fundamental objectives presented by Keeney [1992:  82-87] were used as a guide during 
development.  The descriptions of the nine attributes were adapted to the system 
engineering process, as described below, and were adopted whenever possible for this 
thesis.  First, the fundamental objectives of the system should be essential to the design 
of the command and control system; each alternative design of the command and control 
system impacts the degree to which the fundamental objectives are achieved.  Second, the 
fundamental objectives of the system should be controllable; the fundamental objectives 
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are impacted only by the alternative designs of the command and control system.  Third, 
the set of fundamental objectives of the system should be complete; the alternative 
designs of the system can be differentiated from each other by the set of fundamental 
objectives.  Fourth, the fundamental objectives of the system should be measurable; each 
of the fundamental objectives, and the degree to which they can be achieved, can be 
precisely defined.  Fifth, the fundamental objectives should be operational; information 
can be collected which link the various levels of the fundamental objectives to value of 
the system.  Sixth, the set of fundamental objectives of the system should be 
decomposable; the impact of one fundamental objective can be considered independently 
of another fundamental objective.  Seventh, the fundamental objectives of the system 
should be non-redundant.  Eighth, the set of fundamental objectives of the system should 
be concise.  Conciseness conflicts with the attribute of completeness, however, by 
eliminating objectives which provide little assistance in comparing alternative systems 
the decision scope is reduced.  Ninth, each of the fundamental objectives must be 
understandable; the idea of each fundamental objective can be “adequately 
communicated to and understood by individuals in positions to make or influence 
decisions” [Keeney, 1992:  85]. 
Attributes of Fundamental Objectives 
Essential Controllable Complete 
Measurable Operational Decomposable 
Non-redundant Concise Understandable 
Table 19.   Attributes of Fundamental Objectives [Keeney, 1992] 
The first step to ensuring the set of fundamental objectives were essential was to 
review the previous products of the operational concept.  As discussed in Appendix C:
 External Systems Diagram the C2 system contains communication and 
information systems which connect nodes and information flows through these 
connections.  Therefore, quality of information and quality of relationships and 
connections are essential.  Quality of relationships and connections was also essential 
because of the portion of the refined problem statement; “command and control system 
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which connects dispersed forces.”  The refined problem statement also states the C2 
system should enable forces to “allocate resources… in order to meet established 
intent….”  Therefore, awareness of established intent and quality of allocations are also 
essential.  Recall, as discussed in Chapter II, that a C2 system is the means by which the 
C2 process is executed.  Therefore, the third step to ensure the set of fundamental 
objectives were essential was to review several conceptual models of the C2 process.  
Conceptual models reviewed included Lawson [1981], Athans [1986], Levis and Athans 
[1992], Alberts and Hayes [2006], as well as those presented in NDP 6 [1995] and JP 3-
60 [2007].  Though these conceptual models are “abstractions and idealizations” [Levis 
& Athans, 1992: 6], they do provide examples of what C2 systems are expected to 
support.  All of the conceptual models reviewed describe a phase of the C2 process 
consists of a decision or decision-making.  Therefore, quality of response decision is also 
an essential objective.  In addition, all of the conceptual models reviewed describe a 
phase of the C2 process which consists of actions of forces or directions to forces to act.  
Since these forces act within an environment and are subject to rules and constraints, 
whether self-imposed or imposed by higher authority, awareness of rules and constraints 
is also an essential objective.  The discussion above has demonstrated that each of the six 
fundamental objectives is essential to the design of a C2 system.  The next step is to 
determine if the set of fundamental objectives is complete. 
A C2 system is the means by which the C2 process is executed.  Therefore, every 
phase of the C2 process should either have a corresponding objective or it should be 
explicitly stated why it does not.  Several C2 process conceptual models will be used to 
determine if the set of fundamental objectives are complete.  Lawson [1981] presents a 
model simplified as sense-process-compare-decide-act.  Levis and Athans [1992] present 
a similar model simplified as sense-assess-generate-select-plan-direct.  In the external 
systems diagram, sensors are considered external systems which provide information to 
the C2 system.  Therefore, quality of information corresponds to the concept of sense.  
Some of the MoM of quality of information correspond to process and assess (i.e., the 
concepts of accuracy, usability, completeness, and precision allude to a form of 
assessment of processed data).  In addition, awareness of established intent and 
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awareness of rules and constraints incorporate portions of assess.  Some of the MoM of 
quality of response decision and quality of allocations correspond to generate (e.g., 
response solution space) and select (e.g., appropriateness of response decision).  In 
addition, the concepts of decide and plan are also incorporated in these two fundamental 
objectives.  Sensors, weapons, and platforms are external systems which receive 
information from the C2 system.  Therefore, quality of information corresponds to the 
concepts of direct and act.   
The models presented by Athans [1986] and in JP 3-60 [2007] are specific to 
target engagement and discussed in Appendix B: Target Engagement.  In fact, the 
models presented by Athans and in JP 3-60 are so specific, and the concepts within the 
objectives hierarchy so general (e.g., response, allocation, etc.) that it is difficult to 
determine if the objectives hierarchy does not incorporate all of the concepts of these 
models.  A review of Appendix B: Target Engagement identified only a few concepts 
not already obviously addressed with the Lawson model and Levis and Athans model 
analysis above.  These concepts include prioritizing ISR, tracking, target area clearance, 
and risk assessment.  Prioritizing ISR is a decision to allocate of resources.  Quality of 
response decision and quality of allocations, therefore, correspond to prioritizing ISR.  
Tracking is continuous sensing, processing, and assessing.  Thus, as discussed above, 
some of the MoM of quality of information correspond to tracking.  Target area clearance 
is directing friendly forces to vacate a specific area for their safety.  Therefore, the 
allocation of roles and responsibilities addresses target area clearance.  Finally, risk 
assessment corresponds to appropriateness of response decision.  The discussion in the 
previous paragraphs has demonstrated that the set of fundamental objectives is, to an 
arguable extent, complete.  Given that there are only six fundamental objectives, the 
author contends that the set is also concise. 
The fundamental objectives are measureable in the fact that they are aggregations 
of several MoM collected from and developed during the publication review and 
stakeholder solicitation.  Defoe [1993] states, “Select criteria that are measurable 
(objective and quantifiable) and express them in well-known, easily understood units.  
However, important criteria for which no measure seems to exist, still must be explicitly 
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addressed.”  The set of fundamental objectives is essential and complete; following 
Defoe’s principle of measurability, no fundamental objective was removed if their 
associated MoM are difficult to measure.  In fact those objectives which are difficult to 
measure align with the moral factors of command and control, as discussed in Chapter II.  
Overview of Command and Control 
In addition to the attributes previously discussed, the fundamental objectives 
should also be operational.  In other words, information should exist which proves the 
fundamental objectives give value to the system.  Validating each fundamental objective 
and its associated MoM with extensive testing, analysis, or research, was beyond the 
scope of this thesis.  The validity of the fundamental objectives, therefore, is determined 
by the fact that most were identified in other publications concerning C2 or were in fact 
specifically referenced in previous C2 research.  Next, given that the author cannot 
guarantee that the system objectives are understandable, stakeholders were solicited 
during the development to mitigate future problems of misunderstanding.  Finally, it is 
left to the reader to analyze the system objective hierarchy in the next section to conclude 
for themselves whether the systems objectives are decomposable (e.g., independent) and 
non-redundant. 
B. SYSTEMS OBJECTIVES HIERARCHY 
The system objectives hierarchy, with measures of merit, developed during this 
thesis for a command and control system is presented below in Table 20.   
 
  QUALITY OF SITUATIONAL AWARENESS 
1.0 FO Quality of Information 
1.1. MoCE Relevance of information Clark & Moon, 2000 
JP 6-0, 2006: Ch I, 3 
NDP 6, 1995: 40 
1.1.1 MoP Percentage of processed information needed by 
nodes for response to changing circumstances 
 
1.1.2 MoP Percentage of information a node receives which is 
a copy of information the node has already received 
 
1.1.3 MoP Percentage of information within the network 
which is a copy of other information within the 
network 
 
1.2 MoCE Accuracy of information JP 6-0, 2006: Ch I, 3 
NDP 6, 1995: 40 
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1.2.1 MoP Number of sources confirming information Clark & Moon, 2000: Section 6 
1.2.2 MoP Veracity (i.e., truthfulness) of sources Clark & Moon, 2000: Section 6 
1.2.2.1 DP History of truthfulness of specific source  
2.2.2.2 DP Probability specific source is telling the truth 
concerning selected piece of information 
 
1.2.3 MoP Equivocality of information (i.e., degree to which 
data is subject to two or more interpretations) 
 
1.2.3.1 MoP Number of possible interpretations of data  
1.2.3.2 MoP Probability interpretation of data is correct  
1.2.4 MoP Internal consistency of information Clark & Moon, 2000: Section 6 
1.2.4.1 MoP Percentage of total information held which 
conflicts with other information held 
Clark & Moon, 2000: Section 6 
1.2.4.2 MoP Mean time between internal inconsistencies of 
information held 
 
1.3 MoCE Timeliness of information Cebrowski & Garstka, 1998 
Clark & Moon, 2000 
JP 6-0, 2006: Ch I, 3 
NDP 6, 1995: 40 
Stytz & Banks, 2006 
1.3.1 MoP Time between changing circumstances and 
observation 
after Alberts & Hayes, 2006: 43 
after Kasunic & Anderson, 
2004: 39 
1.3.2 MoP Time between the observation and the completion 
of processing the data into information 
after Kasunic & Anderson, 
2004: 39 
1.3.3 MoP Frequency (i.e., refresh-rate) of information Clark & Moon, 2000: Section 6 
1.3.3.1.1 MoP Minimum time specific piece of information is 
updated 
 
1.3.3.1.2 MoP Mean time specific piece of information is updated  
1.3.3.1.3 MoP Median time specific piece of information is 
updated 
 
1.3.3.1.4 MoP Maximum time specific piece of information is 
updated 
 
1.3.4 MoP Perishability (i.e. shelf-life) of information Clark & Moon, 2000: Section 6 
1.3.4.1 DP Shelf-life of specific information  
1.3.4.2 MoP Difference between shelf-life and minimum time 
specific information is updated 
 
1.3.4.3 MoP Difference between shelf-life and maximum time 
specific information is updated 
 
1.3.4.4 MoP Probability of shelf-life is less then time between 
updates 
 
1.3.5 MoP Differential between time when information is 
needed by a particular force and time when it 
arrives at that force 
Stytz & Banks, 2006 
1.4 MoCE Usability of information JP 6-0, 2006: Ch I, 3 
NDP 6, 1995: 40 
1.4.1 MoP Latency (i.e., visibility) of information Clark & Moon, 2000: Section 6 
1.4.1.1 MoP Number of nodes which are capable of viewing 
information 
 
1.4.1.2 MoP Percentage of nodes which are capable of viewing 
information 
 
1.4.1.3 MoP Percentage of nodes, which are capable of using 
information, that can view the information 
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1.4.2 MoP Shareability of information (i.e., ability of 
information to be used by multiple nodes) 
NATO Research and 
Technology Organization 
(R&TO), 2006: 21 
1.4.2.1 MoP Percentage of nodes authorized to act upon 
information 
after Washburn, 2001a: 6 
1.4.2.2 MoP Percentage of nodes which are capable of acting on 
information 
 
1.5 MoCE Completeness of information Clark & Moon, 2000 
JP 6-0, 2006: Ch I, 3 
NDP 6, 1995: 40 
1.5.1 MoP Range (i.e., scale) of observation capability  
1.5.1.1 DP Spatial range of observation capability  
1.5.1.2 DP Temporal range of observation capability  
1.5.2 MoP Availability of information after Alberts & Hayes, 2006: 58 
1.5.2.1 MoP Proportion of collected information which was 
processed 
Clark & Moon, 2000: Section 6 
1.5.2.2 MoP Percentage of Commander’s Critical Information 
Requirements (CCIR) met 
after Clark & Moon, 2000: 
Section 6 
1.5.2.3 MoP Percentage of Priority Intelligence Requirements 
(PIR) met 
 
1.5.2.4 MoP Percentage of Essential Elements of Information 
(EEI) met 
 
1.5.2.4.1 MoP Percentage of EEI from PIR met  
1.5.2.4.2 MoP Percentage of EEI from RFI met  
1.5.2.5 MoP Percentage of commander’s Essential Elements of 
Friendly Information (EEFI) met 
 
1.5.2.6 MoP Percentage of Requests for Intelligence (RFI) met  
1.6 MoCE Conciseness (i.e., brevity) of information JP 6-0, 2006: Ch I, 3 
1.6.1 MoP Size (bytes) of digitized data  
1.6.1.1 DP Size of digitized datum  
1.6.1.2 MoP Mean size of all digitized data  
1.6.1.3 MoP Median size of all digitized data  
1.6.1.4 MoP Maximum size of all digitized data  
1.6.2 MoP Time of analog data (e.g., spoken voice)  
1.6.2.1 DP Time of analog datum  
1.6.2.2 MoP Mean time of all analog data  
1.6.2.3 MoP Median time of all analog data  
1.6.2.4 MoP Maximum size of all analog data  
1.7 MoCE Security of information JP 6-0, 2006: Ch I, 3 
1.7.1 MoP Probability of detection of specific information 
traversing the network of relationships and 
connections 
after JP 6-0, 2006: Ch I, 10 
1.7.2 MoP Probability of interception of specific information 
traversing the network of relationships and 
connections 
after JP 6-0, 2006: Ch I, 10 
1.8 MoCE Precision of information NDP 6, 1995: 40 
1.8.1 MoP Resolution of observation capability after NATO R&TO, 2006:17 
1.8.1.1 DP Spatial resolution of observation capability  
1.8.1.2 DP Temporal resolution of observation capability  
1.8.2 MoP Repeatability of observation capability (i.e., 




1.8.2.1 MoP Range of differences in observations under same 
conditions 
 
1.8.2.2 MoP Deviation of observations under same conditions 
from the mean 
 
1.9 MoCE Attributability (i.e., pedigree) of information NATO R&TO, 2006: 18 
1.9.1 MoP Differential between time information is received 
by a node and when information can be attributed 
 
1.9.2 MoP Number of nodes in the life of the information to 
which it can be attributed 
 
1.9.3 MoP Specificity of a nodes identity  
2.0 FO Quality of relationships/connections 
2.1 MoCE Usability of relationships and connections  
2.1.1 MoP Availability of needed relationships and 
connections 
 
2.1.1.1 MoP Percentage of total known sources that are available 
via existing relationships and connections 
after Clark & Moon, 2000: 
Section 6 
2.1.1.2 MoP Percentage of total decision-authorized entities that 
are available via existing relationships and 
connections 
 
2.1.1.3 MoP Percentage of total allocation-authorized entities 
that are available via existing relationships and 
connections 
 
2.1.1.4 MoP Percentage of total action-authorized entities that 
are available via existing relationships and 
connections 
 
2.1.1.5 MoP Time between failures to have needed relationships 
and connections 
 
2.1.2 MoP Reliability of relationships and connections  
2.1.2.1 MoP Duration of operational failure-free connections  
2.1.2.1.1 DP Time between operational failures for each 
connection 
 
2.1.2.1.2 MoP Time between operational failures for the network 
of connections 
 
2.1.2.2 MoP Probability of operational failure-free connections  
2.1.2.2.1 DP Probability of operational failure for each 
connection 
 
2.1.2.2.2 MoP Probability of operational failure for network of 
connections 
 
2.1.3 MoP Veracity (i.e., accuracy of transmission) of needed 
relationships and connections 
 
2.1.3.1 MoP Duration of error-free transmissions  
2.1.3.1.1 DP Time between transmission error for each 
connection 
 
2.1.3.1.2 MoP Time between transmission error for the network of 
connections 
 
2.1.3.2 MoP Probability of error-free transmissions  
2.1.3.2.1 DP Probability of error-free transmission for each 
connection 
 
2.1.3.2.2 MoP Probability of error-free transmission for the 
network of connections 
 
2.1.4 MoP Utilization of relationships and connections after Kasunic & Anderson, 
2004: 39 
2.1.4.1 MoP Frequency of utilization  
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2.1.4.1.1 MoP Number of uses per unit time of each relationship 
and connection 
 
2.1.4.1.2 MoP Mean number of uses per unit time of relationships 
and connections 
 
2.1.4.1.3 MoP Median number of uses per unit time of 
relationships and connections 
 
2.1.4.2 MoP Duration of utilization  
2.1.4.2.1 MoP Mean duration of use of each relationship and 
connection 
 
2.1.4.2.2 MoP Median duration of use of each relationship and 
connection 
 
2.1.4.2.3 MoP Minimum duration of use of each relationship and 
connection 
 
2.1.4.2.4 MoP Mean duration of use of all relationships and 
connections 
 
2.1.4.2.5 MoP Median duration of use of each relationship and 
connection 
 
2.1.4.2.6 MoP Maximum duration of use of each relationship and 
connection 
 
2.2 MoCE Security of relationships and connections  
2.2.1 MoP Detection of relationships and connections  
2.2.1.1 MoP Probability of Detection  
2.2.1.2 MoP Mean time between known detections by specified 
entity 
 
2.2.2 MoP Detection of information traversing relationship or 
connection 
 
2.2.2.1 MoP Probability of detection of specific relationship or 
connection 
JP 6-0, 2006: Ch I, 10 
2.2.2.2 MoP Mean time between known detections of specific 
relationship or connection by specified entity  
 
2.2.3 MoP Interception of information traversing relationship 
and connection 
 
2.2.1 MoP Probability of interception of information 
traversing specific relationship or connection 
JP 6-0, 2006: Ch I, 10 
2.2.2 MoP Mean time between known interception of 
information traversing a specific relationship or 
connection  
 
2.3 MoCE Throughput of relationships and connections  
2.3.1 MoP Capacity of relationships and connections after Kasunic & Anderson, 
2004: 39 
after Stytz & Banks, 2006: 
Section 4 
2.3.1.1 DP Capacity of each relationship and connection  
2.3.1.2 MoP Capacity of the network of relationships and 
connections 
 
2.3.2 MoP Speed of service the relationships and connections 
are capable of providing 
after Clark & Moon, 2000: 
Section 6 
2.3.2.1 DP Speed of service each relationship or connection is 
capable of providing 
 
2.3.2.2 MoP Speed of service the network of relationships and 
connections is capable of providing 
 
2.3.3 MoP Overflow of needed relationships and connections after Kasunic & Anderson, 
2004: 39 
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2.3.3.1 MoP Quantity of overflow beyond capacity of needed 
relationships and connections 
 
2.3.3.1.1 DP Quantity of overflow beyond capacity for each 
needed relationship or connection 
 
2.3.3.1.2 MoP Quantity of overflow beyond capacity for the 
network of relationships and connections 
 
2.3.3.2 MoP Duration of overflow beyond capacity of needed 
relationships and connections 
 
2.3.3.2.1 DP Duration of overflow beyond capacity for each 
needed relationship or connection 
 
2.3.3.2.2 MoP Duration of overflow beyond capacity for the 
network of relationships and connections 
 
2.3.3.3 MoP Probability of overflow beyond capacity of needed 
relationships and connections 
 
2.3.3.3.1 DP Probability of overflow beyond capacity for each 
needed relationships or connections 
 
2.3.3.3.2 MoP Probability of overflow beyond capacity for the 
network of needed relationships and connections 
 
2.4 MoCE Landscape of the relationships and connections  
2.4.1 MoP Geographical reach of the relationships and 
connections 
after Clark & Moon, 2000: 
Section 1 
2.4.1.1 MoP Geographical volume of relationships and 
connections 
 
2.4.1.1.1 DP Geographical volume of each relationship or 
connection 
 
2.4.1.1.2 MoP Mean geographical volume of relationships and 
connections 
 
2.4.1.1.3 MoP Median geographical volume of relationships and 
connections 
 
2.4.1.1.4 MoP Total geographical volume of relationships and 
connections 
 
2.4.2 MoP Reconfigurability, or adaptability, of relationships 
and connections to meet changing circumstances 
and/or necessary responses 
 
2.4.2.1 MoP Time to reconfigure  
2.4.2.1.1 MoP Minimum time required to reconfigure 
relationships and connections to meet changing 
circumstances and/or necessary responses 
 
2.4.2.1.2 MoP Mean time required to reconfigure relationships 
and connections to meet changing circumstances 
and/or necessary responses 
 
2.4.2.1.3 MoP Median time required to reconfigure relationships 
and connections to meet changing circumstances 
and/or necessary responses 
 
2.4.2.1.4 MoP Maximum time required to reconfigure 
relationships and connections to meet changing 
circumstances and/or necessary responses 
 
2.4.2.2 MoP Number of possible solutions for required 
reconfiguration to meet changing circumstances 
and/or necessary responses 
 
2.4.3 MoP Interoperability of relationships and connections 
(i.e., ability of relationship or connection to be used 
by varying types of nodes) 
after NATO R&TO, 2006: 20 
JP 6-0, 2006: Ch I, 8 
2.4.3.1 MoP Commonality of relationships and connections JP 6-0, 2006: Ch I, 8 
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2.4.3.1.1 DP Number of nodes each relationship or connection is 
capable of connecting with 
 
2.4.3.1.2 MoP Percentage of nodes which each relationship or 
connection is capable of connecting with 
 
2.4.3.1.3 MoP Mean percentage of nodes which each relationship 
or connection is capable of connecting with 
 
2.4.3.1.4 MoP Median percentage of nodes which each 
relationship or connection is capable of connecting 
with 
 
2.4.3.2 MoP Standardization of relationships and connections JP 6-0, 2006: Ch I, 8 
2.4.3.2.1 MoP Percentage of interfaces which meet 
standardization requirements 
 
2.4.3.2.2 DP Percentage of interfaces at a node which do not 
meet standardization requirements 
 
2.4.3.2.3 MoP Number of nodes which have at least one interface 
which does not meet standardization requirements 
 
2.4.3.2.4 MoP Percentage of nodes which have at least one 
interface which does not meet standardization 
requirements 
 
2.4.3.2.5 MoP Number of nodes which have no interfaces which 
meet standardization requirements 
 
2.4.3.2.6 MoP Percentage of nodes which have no interfaces 
which meet standardization requirements 
 
2.4.3.3 MoP Compatibility of relationships and connections (i.e., 
capability of two or more relationships or 
connections to exist without mutual interference) 
JP 6-0, 2006: Ch I, 8 
2.4.3.1 DP Minimum stand-off distance of interference for 
each connection 
 
2.4.3.2 DP Frequency separation for each connection  
2.4.4 MoP Extensibility of relationships and connections to 
meet changing circumstances and/or necessary 
responses 
 
2.4.4.1 MoP Landscape of extension  
2.4.4.1.1 MoP Number of nodes connection is capable of adding  
2.4.4.1.2 MoP Number of connections capable of adding a given 
node 
 
2.4.4.1.3 MoP Number of nodes the network of connections are 
capable of adding 
 
2.4.4.1.4 MoP Available connection capacity for each potentially 
added node 
 
2.4.4.1.5 MoP Available total connection capacity for all 
potentially added nodes 
 
2.4.4.2 MoP Time to extend  
2.4.4.2.1 MoP Minimum time required to add a relationship and 
connection to meet changing circumstances and/or 
necessary responses 
 
2.4.4.2.2 MoP Mean time required to add a relationship and 
connection to meet changing circumstances and/or 
necessary responses 
 
2.4.4.2.3 MoP Median time required to add a relationship and 




2.4.4.2.4 MoP Maximum time required to add a relationship and 
connection to meet changing circumstances and/or 
necessary responses 
 
2.4.4.2.5 MoP Minimum time required to add all relationships and 
connections to meet changing circumstances and/or 
necessary responses 
 
2.4.4.2.6 MoP Mean time required to add all relationships and 
connections to meet changing circumstances and/or 
necessary responses 
 
2.4.4.2.7 MoP Median time required to add all relationships and 
connections to meet changing circumstances and/or 
necessary responses 
 
2.4.4.2.8 MoP Maximum time required to add all relationships and 
connections to meet changing circumstances and/or 
necessary responses 
 
2.4.5 MoP Mobility of nodes NATO R&TO, 2006: 17 
2.4.5.1 MoP Geographical range of nodes  
2.4.5.1.1 DP Geographical range each node can maneuver while 
maintaining needed relationships or connections 
 
2.4.5.1.2 MoP Mean geographical range nodes can maneuver 
while maintaining needed relationships or 
connections 
 
2.4.5.1.3 MoP Median geographical range nodes can maneuver 
while maintaining needed relationships or 
connections 
 
2.4.5.2 MoP Geographical speed of nodes  
2.4.5.2.1 DP Geographical speed at which each node can 
maneuver while maintaining needed relationships 
or connections 
 
2.4.5.2.2 MoP Mean geographical speed at which nodes can 
maneuver while maintaining needed relationships 
and connections 
 
2.4.5.2.3 MoP Median geographical speed at which nodes can 
maneuver while maintaining needed relationships 
and connections 
 
2.4.5.2.3 MoP Maximum geographical speed at which nodes can 
maneuver while maintaining needed relationships 
and connections 
 
3.0 FO Awareness of Established Intent 
3.1 MoP Degree to which the established intent is 
understood by forces 
Alberts & Hayes, 2006: 38-39 
3.2 MoP Consistency of established intent between forces  
3.3 MoP Time differential of awareness of established intent 
by different forces 
 
3.4 MoP Differential in time between awareness of 
established intent by a force and time when 
awareness is needed for force to act accordingly 
 
3.5 MoP Degree of situational familiarity for forces NATO R&TO, 2006: 18 
4.0 FO Awareness of Rules and Constraints 
4.1 MoP Degree to which rules and constraints are 
understood by forces 
Alberts & Hayes, 2006: 42 
4.2 MoP Consistency of awareness between forces of rules 
and constraints which are applicable to such forces 
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4.3 MoP Accuracy of awareness of rules and constraints 
compared with actual rules and constraints 
after Alberts & Hayes, 2006: 
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  QUALITY OF RESPONSE 
5.0 FO Quality of response decision 
5.1 MoCE Appropriateness of response to changing 
circumstances 
Alberts & Hayes, 2006: 42 
5.1.1 MoP Degree to which the established intent is accepted 
by forces 
Alberts & Hayes, 2006: 38-39 
5.1.2 MoP Consistency of response with established intent  
5.1.3 MoP Degree to which rules and constraints are accepted 
by forces 
Alberts & Hayes, 2006: 42 
5.1.4 MoP Consistency of response with rules and constraints  
5.1.5 MoP Degree of risk to forces for each response  
5.2 MoCE Timeliness of response decision after Alberts & Hayes, 2006: 43 
5.2.1 MoP Time between receipt of information concerning 
changing circumstances and acknowledgement of 
receipt 
 
5.2.2 MoP Time between acknowledgement of receipt of 
information concerning changing circumstances 
and response decision 
 
5.2.2.1 MoP Time between acknowledgement of receipt of 
information concerning changing circumstances 
and response option being developed 
 
5.2.2.2 MoP Time between response option being developed and 
response decision 
 
5.2.3 MoP Time between response decision and order of 
response execution by decision-authorized entity 
 
5.2.4 MoP Time between order of response execution and time 
required to allocate and execute response 
 
5.3 MoCE Distribution of response decision capability  
5.3.1 MoP Mean number of connections between decision-
authorized entity and action-authorized entity 
 
5.3.2 MoP Median number of connections between decision-
authorized entity and action-authorized entity 
 
5.3.3 MoP Maximum number of connections between 
decision-authorized entity and action-authorized 
entity 
 
5.3.4 MoP Percentage of entities connected by existing 
relationships and connections which are authorized 
to make a specific decision concerning a specific 
change in circumstances 
 
5.4 MoCE Response solution space  
5.4.1 MoP Number of distinct response solutions generated by 
decision-authorized entities concerning a specific 
change in circumstances 
 
5.4.2 MoP Number of distinct response solutions concerning a 
specific change in circumstances which, if selected 
concurrently, do not interfere with each other in 
execution 
 
5.5 MoCE Consistency of response between decision-
authorized entities 
 
5.5.1 MoP Number of action-authorized entities with 
conflicting orders from decision-authorized entities 
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5.5.2 MoP Percentage of action-authorized entities with 
conflicting orders from decision-authorized entities 
 
6.0 FO Quality of allocations 
6.1 MoCE Appropriateness of allocations  
6.1.1 MoP Degree to which forces understand the roles and 
responsibilities allocated to them 
Alberts & Hayes, 2006: 41 
6.1.2 MoP Degree to which forces accept the roles and 
responsibilities allocated to them 
 
6.1.3 MoP Feasibility of role and responsibility allocations after NATO R&TO, 2006:  24 
6.1.3.1 MoP Availability of material for allocation after Alberts & Hayes, 2006:  
58 
6.1.3.2 MoP Number of action-authorized entities which are 
allocated a role or responsibility which they cannot 
accomplish 
 
6.1.3.3 MoP Percentage of action-authorized entities which are 
allocated a role or responsibility which they cannot 
accomplish 
 
6.2 MoCE Timeliness of allocations  
6.2.1 MoP Time between order of response execution by 
decision-authorized entity and completion of 
allocations by allocation-authorized entity 
 
6.2.2 MoP Time between allocation of role or responsibility 
and commencement of role or responsibility by 
action-authorized entity 
 
6.2.3 MoP Time between allocation of role or responsibility  
and time required to execute response action 
 
6.3 MoCE Distribution of response allocation capability  
6.3.1 MoP Mean number of connections between allocation-
authorized entity and action-authorized entity 
 
6.3.2 MoP Median number of connections between allocation-
authorized entity and action-authorized entity 
 
6.3.3 MoP Maximum number of connections between 
allocation-authorized entity and action-authorized 
entity 
 
6.3.4 MoP Percentage of entities connected by existing 
relationships and connections which are authorized 
to make allocations concerning a specific decision 
 
6.4 MoCE Completeness of role and responsibility allocation Alberts & Hayes, 2006:  41 
6.4.1 MoP Number of roles and responsibilities which are 
required for the specific decision which are not 
allocated 
 
6.4.2 MoP Percentage of roles and responsibilities which are 
required for the specific decision which are not 
allocated 
 
Table 20.   System Objectives Hierarchy 
C. SELECTED MEASURES OF MERIT 
The focus of this thesis was on the engineering of a command and control system 
for naval forces at the tactical level of war which could incorporate concepts associated 
with network-centric warfare.  The systems objective hierarchy presented in the previous 
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section is far too large, given the scope of this thesis, for an effective analysis of the value 
of the C2 system.  Therefore, a reasonable subset of the measures was selected for the 
remaining phases of the engineering process.  The refined problem statement generated 
during the operational concept development served as a guide for the selection.  Recall 
that the refined problem statement is: 
A responsive and robust command and control system which connects 
dispersed forces and enables such forces to self-synchronize and allocate 
resources to mass effects in order to meet the established intent at the 
tactical level of war. 
Responsive is the timeliness in which the command and control system can 
identify changing circumstances, determine the impact of the changing circumstances, 
and enact an appropriate response.  Selected measures of performance applying to the 
concept of responsive are presented in Table 21.   
1.3.1 MoP Time between changing circumstances and observation 
1.3.2 MoP Time between the observation and the completion of processing the data into 
information 
1.3.4.4 MoP Probability of shelf-life is less then time between updates 
1.9.1 MoP Differential between time information is received by a node and when information can 
be attributed 
2.4.2.1.3 MoP Median time required to reconfigure relationships and connections to meet changing 
circumstances and/or necessary responses 
2.4.4.2.7 MoP Median time required to add all relationships and connections to meet changing 
circumstances and/or necessary responses 
5.2.1 MoP Time between receipt of information concerning changing circumstances and 
acknowledgement of receipt 
5.2.2.1 MoP Time between acknowledgement of receipt of information concerning changing 
circumstances and response option being developed 
5.2.2.2 MoP Time between response option being developed and response decision 
5.2.3 MoP Time between response decision and order of response execution by decision-
authorized entity 
6.2.1 MoP Time between order of response execution by decision-authorized entity and 
completion of allocations by allocation-authorized entity 
6.2.2 MoP Time between allocation of role or responsibility and commencement of role or 
responsibility by action-authorized entity 
Table 21.   Responsive Measures of Performance 
Robust it is meant the ability of the command and control system to identify a 
range of changing circumstances, determine the impact of the changing circumstances, 
and enact an appropriate response.  Selected measures of merit applying to the concept of 





1.2.1 MoP Number of sources confirming information 
1.5.2.4 MoP Percentage of Essential Elements of Information (EEI) met 
1.5.2.5 MoP Percentage of commander’s Essential Elements of Friendly Information (EEFI) met 
1.8.1.1 DP Spatial resolution of observation capability 
1.8.1.2 DP Temporal resolution of observation capability 
1.9.2 MoP Number of nodes in the life of the information to which it can be attributed 
2.1.2.1.2 MoP Time between operational failures for the network of connections 
2.1.2.2.2 MoP Probability of operational failure for network of connections 
2.3.3.1.2 MoP Quantity of overflow beyond capacity for the network of relationships and 
connections 
2.4.2.2 MoP Number of possible solutions for required reconfiguration to meet changing 
circumstances and/or necessary responses 
2.4.3.1.4 MoP Median percentage of nodes which each relationship or connection is capable of 
connecting with 
2.4.4.1.3 MoP Number of nodes the network of connections are capable of adding 
5.4.1 MoP Number of distinct response solutions generated by decision-authorized entities 
concerning a specific change in circumstances 
Table 22.   Robust Measures of Performance and Dimensional Parameters 
Dispersed forces are geographically dispersed as well as dispersed on the network 
which connects the forces.  Selected measures of merit applying to the concept of 
dispersed forces are presented in Table 23.   
1.4.1.2 MoP Percentage of nodes which are capable of viewing information 
1.4.2.2 MoP Percentage of nodes which a capable of acting information 
2.1.1.2 MoP Percentage of total decision-authorized entities that are available via existing 
relationships and connections 
2.1.1.3 MoP Percentage of total allocation-authorized entities that are available via existing 
relationships and connections 
2.1.1.4 MoP Percentage of total action-authorized entities that are available via existing 
relationships and connections 
2.4.1.1.4 MoP Total geographical volume of relationships and connections 
2.4.5.1.3 MoP Median geographical range nodes can maneuver while maintaining needed 
relationships or connections 
5.3.2 MoP Median number of connections between decision-authorized entity and action-
authorized entity 
5.3.4 MoP Percentage of entities connected by existing relationships and connections which are 
authorized to make a specific decision concerning a specific change in circumstances 
6.3.2 MoP Median number of connections between allocation-authorized entity and action-
authorized entity 
6.3.4 MoP Percentage of entities connected by existing relationships and connections which are 
authorized to make allocations concerning a specific decision 
Table 23.   Dispersed Forces Measures of Performance 
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Self-synchronization is the ability of a force to “organize and synchronize 
complex warfare activities from the bottom up” [Cebrowski & Garstka, 1998].  Self-
synchronization includes the ability for the forces to allocate resources at their disposal to 
mass effects to meet an established intent.  Established intent is used instead of the 
traditional commander’s intent since self-synchronizing forces, which either may not be 
connected with their commander or may not have a commander (e.g., coalition forces), 
may be capable identifying and responding to emerging circumstances which alter the 
operating environment and their purpose.  Selected measures of merit applying to the 
concept of self-synchronization are presented in Table 24.   
3.2 MoP Consistency of established intent between forces 
4.2 MoP Consistency of awareness between forces of rules and constraints which are applicable 
to such forces 
5.1.2 MoP Consistency of response with established intent 
5.1.4 MoP Consistency of response with rules and constraints 
5.5.2 MoP Percentage of action-authorized entities with conflicting orders from decision-
authorized entities 
6.1.3.3 MoP Percentage of action-authorized entities which are allocated a role or responsibility 
which they cannot accomplish 
6.4.2 MoP Percentage of roles and responsibilities which are required for the specific decision 
which are not allocated 
Table 24.   Self-synchronization Measures of Performance 
The entire set of selected measures is presented below in Table 25.   
1.2.1 MoP Number of sources confirming information 
1.3.1 MoP Time between changing circumstances and observation 
1.3.2 MoP Time between the observation and the completion of processing the data into 
information 
1.3.4.4 MoP Probability of shelf-life is less then time between updates 
1.4.1.2 MoP Percentage of nodes which are capable of viewing information 
1.4.2.2 MoP Percentage of nodes which a capable of acting information 
1.5.2.4 MoP Percentage of Essential Elements of Information (EEI) met 
1.5.2.5 MoP Percentage of commander’s Essential Elements of Friendly Information (EEFI) met 
1.8.1.1 DP Spatial resolution of observation capability 
1.8.1.2 DP Temporal resolution of observation capability 
1.9.2 MoP Number of nodes in the life of the information to which it can be attributed 
1.9.1 MoP Differential between time information is received by a node and when information can 
be attributed 
2.1.1.2 MoP Percentage of total decision-authorized entities that are available via existing 
relationships and connections 
2.1.1.3 MoP Percentage of total allocation-authorized entities that are available via existing 
relationships and connections 
2.1.1.4 MoP Percentage of total action-authorized entities that are available via existing relationships 
and connections 
2.1.2.1.2 MoP Time between operational failures for the network of connections 
2.1.2.2.2 MoP Probability of operational failure for network of connections 
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2.3.3.1.2 MoP Quantity of overflow beyond capacity for the network of relationships and connections 
2.4.1.1.4 MoP Total geographical volume of relationships and connections 
2.4.2.1.3 MoP Median time required to reconfigure relationships and connections to meet changing 
circumstances and/or necessary responses 
2.4.2.2 MoP Number of possible solutions for required reconfiguration to meet changing 
circumstances and/or necessary responses 
2.4.3.1.4 MoP Median percentage of nodes which each relationship or connection is capable of 
connecting with 
2.4.4.1.3 MoP Number of nodes the network of connections are capable of adding 
2.4.4.2.7 MoP Median time required to add all relationships and connections to meet changing 
circumstances and/or necessary responses 
2.4.5.1.3 MoP Median geographical range nodes can maneuver while maintaining needed relationships 
or connections 
3.2 MoP Consistency of established intent between forces 
4.2 MoP Consistency of awareness between forces of rules and constraints which are applicable 
to such forces 
5.1.2 MoP Consistency of response with established intent 
5.1.4 MoP Consistency of response with rules and constraints 
5.2.1 MoP Time between receipt of information concerning changing circumstances and 
acknowledgement of receipt 
5.2.2.1 MoP Time between acknowledgement of receipt of information concerning changing 
circumstances and response option being developed 
5.2.2.2 MoP Time between response option being developed and response decision 
5.2.3 MoP Time between response decision and order of response execution by decision-
authorized entity 
5.3.2 MoP Median number of connections between decision-authorized entity and action-
authorized entity 
5.3.4 MoP Percentage of entities connected by existing relationships and connections which are 
authorized to make a specific decision concerning a specific change in circumstances 
5.4.1 MoP Number of distinct response solutions generated by decision-authorized entities 
concerning a specific change in circumstances 
5.5.2 MoP Percentage of action-authorized entities with conflicting orders from decision-
authorized entities 
6.1.3.3 MoP Percentage of action-authorized entities which are allocated a role or responsibility 
which they cannot accomplish 
6.2.1 MoP Time between order of response execution by decision-authorized entity and completion 
of allocations by allocation-authorized entity 
6.2.2 MoP Time between allocation of role or responsibility and commencement of role or 
responsibility by action-authorized entity 
6.3.2 MoP Median number of connections between allocation-authorized entity and action-
authorized entity 
6.3.4 MoP Percentage of entities connected by existing relationships and connections which are 
authorized to make allocations concerning a specific decision 
6.4.2 MoP Percentage of roles and responsibilities which are required for the specific decision 
which are not allocated 
Table 25.   Selected Measures of Merit 
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APPENDIX E: FUNCTIONAL DECOMPOSITION 
A function is a process that takes inputs and transforms them into outputs [Buede, 
2000:  178].  Recall that a system is “a set of components (subsystems, segments) acting 
together to achieve a set of common objectives via the accomplishment of a set of tasks” 
[Buede, 2000: 38].  A system, therefore, is defined by 1) its set of objectives and 2) the 
functions required for it to achieve such set of objectives.  As discussed in Appendix C:  
External Systems Diagram, the execution of the C2 process is the objective of a C2 
system.  The functional architecture describes how the system transforms the given inputs 
into the desired outputs. 
This appendix will describe concepts pertinent to the functional decomposition of 
a naval tactical command and control system not previously described in the body of this 
thesis.  The first section will discuss C2 functions identified by past researchers.  The 
second section will present concepts concerning information and human decision making 
influential to the definition of functions and sub-functions. 
A. SURVEY OF COMMAND AND CONTROL FUNCTIONS 
As during the development of the operational concept, a publication review was 
conducted to provide the author with a foundational knowledge of the functions of 
command and control.  Though by no means an exhaustive review, the author did seek to 
review many of most referenced contemporary publications.  As stated above, the 
execution of the C2 process is the objective of a C2 system.  Therefore, many of the 
publications reviewed contained conceptual models of the C2 process.  Table 26.  














Establish rules and 
constraints 
Monitor and assess 






education Provisioning  
Table 26.   Command and Control Functions  
[from Alberts & Hayes, 2006: 35-36] 


















Objectives Make Decision 






Table 27.   Command and Control Functions 
[from Van Creveld, 1985: 6-7] 
Command and Control Functions 
Sense Process Compare Decide Act 
Table 28.   Command and Control Functions [from Lawson, 1981] 
Command and Control Functions 
Sense Assess Generate Select Plan Act 





Defensive Command and Control Functions 
Threat Detection Target Tracking Discrimination Identification 





Table 30.   Defensive Command and Control Functions  
[from Athans, 1986: 6-7] 
Target Engagement Functions 
Find Fix Track Target Engage Assess 
Table 31.   Target Engagement Functions [from JP 3-60, 2007]  
Communications Systems Functions 
Acquire 
Information 















Table 32.   Communications Systems Functions  
[from JP 6-0, 2006: Ch I, 6-8] 
B. INFORMATION AND HUMAN DECISION MAKING 
The basic external systems diagram developed in the operational concept shows 
that people and the communications & information systems are two categories of 
components of the C2 system and that inputs to and outputs form the system, along with 
the cross-communication between the subsystems, is information.  Understanding what 
humans and automated systems can bring to the C2 process can be beneficial in the 
decomposition of the top-level functions.  Additionally, understanding the forms of 
information and the processes to convert one form of information into another can 
enlighten the system engineer to other potential sub-functions of the C2 system. 
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1. Cognitive Hierarchy 
Information comes in many forms.  One form of information is transformed to 
another form of information through a process.  Ackoff [1989] posits that the forms of 
information are actually structured in a hierarchy of five forms.  The lowest form of 
information in his hierarchy is data, which he contends is a product of observation.  
Information, the next highest form of information in his hierarchy, is data which has been 
“processed into a useable (i.e., relevant) form” [Ackoff, 1989:  3].  Learning, either by 
instruction or by extracting it from experience, transforms information into knowledge 
[Ackoff, 1989: 4].  Ackoff describes learning with changing conditions as adaption.  He 
then contends that systematic learning and adaption, through diagnosis and prescription, 
transforms knowledge into understanding.  Finally, wisdom is understanding with value, 
judgment being the mental function which transforms understanding into wisdom.  
Ackoff’s hierarchy of information and processes is presented in Figure 46.   
 
Figure 46.   Hierarchy of Information Forms [after Ackoff, 1989] 
There are many concepts within Ackoff’s hierarchy which have significant 
pertinence to this thesis.  First, the most obvious given the explanation above, is that 
information comes in many forms.  Second, non-human systems can be built that perform 
all of the processes except judgment, which is solely a capability of humans.  This differs 
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significantly from similar hierarchies described in Naval Doctrine Publication 6 [1995: 
21] and Marine Corps Doctrine Publication 6 [1996: 67] that contend knowledge and 
above requires cognition, a human-only capability.  Figure 47.  and Figure 48.  present 
each, respectively.  The third significant idea which is inferred from Ackoff’s hierarchy is 
that, just as there is a process to convert one form to a higher form, there must be a 
process to convert one form to a lower form.  This is best understood with the fourth 
significant idea, also inferred, that transmission of a form of information requires that it 
be transformed into data.   
 





Figure 48.   Information Hierarchy [after MCDP 6, 1996:  67] 
To understand the third and fourth ideas, take the example where one person has a 
piece of knowledge which they wish to share with another person.  As Ackoff explains, 
this is done through instruction [pg. 4].  To gain knowledge, the student has to learn 
information.  To learn the information, though, requires the student to observe the 
instruction by the instructor.  The instructor, therefore, must transform his knowledge 
into data for the student to learn.   
Communication of information, in whatever form, is based on the exchange of 
data through observation.  Examples are numerous in human-to-machine communication 
(e.g., keyboards), machine-to-human communication (e.g., visual displays), and machine-
to-machine communications (e.g., common protocols).  A C2 system interfaces with 
external systems.  Therefore, it must be capable of transforming its inputs, which are in 
the form of data, into useful information.  It must also be capable of transforming its 
useful information into data to become output.  Process, and its inverse function, must be 
a function of the C2 system.  Learning, diagnose, prescribe, and their inverse functions 
are candidate functions as well.  Judgment and its inverse are also candidate functions, 
but, as Ackoff contends, can only be executed by human components of the C2 system. 
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2. Human Decision Making 
People and communications & information systems  are two types of components 
of a C2 system.  The significance of these two categories is that they highlight the types 
of entities within the system which can fill, partially or wholly, the functions of the C2 
system – humans and automated systems.  Understanding what humans and automated 
systems can bring to the C2 process can be beneficial in the decomposition of the top-
level functions.  The first step, then, is to review the process by which humans make 
decisions.  Also, given that the commander is an external system, this review can identify 
inputs for the commander which may subsequently be outputs from the C2 system. 
Human decision making is a major reason why command and control has been an 
enigma.  Understanding and modeling human decision making has plagued engineers and 
analysts for as long as they have studied command and control.  Many have developed 
conceptual models to explain all or part of the process.  Despite the mystery of human 
decision making, reviewing several of these conceptual models of the process can 
enlighten the system engineer to potential sub-functions of generate response options and 
other top-level functions.  The first conceptual model to review, which is perhaps the 
most famous amongst military scholars, is the Observation-Orientation-Decision-Action 
(OODA) Loop presented by Boyd [1996].  A depiction of the OODA Loop from Boyd’s 
unpublished lecture notes is presented in Figure 49.   
Boyd’s OODA Loop is the culmination of decades of research and analysis which 
began with his study of air attack, then air-to-air combat, then finally to a more general 
theory of competition.  The OODA Loop has been applied by contemporary scholars to 
describe the C2 process for groups, but Boyd’s original intentions leading to the OODA 
loop was to describe the process an individual uses when combating another individual.  
It is from this individual, human decision making view that the OODA loop will be used 
for generating sub-functions.  Boyd did not formally publish any of his work, choosing 
rather to give lectures concerning his concepts, and unfortunately the author was not able 
to attend any of his lectures.  Therefore, the discussion below is a result of the author’s 
review of Boyd’s unpublished lecture notes. 
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The OODA Loop is a relatively straightforward conceptual model with nearly the 
entire concept neatly depicted in Figure 49.  Competition for an individual is an iterative 
process of four phases – observation, orientation, decision, and action.  Each phase feeds 
forward to the next phase and each phase provides feedback to observation.  There are six 
inputs to the process, or in other words six inputs to the human decision making system.  
Three of the inputs are within observation (outside information, unfolding circumstances, 
and unfolding environmental interaction) and three within orientation (cultural traditions, 
genetic heritage, and previous experiences; new information is product of observation).  
These six inputs are analyzed and synthesized during orientation to feed the decision and 
action phases.  The analysis and synthesis of the inputs, as Boyd contends, is the most 
crucial to the entire decision making process. 
The second O, orientation – as the repository of our genetic heritage, cultural 
tradition, and previous experiences – is the most important part of the O-O-D-A loop 
since it shapes the way we observe, the way we decide, and the way we act.  [Boyd, 
1987:  26] 
From this basic review of the OODA Loop, the system engineer can conclude that 
the human decision making system is comprised of six top-level functions – observe, 
orient, hypothesize, test, decide, and act.  In addition, the sub-functions of orient are 





Figure 49.   OODA Loop [from Boyd, 1996] 
The second conceptual model to review is the Recognition-Primed Decision 
Making (RPD) model presented by Klein [1988].  Klein contends that there are two types 
of approaches to decision making, one analytical and the other recognitional.  Analytical 
approaches, Klein argues, are most appropriate in situations with “low time pressure, 
need for careful documentation, and context free task with many components” while 
recognitional approaches are appropriate in situations with “high time pressure, highly 
experienced decision maker, low need for precision, and strong contextual influences” 
[1988, 86].  From previous work with other researchers, Klein presents and discuses the 
RPD model developed, which is shown in Figure 50.    
In the simplest case of the RPD model, the decision maker uses cues of the 
situation and knowledge to recognize a situation.  The recognition also incorporates the 
goals which “can be achieved, what cues to monitor, and other types of expectancies” 
[Klein, 1988:  87].  From this recognition, the decision maker identifies the typical 
response and implements the action.  In the next case, when time is available, the 
decision maker evaluates the typical action and implements the action.  No other actions 
other than the typical action are considered or evaluated.  In the final case of RPD, again 
when time is available, the decision maker evaluates the typical reaction from a queue of 
actions.  The action may be implemented, modified, or rejected.  If the action is rejected, 
another action from the queue is evaluated and then implemented, modified, or rejected.  
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This process continues until an action is selected and implemented.  A difference between 
recognitional and analytical approaches is that, for example, in the final case of RPD the 

































(a) Automatic RPD (b) Verify RPD (c) Serial RPD
 
Figure 50.   Recognition-Primed Decision Making [from Klein, 1988] 
Though both conceptual models have yielded relatively few ideas for sub-
functions of the C2 system, they have identified system outputs and possible constraints 
to the outputs.  A C2 system’s outputs to the decision making person, when one exists, 
include information concerning the environment, the interaction between the force and 
the environment, and any other outside information pertinent to the environment (e.g., 
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updated ROE).  Constraints on the C2 system may be to present the outputs to the 
decision maker taking into account inputs outside of the C2 system, namely genetic 
heritage, cultural traditions, and previous experiences.  In addition, when time is critical, 
it may be best for the C2 system to present response options in series rather than in a set. 
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THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
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APPENDIX F: INPUT-OUTPUT RELATIONSHIPS 
After the functional hierarchy was detailed, the next phase of the functional 
architecture development was to describe the relationships between inputs and outputs of 
the system.  During the operational concept, interaction diagrams were developed 
demonstrating the relationship between certain inputs, outputs, and the system.  This 
appendix presents the further detail to explain the process (i.e., sequence of functions) by 
which inputs are converted into outputs. 
Below is a collection of relationship diagrams developed for this thesis using 
IDEF0.  The color selection of lines and font are not standard for IDEF0 but were 
implemented to make the relationship diagrams more easily readable.  Red lines and red, 
italic, sans-serif fonts denote procedures and controls, which will be discussed in the 
physical architecture.  Blue lines and blue, bold, serif fonts denote mechanisms, again 
which will be discussed in the physical architecture.  Black lines and black, sans serif 
fonts denote inputs and outputs.  In those instances where an output of one function was a 
control for another function, the line and font was drawn in red. 
The sub-diagrams presented below denote mechanisms which correspond to 
generic physical components which were developed in the physical architecture.  Specific 
mechanisms, or instantiated physical components, for each function were identified and 
finalized during the development of the operational architecture.  Further discussion of 
the mechanism, shown in the following figures, is presented in the physical architecture 
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Figure 63.   Relationship Diagram – A0614 
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APPENDIX G: OPERATIONAL ARCHITECTURE 
The operational architecture provides a description of the system design, 
incorporating the products of the operational concept, functional architecture, and 
physical architecture.  This appendix provides further documentation concerning the 
operational architecture to include the full collection of relationship diagrams developed 
modeling the contact prosecution process and the associated activation and controls of the 
functions.  In addition, this appendix provides further detail of the Arena® model of the 
contact prosecution and the results of the simulations conducted. 
A. CONTACT PROSECUTION 
This section presents the key thread of processes converting inputs into outputs 
for contact prosecution.  First, the collection of relationship diagrams using the IDEF0 
methodology is presented.  Second, the activation and controls of the pertinent functions 















































































































































































   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   


















































































   
   
   
   
   
   
   





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Function Output Required Inputs Required Controls 
1.0 Transport Information - Transported Data - Transport Data N/A 
2.0 Process Information 
- Transport Data 
- Response Option - Communication Protocols 
- Response - Communication Protocols 
- Order - Communication Protocols 
- Expected 
Circumstances - Communication Protocols 
- Infeasible Response - Communication Protocols 
- Incomplete Response - Communication Protocols 
- Unassigned Tasks - Communication Protocols 
- Illegal Response - Communication Protocols 
- Immoral Response - Communication Protocols 
- Immoral Tasks - Communication Protocols 
- Past Experiences - Stored Data - Communication Protocols 
- Resources' 
Capabilities - Stored Data - Communication Protocols 
- Response Option 
Output 
- Response Option - Communication Protocols 
- Response Option 
Data - Communication Protocols 
- Assignment - Transported Data - Communication Protocols 
- Warning - Transported Data - Communication Protocols 
- Assignment Output - Transported Data - Communication Protocols 
- Warning Output - Transported Data - Communication Protocols 
- Circumstance 
Output - Transported Data - Communication Protocols 
- Intent Output - Transported Data - Communication Protocols 
- Response - Transported Data - Past Experiences 
- Infeasible Response - Transported Data - Past Experiences 
- Incomplete 
Response - Transported Data - Past Experiences 
- Illegal Response - Transported Data - Past Experiences 
- Immoral Response - Transported Data - Past Experiences 
- Unassigned Tasks - Transported Data - Past Experiences 
- Immoral Tasks - Transported Data - Past Experiences 
- Expected 
Circumstances - Transported Data - Past Experiences 
- Response Option - Transported Data - Past Experiences 
- Order - Order - Past Experiences 
- Current 
Circumstances - Transported Data - Past Experiences 
- Past Circumstances - Transported Data - Past Experiences 
- Established Intent - Transported Data - Past Experiences 
2.1 Convert Data 
- Transport Data 
- Response Option - Communication Protocols 
- Response - Communication Protocols 
- Order - Communication Protocols 
- Expected 
Circumstances - Communication Protocols 
- Infeasible Response - Communication Protocols 
- Incomplete Response - Communication Protocols 
- Unassigned Tasks - Communication Protocols 
- Illegal Response - Communication Protocols 
- Immoral Response - Communication Protocols 
- Immoral Tasks - Communication Protocols 
- C2 Data - Transported Data - Communication Protocols 
- Past Data - Stored Data - Communication Protocols 
- Past Experiences - Stored Data - Communication Protocols 
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- Resources' 
Capabilities - Stored Data - Communication Protocols 
- Input Data 
- Order - Communication Protocols 
- Sensor System 
Information - Communication Protocols 
- Weapon System 
Information - Communication Protocols 
- Platform Information - Communication Protocols 
- Assignment - Assignment Data - Communication Protocols 
- Warning - Warning Data - Communication Protocols 
- Assignment Output - Assignment Data - Communication Protocols 
- Warning Output - Warning Data - Communication Protocols 
- Response Option 
Output 
- Response Option 
Data - Communication Protocols 
- Circumstance 
Output - Circumstance Data - Communication Protocols 
- Intent Output - Intent Data - Communication Protocols 
2.1.1 Transport Conversion - Transport Data 
- Response Option - Communication Protocols 
- Response - Communication Protocols 
- Order - Communication Protocols 
- Expected 
Circumstances - Communication Protocols 
- Infeasible Response - Communication Protocols 
- Incomplete Response - Communication Protocols 
- Unassigned Tasks - Communication Protocols 
- Illegal Response - Communication Protocols 
- Immoral Response - Communication Protocols 
- Immoral Tasks - Communication Protocols 
- C2 Data - Transported Data - Communication Protocols 
2.1.2 Storage Conversion - Past Data - Stored Data - Communication Protocols - Past Experiences - Stored Data - Communication Protocols 
2.1.3 Input Conversion - Input Data 
- Order - Communication Protocols 
- Sensor System 
Information - Communication Protocols 
- Weapon System 
Information - Communication Protocols 
- Platform Information - Communication Protocols 
2.1.4 Output Conversion 
- Assignment - Assignment Data - Communication Protocols 
- Warning - Warning Data - Communication Protocols 
- Assignment Output - Assignment Data - Communication Protocols 
- Warning Output - Warning Data - Communication Protocols 
- Response Option 
Output 
- Response Option 
Data - Communication Protocols 
- Circumstance 
Output - Circumstance Data - Communication Protocols 
- Intent Output - Intent Data - Communication Protocols 
2.2 Evaluate Information 
- Valid Past Data - Past Data - Past Experiences 
- Valid Input Data - Input Data - Past Experiences 
- Valid C2 Data - C2 Data - Past Experiences 
2.2.1 Evaluate accuracy of information - Accurate Data 
- Past Data - Past Experiences 
- Input Data - Past Experiences 
- C2 Data - Past Experiences 
2.2.2 Evaluate completeness of information 
- Valid Past Data - Accurate Data - Past Experiences 
- Valid Input Data - Accurate Data - Past Experiences 
- Valid C2 Data - Accurate Data - Past Experiences 
2.3 Analyze information - Data 
- Information - Past Experiences 
- Executable Response - Past Experiences 
- Data - Past Experiences 
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- Assignment Data - Information - Past Experiences 
- Warning Data - Information - Past Experiences 
- Response Option 
Data - Information - Past Experiences 
- Circumstance Data - Information - Past Experiences 
- Intent Data - Information - Past Experiences 
2.4 Synthesize information 
- Information 
- Valid Input Data - Past Experiences 
- Valid Past Data - Past Experiences 
- Response Option 
Data - Past Experiences 
- Data - Past Experiences 
- Response - Valid C2 Data - Past Experiences 
- Infeasible Response - Valid C2 Data - Past Experiences 
- Incomplete 
Response - Valid C2 Data - Past Experiences 
- Illegal Response - Valid C2 Data - Past Experiences 
- Immoral Response - Valid C2 Data - Past Experiences 
- Unassigned Tasks - Valid C2 Data - Past Experiences 
- Immoral Tasks - Valid C2 Data - Past Experiences 
- Expected 
Circumstances - Valid C2 Data - Past Experiences 
- Response Option - Valid C2 Data - Past Experiences 
- Order - Valid C2 Data - Past Experiences 
- Current 
Circumstances - Valid C2 Data - Past Experiences 
- Past Circumstances - Valid C2 Data - Past Experiences 
- Established Intent - Valid C2 Data - Past Experiences 
3.0 Store information - Stored Data - Storage Data N/A 
4.0 Present information - Presented Data 
- Assignment Output - HSI Requirements 
- Warning Output - HSI Requirements 
- Circumstance Output - HSI Requirements 
- Intent Output - HSI Requirements 
- Response Option 
Output - HSI Requirements 
5.0 Generate response options - Response Option 
- Current 
Circumstances 
- Past Circumstances 
- Established Intent 
- Past Experiences 
- Law of Armed Conflict 
- Rules of Engagement 
- Weapons Control Status 
- No Strike List 
- Restricted Target List 
- Tactics, Techniques, and 
Procedures 
- Pre-planned Responses 





- Established Intent 
- Response 
- Past Experiences 
- Law of Armed Conflict 
- Rules of Engagement 
- Weapons Control Status 
- No Strike List 
- Restricted Target List 
- Tactics, Techniques, and 
Procedures 
- Pre-planned Responses 
- Resources' Capabilities 
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- Established Intent 
- Infeasible Response 
- Past Experiences 
- Law of Armed Conflict 
- Rules of Engagement 
- Weapons Control Status 
- No Strike List 
- Restricted Target List 
- Tactics, Techniques, and 
Procedures 
- Pre-planned Responses 
- Resources' Capabilities 
- Infeasible Response 
- Past Experiences 
- Law of Armed Conflict 
- Rules of Engagement 
- Weapons Control Status 
- No Strike List 
- Restricted Target List 
- Tactics, Techniques, and 
Procedures 
- Pre-planned Responses 
- Resources' Capabilities 
- Established Intent- 
Incomplete Response- 
Unassigned Tasks 
- Past Experiences- Law of 
Armed Conflict- Rules of 
Engagement- Weapons 
Control Status- No Strike 
List- Restricted Target List- 




- Incomplete Response 
- Unassigned Tasks 
- Past Experiences 
- Law of Armed Conflict 
- Rules of Engagement 
- Weapons Control Status 
- No Strike List 
- Restricted Target List 
- Tactics, Techniques, and 
Procedures 
- Pre-planned Responses 
- Resources' Capabilities 
- Illegal Response 
- Past Experiences 
- Law of Armed Conflict 
- Rules of Engagement 
- Weapons Control Status 
- No Strike List 
- Restricted Target List 
- Tactics, Techniques, and 
Procedures 
- Pre-planned Responses 
- Resources' Capabilities 
- Established Intent 
- Immoral Response 
- Immoral Tasks 
- Past Experiences 
- Law of Armed Conflict 
- Rules of Engagement 
- Weapons Control Status 
- No Strike List 
- Restricted Target List 
- Tactics, Techniques, and 
Procedures 
- Pre-planned Responses 
- Resources' Capabilities 
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- Immoral Response 
- Immoral Tasks 
- Past Experiences 
- Law of Armed Conflict 
- Rules of Engagement 
- Weapons Control Status 
- No Strike List 
- Restricted Target List 
- Tactics, Techniques, and 
Procedures 
- Pre-planned Responses 
- Resources' Capabilities 





- Past Experiences- Law of 
Armed Conflict- Rules of 
Engagement- Weapons 
Control Status- No Strike 
List- Restricted Target List- 







- Established Intent 
- Past Experiences 
- Law of Armed Conflict 
- Rules of Engagement 
- Weapons Control Status 
- No Strike List 
- Restricted Target List 
- Tactics, Techniques, and 
Procedures 
- Pre-planned Responses 
- Established Intent 
- Infeasible Response 
- Past Experiences 
- Tactics, Techniques, and 
Procedures 
- Pre-planned Responses 
- Established Intent 
- Incomplete Response 
- Unassigned Tasks 
- Past Experiences 
- Established Intent 
- Immoral Response 
- Immoral Tasks 
- Past Experiences 
5.1 Determine changing circumstances 




- Past Circumstances 





- Past Experiences 





- Past Circumstances 





- Past Experiences 
5.1.1.1 
Detect differences 




















5.1.2 Identify changing circumstances 
- Identified Changing 
Circumstances 
- Changing 
Circumstances - Past Experiences 
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5.1.3 Classify changing circumstances 
- Classified Changing 
Circumstances 
- Identified Changing 
Circumstances - Past Experiences 
5.1.4 Confirm changing circumstances 
- Verified Changing 
Circumstances 
- Classified Changing 
Circumstances [X2] N/A 
5.2 Determine required tasks - Required Tasks 
- Verified Changing 
Circumstances- 
Established Intent 
- Past Experiences- Law of 
Armed Conflict- Rules of 
Engagement- Weapons 
Control Status- No Strike 
List- Restricted Target List- 
Tactics, Techniques, and 
Procedures- Pre-planned 
Responses 
- Established Intent 
- Infeasible Response 
- Past Experiences 
- Tactics, Techniques, and 
Procedures 
- Pre-planned Responses 
- Established Intent 
- Incomplete Response 
- Unassigned Tasks 
- Past Experiences 
- Established Intent 
- Immoral Response 
- Immoral Tasks 
- Past Experiences 
5.2.1 Identify specified tasks - Specified Tasks 
- Verified Changing 
Circumstances 
- Established Intent 
- Law of Armed Conflict 
- Rules of Engagement 
- Weapons Control Status 
- No Strike List 
- Restricted Target List 
- TTPs 
- PPRs 
5.2.2 Hypothesize implicit tasks - Implicit Tasks 
- Verified Changing 
Circumstances 
- Established Intent 
- Past Experiences 
- Law of Armed Conflict 
- Rules of Engagement 
- Weapons Control Status 
- No Strike List 
- Restricted Target List 
- TTPs 
- PPRs 
- Specified Tasks 
5.2.3 Hypothesize emergent tasks - Emergent Tasks 
- Verified Changing 
Circumstances 
- Established Intent 
- Past Experiences 
- Law of Armed Conflict 
- Rules of Engagement 
- Weapons Control Status 
- No Strike List 
- Restricted Target List 
- TTPs 
- PPRs 
- Specified Tasks 
5.2.4 Confirm Required Tasks - Required Tasks 
- Established Intent 
- Infeasible Response 
- Past Experiences 
- TTPs 
- PPRs 
- Established Intent 
- Incomplete Response 
- Unassigned Tasks 
- Past Experiences 
- Established Intent- 
Immoral Response- 
Immoral Tasks 
- Past Experiences 
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5.3 Identify resources for required tasks - Solution Space 
- Required Tasks 
- Past Experiences 
- Law of Armed Conflict 
- Rules of Engagement 
- Weapons Control Status 
- No Strike List 
- Restricted Target List 
- TTPs 
- PPRs 
- Resources' Capabilities 
- Response 
- Past Experiences 
- Law of Armed Conflict 
- Rules of Engagement 
- Weapons Control Status 
- No Strike List 
- Restricted Target List 
- Tactics, Techniques, and 
Procedures 
- Pre-planned Responses 
- Resources' Capabilities 
- Infeasible Resposne 
- Past Experiences 
- Law of Armed Conflict 
- Rules of Engagement 
- Weapons Control Status 
- No Strike List 
- Restricted Target List 
- Tactics, Techniques, and 
Procedures 
- Pre-planned Responses 
- Resources' Capabilities 
- Unassigned Tasks 
- Incomplete Response 
- Past Experiences 
- Law of Armed Conflict 
- Rules of Engagement 
- Weapons Control Status 
- No Strike List 
- Restricted Target List 
- Tactics, Techniques, and 
Procedures 
- Pre-planned Responses 
- Resources' Capabilities 
- Illegal Response 
- Past Experiences 
- Law of Armed Conflict 
- Rules of Engagement 
- Weapons Control Status 
- No Strike List 
- Restricted Target List 
- Tactics, Techniques, and 
Procedures 
- Pre-planned Responses 
- Resources' Capabilities 
- Immoral Response 
- Past Experiences- Law of 
Armed Conflict- Rules of 
Engagement- Weapons 
Control Status- No Strike 
List- Restricted Target List-  





5.4 Allocate resources for required tasks - Response Option - Solution Space 
- Past Experiences 
- Law of Armed Conflict 
- Rules of Engagement 
- Weapons Control Status 
- No Strike List 
- Restricted Target List 
- Tactics, Techniques, and 
Procedures 
- Pre-planned Responses 
- Resources' Capabilities 
- Required Tasks 
6.0 Select response options 
Executable Response 
- Response Option 
- Resources' 
Capabilities 
- Past Experiences 
- Established Intent 
- Required Tasks 
- Law of Armed Conflict 
- Rules of Engagement 
- Weapons Control Status 
- No Strike List 
- Restricted Target List 
- Tactics, Techniques, and 
Procedures 









- Past Experiences 
- Required Tasks 
- Law of Armed Conflict 
- Rules of Engagement 
- Weapons Control Status 
- No Strike List 
- Restricted Target List 
6.1 Evaluate response options 
- Evaluated Response 





- Past Experiences 
- Established Intent 
- Required Tasks 
- Law of Armed Conflict 
- Rules of Engagement 
- Weapons Control Status 
- No Strike List 
- Restricted Target List 
Expected 
Circumstances 





- Past Experiences 
- Required Tasks 
- Law of Armed Conflict 
- Rules of Engagement 
- Weapons Control Status 
- No Strike List 
- Restricted Target List 
6.1.1 Evaluate feasibility of options 
- Feasible Response  
- Infeasible Response 
- Legal Response 
- Resources' 
Capabilities 
- Required Tasks 
6.1.2 Evaluate completeness of options 
- Complete Response  
- Incomplete 
Response 
- Feasible Response 
- Resources' 
Capabilities 
- Required Tasks 
- Unassigned Tasks 
- Feasible Response 
- Resources' 
Capabilities 
- Required Tasks 
6.1.3 Evaluate legality of options 
- Legal Response 
- Illegal Response - Response Option 
- Law of Armed Conflict 
- Rules of Engagement 
- Weapons Control Status 
- No Strike List 




tasks with law of 
armed conflict 
- LOAC Complied 
Response 
- Illegal Response 
- Response Option - Law of Armed Conflict 
6.1.3.2 
Compare assigned 
tasks with rules of 
engagement 
- Legal Response  
- Illegal Response 
- LOAC Complied 
Response 
- Rules of Engagement 
- Weapons Control Status 
- No Strike List 
- Restricted Target List 
6.1.4 Estimate effectiveness of option 
- Evaluated Response 





- Past Experiences 
- Established Intent 
- Expected 
Circumstances 





- Past Experiences 
6.1.4.1 Hypothesize expected circumstances 
- Expected 
Circumstances 
- Complete Response 
- Resources' 
Capabilities 
- Past Experiences 
6.1.4.2 Estimate measures of effectiveness - Evaluated Response 







- Past Experiences 
- Established Intent 
6.2 Judge response options - Response - Immoral Response - Evaluated Response 
- Past Experiences 
- Established Intent 
- Ethics 
6.3 Assign tasks to resources 
- Executable 
Response - Response 
- Tactics, Techniques, and 
Procedures 
- Pre-planned Responses 
Table 33.   Contact Prosecution – Function Activation and Control 
B. ARENA® MODELS OF THE CONTACT PROSECUTION PROCESS 
To demonstrate the feasibility of using the developed architectural framework to 
analyze and compare alternative designs, Arena®, version 10.0, was used.  Arena® is a 
discrete-event modeling and simulation software developed by Rockwell Automation, 
Inc.  This section presents the developed Arena® models of the contact prosecution 
process and the subsequent simulation results. 
1. The Models 
Arena® was used to develop two models, one for each of the alternative 
architectures of the system.  The models represent a portion of the notional contact 
prosecution process discussed in Chapter VII and detailed in the previous sections of this 
thesis.  The top-level diagram, which is identical for both models, is presented in Figure 
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79.  The diagram shows the three top-level functions which are a part of the process:  
Transport Information, Process Information, and Select Response Options.  The other 
items in the diagram are for the creation and disposal of the entities (i.e., response options 
and responses) flowing through the model, as well as for measuring and controlling the 
flow of the entities. 
 
Figure 79.   Arena® Model – Top-level 
In both models, the first step is the creation of a response option.  The response 
option is then copied; the number of copies determined by the selected architecture.  The 
response option and its copies are then processed, transported, and processed again to 
serve as an input to Select Response Options.  The first response to arrive at a particular 
line of mechanisms is used.  All other copies sent to such line of mechanisms are 
discarded.  The response option is then evaluated and judged.  If the response option is 
determined to be either illegal, infeasible, incomplete, or immoral, it is sent to Redo CP0a 
to serve as input for the generation of another response option.  If it is determined to be 
legal, feasible, incomplete, and moral, it becomes a response.  The response is copied 
multiple times, again as determined by the selected architecture.  The response is then 
processed, transported, and processed to serve as input for Select Response Options 
where tasks are assigned to resources.  Again, the first response to arrive at a particular 
 209 
line of mechanisms is used while all other responses are discarded.  Once the assignments 
are complete, the response becomes an executable response and the model is complete. 
The use of Arena® to model the selected portion of the contact prosecution 
process required the adaptation of the previously generated relationship diagrams along 
with the integration of the identified functional activations.  Whenever possible, the 
author attempted to construct the Arena® models to flow, both visually and logically, as 
the previously generated relationship diagrams.  In addition, many logical decision points 
were included throughout the model to control the flow of the entities (e.g., response 
options and responses). 
A major challenge faced, due to the selection of Arena® as the modeling and 
simulation software, was the modeling of the systems resources.  Arena® does provide a 
simple module for managing resources, to include the number available to the system and 
the rules for each resources use.  The software also allows for a straight-forward 
assignment of a resource, or a set of resources, to a given function.  The difficulty with 
using Arena® arose when trying to model the parallel paths associated with a distributed 
network.  To overcome this challenge, most functions were further dissected logically to 
ensure a particular entity was assigned the corresponding mechanism.  For example, as 
shown in Figure 80.  and Figure 81.  , responses being transported were first separated 
according to their destination line-of-mechanisms in Select Response Options and then 
according to the specific link to be used for transport.  This was done to ensure that the 
entities were properly delayed and queues for future mechanisms were properly 
established.  This approach, however, makes the model cumbersome and difficult to scale 
(e.g., adding more parallel subordinate commanders).  Though a better approach to 
account for these difficulties may have been possible using Arena®, such application was 
beyond the skill of the author. 
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Figure 80.   Arena® Model – Transport Information 
 
 
Figure 81.   Arena® Model – Transport to 6a1 
The model for Alternative #2 was developed first.  From this, the model for 
Alternative #1 was created by reducing the number of copies of response options and 
responses generated.  In essence, for Alternative #1, copies of response options and 
responses were made only to follow the top line-of-mechanisms for Select Response 
Options of Alternative #2, when appropriate.  This approach ensured the attributes and 
characteristics of each function and resource remained consistent between models.  The 
only other significant changes between models involved the respective collection of data.  
Figure 82.  through Figure 86.  present selected views of the Arena® models developed.  
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Table 34.  shows the distributions and resources associated with each function.  The 
section following discusses the simulations and results. 
 
 
Figure 82.   Arena® Model – Process Information 
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Figure 83.   Arena® Model – Select Response Option 
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Figure 84.   Arena® Model – Evaluate Response Options 
 
Figure 85.   Arena® Model – Judge Response Options 
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 Function Distribution Resources 
1.0 Transport Information Normal (0.0005, 0.0001) Links – 3 per line-
of-mechanisms 
2.1.1 Transport Conversion Normal (0.05, 0.01) Processor – 1 per 
link per line-of-
mechanisms 
2.2.1 Evaluate Accuracy of Data Normal (0.05, 0.01) Processors – 1 per 
line-of-mechanisms 
2.2.2 Evaluate Completeness of 
Data 
Normal (0.05, 0.01) Processors – 1 per 
line-of-mechanisms 
2.3 Analyze Information Normal (1.0, 0.2) Processors – 1 per 
line-of-mechanisms 
2.4 Synthesize Information Normal (0.2, 0.02) Processors – 2 per 
line-of-mechanisms 
6.1.1 Evaluate feasibility of 
options 
Normal (0.08, 0.02) Processors – 1 per 
line-of-mechanisms 
6.1.2 Evaluate completeness of 
options 
Normal (0.05, 0.01) Processors – 1 per 
line-of-mechanisms 
6.1.3.1 Compare assigned tasks 
with law of armed conflict 
Normal (0.05, 0.01) Processors – 1 per 
line-of-mechanisms 
6.1.3.2 Compare assigned tasks 
with rules of engagement 
Normal (0.05, 0.01) Processors – 1 per 
line-of-mechanisms 
6.1.4.1 Hypothesize expected 
circumstances 
Normal (1.0, 0.2) Processors – 1 per 
line-of-mechanisms 
6.1.4.2 Estimate measures of 
effectiveness 
Normal (0.8, 0.2) Processors – 1 per 
line-of-mechanisms 
6.2 Judge Response Options Normal (3.0, 1.0) Subordinate 
Commander – 1 per 
line-of-mechanisms 
6.3 Assign Tasks to Resources Normal (5.0, 1.0) Processors – 4 per 
line-of-mechanisms 
N/A Redo CP06a (e.g., make 
new response option) 
Triangle (3.0, 5.0, 10.0) N/A 
Table 34.   Associated Distributions and Resources for Functions 
2. The Simulation 
The objective of simulating the two models was to demonstrate possible 
performance differences in the alternative architectures.  A combination of three MoMs 
from the systems objective hierarchy was selected to highlight such differences.  First, 
the sum of MoP 5.2.2.2, time between response option being developed and response 
decision, and MoP 6.2.1, time between order of response execution by decision-
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authorized entity and completion of allocations by allocation-authorized entity, was 
recorded for each alternative design.  Second, MoCE 5.5, consistency of response 
between decision-authorized entities, was also recorded. 
Once both models were complete, thirty replications were conducted for each.  
Each replication began with a warm-up time of three simulation-minutes to fill queues 
and task resources followed by ten simulation-minutes in which data was collected.  For 
both alternative models, response options were created with inter-arrival times following 
an exponential distribution with a mean of 1/5 s-1.  As a result, approximately 100+ 
response options were created and served as input during the ten operational simulation-
minutes.   
The minimum time from response option creation until the generation of an 
associated executable response, the sum of MoP 5.2.2.2 and MoP 6.2.1, was recorded for 
each response option and, in the case of Alternative #2, for each line of Select Response 
Option mechanisms.  In addition, for Alternative #2, the executable responses for each 
response option were compared to determine consistency (i.e., MoCE 5.5).  Results for 
the model of Alternative #1 are presented in Table 35.  The first column denotes the 
replication number.  The second column denotes the average time for one of the 
approximately 100+ response options to generate an executable response.  The third 
column denotes the equivalent minimum time for the replication while the fourth column 
denotes the equivalent maximum time.  The fifth column shows the number of response 
options created during the replication.  The sixth column shows the number of executable  
responses generated from the response options for the replication.  Finally, the seventh 
column presents the percentage of response options which generate executable responses 














Percentage # Avg Min Max 
1 15.260 9.556 34.983 132 129 97.73% 
2 15.881 8.517 39.135 131 125 95.42% 
3 18.508 9.653 48.906 138 136 98.55% 
4 17.451 7.466 44.437 131 128 97.71% 
5 16.534 8.528 39.753 138 131 94.93% 
6 20.417 9.235 67.205 134 129 96.27% 
7 14.967 8.783 47.998 116 112 96.55% 
8 16.548 8.972 46.633 122 118 96.72% 
9 14.568 8.915 27.816 108 107 99.07% 
10 17.508 9.194 51.854 133 126 94.74% 
11 16.096 8.003 39.235 115 114 99.13% 
12 15.195 9.007 30.510 117 113 96.58% 
13 15.068 7.138 38.178 124 121 97.58% 
14 18.575 8.999 58.073 141 138 97.87% 
15 14.755 9.602 32.627 124 122 98.39% 
16 15.021 8.550 30.509 112 109 97.32% 
17 16.670 7.295 38.159 120 116 96.67% 
18 15.047 8.547 36.435 113 110 97.35% 
19 17.186 9.142 37.730 111 108 97.30% 
20 16.971 9.774 40.362 137 134 97.81% 
21 14.671 8.778 34.410 103 101 98.06% 
22 16.787 10.096 37.522 125 123 98.40% 
23 16.435 7.726 36.008 127 124 97.64% 
24 14.987 10.117 29.551 111 107 96.40% 
25 16.714 7.626 51.489 129 128 99.22% 
26 15.492 7.689 34.432 113 111 98.23% 
27 16.877 8.968 38.586 133 133 100.00% 
28 16.256 9.216 35.771 129 124 96.12% 
29 17.875 8.097 43.541 116 113 97.41% 
30 15.085 9.358 31.910 110 106 96.36% 
Table 35.   Alternative #1 Arena® Results 
Table 36.  presents results of the Alternative #2 model, specifically the minimum 
time from response option to executable response.  Again, the first column denotes the 
replication number.  To understand the second through tenth columns, the reader must 
first understand the ideas of grouping and consistency as they apply to this thesis and 
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simulation.  At the beginning of the Alternative #2 model, one response option is copied 
multiple times both for the multiple lines-of-mechanisms in Select Response Options and 
for the multiple links used in Transport Information.  Such response option and copies 
are a deemed a group.  When during Select Response Options a response option is 
deemed illegal, infeasible, incomplete, or immoral, it is return to Generate Response 
Options to serve as input for a new response option.  If all or none of the response options 
return to Generate Response Options then the group of executable responses which will 
be generated from the original response option will be consistent.  Otherwise, they will be 
inconsistent. 
The second, third, and fourth column present the results for all groups of 
executable responses, the fifth, sixth, and seventh for all groups of consistent executable 
responses, and the eighth, ninth, and tenth for all groups of inconsistent executable 
responses.  In each column group, the first column denotes the average minimum time, 
for each group of responses, from response option to executable response.  The second 
and third in each column group present minimum time, for each group of responses, from 











 Minimum time, for 
group of responses, 
from response option to 
executable response: 
All groups 
Minimum time, for 
group of responses, 
from response option to 
executable response: 
Consistent groups 
Minimum time, for 
group of responses, 
from response option to 
executable response: 
Inconsistent groups 
# Avg Min Max Avg Min Max Avg Min Max 
1 19.048 7.996 37.035 19.284 7.996 37.035 17.791 9.222 34.587 
2 14.189 8.738 26.970 14.267 8.738 26.970 13.459 9.495 21.464 
3 15.278 8.014 37.152 15.516 8.014 37.152 14.115 8.296 29.317 
4 15.024 7.408 32.707 15.141 7.408 32.707 14.348 9.630 25.869 
5 15.772 8.589 34.415 15.723 8.589 34.415 16.056 9.309 31.758 
6 15.316 6.398 31.776 15.308 6.398 31.776 15.402 9.876 26.314 
7 16.772 8.968 39.589 16.360 8.968 38.538 19.707 10.777 39.589 
8 11.055 7.670 16.242 11.085 7.670 16.242 10.790 9.439 13.843 
9 13.173 8.095 24.574 13.157 8.095 24.574 13.307 8.704 18.073 
10 25.478 7.266 52.300 25.181 7.266 51.403 27.992 9.497 52.300 
11 13.153 7.861 25.144 12.694 7.861 25.144 15.969 9.374 22.967 
12 13.778 8.139 24.705 13.695 8.139 24.705 14.286 9.576 21.525 
13 13.770 8.115 27.319 13.756 8.115 27.319 13.874 10.611 23.587 
14 11.795 7.412 20.006 11.792 8.475 20.006 11.812 7.412 15.442 
15 14.124 8.049 24.063 14.089 8.049 24.063 14.477 9.102 23.347 
16 15.108 7.396 29.288 14.924 7.396 29.288 16.383 10.647 27.649 
17 15.551 8.813 27.900 15.366 8.813 27.900 16.771 9.510 25.429 
18 13.148 6.963 23.288 13.170 6.963 23.288 12.946 8.659 19.265 
19 13.883 7.287 28.151 13.959 7.287 28.151 13.384 9.623 19.047 
20 14.966 8.309 25.373 14.520 8.309 23.536 16.971 9.009 25.373 
21 18.693 6.994 32.648 18.249 6.994 31.376 21.548 9.604 32.648 
22 14.285 8.038 29.258 13.850 8.038 27.662 16.920 10.098 29.258 
23 11.910 7.307 20.099 11.870 7.307 20.099 12.339 7.970 14.335 
24 14.498 8.088 30.613 14.035 8.088 30.613 16.881 8.861 29.789 
25 16.068 8.488 32.353 15.758 8.488 29.285 17.249 9.927 32.353 
26 14.728 6.373 29.513 14.715 8.155 27.229 14.797 6.373 29.513 
27 13.283 8.271 21.733 13.219 8.271 21.733 13.628 9.407 20.754 
28 14.582 7.251 28.030 14.398 7.251 28.030 16.160 8.553 26.094 
29 14.810 8.797 37.425 14.522 8.797 37.425 16.285 9.186 31.815 
30 15.405 8.628 35.001 15.579 8.631 35.001 14.486 8.628 27.359 
Table 36.   Alternative #2 Arena® Results – Minimum  
Time from Response Option to Executable Response 
Table 37.  presents results of the Alternative #2 model, specifically the time 
interval between executable responses.  The second through fifth columns denote time 
intervals for groups of consistent executable responses while the sixth through eighth 
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columns denote time intervals for groups of inconsistent executable responses.  In each 
column group, the first column denotes the average time between an executable response 
in the group and the next subsequent executable response.  The second and third columns 
of each column group denote the minimum and maximum time between an executable 
response in the group and the next subsequent executable response, respectively. 
 Interval between Responses 
(Groups of Consistent Reponses) 
Interval between Responses 
(Groups of Inconsistent Responses) 
# Avg Min Max Avg Min Max 
1 4.338 0.171 11.529 18.808 4.722 33.395 
2 3.577 0.074 10.386 17.229 8.891 30.378 
3 4.411 0.498 14.263 24.299 10.299 49.969 
4 3.809 0.103 12.178 18.906 2.087 29.842 
5 4.351 0.149 18.226 19.483 9.028 43.081 
6 4.618 0.319 14.703 22.753 11.123 37.728 
7 4.559 0.291 19.228 23.516 8.647 49.527 
8 2.552 0.868 5.087 17.003 13.946 27.850 
9 3.341 0.292 7.813 19.546 9.783 56.541 
10 5.742 0.217 17.996 28.281 0.315 63.333 
11 3.604 0.334 9.920 20.695 12.751 44.756 
12 2.848 0.227 7.650 18.143 9.593 29.001 
13 4.234 0.711 14.817 20.786 13.163 36.533 
14 3.273 0.165 8.751 15.596 6.710 19.708 
15 3.022 0.386 10.041 19.267 10.706 29.408 
16 3.433 0.364 7.874 17.091 10.535 35.511 
17 3.949 0.252 14.000 22.340 11.385 43.676 
18 3.079 0.337 7.605 16.004 12.472 22.337 
19 3.402 0.340 9.079 16.155 9.968 28.609 
20 3.564 0.332 8.577 15.955 6.795 27.760 
21 3.879 0.257 11.245 19.103 5.999 33.499 
22 3.523 0.143 9.952 15.451 6.770 23.675 
23 3.248 0.282 11.943 20.385 9.618 48.725 
24 5.183 0.095 17.787 19.518 7.908 40.171 
25 4.416 0.124 11.017 16.062 8.284 25.313 
26 3.801 0.163 10.890 18.861 9.266 39.118 
27 3.446 0.078 9.017 16.399 6.085 39.335 
28 3.632 0.372 10.090 20.283 12.561 32.125 
29 3.179 0.524 8.265 15.868 8.301 26.766 
30 4.250 0.360 13.666 20.276 9.825 32.209 
Table 37.   Alternative #2 Arena® Results – Time Interval  
Between Executable Responses 
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Table 38.  presents results of the Alternative #2 model.  The second column 
shows the number of response options created during the replication.  The third column 
shows the number of groups of consistent executable responses generated from the 
response options.  The fourth column shows the number of groups of inconsistent 
executable responses generated from the response options.  The fifth column presents the 
percentage of response options which generate executable responses in each ten 
simulation-minute replication.  Finally, the sixth column presents the percentage of 





































1 135 112 21 98.52% 84.21% 
2 118 104 11 97.46% 90.43% 
3 125 103 21 99.20% 83.06% 
4 117 99 17 99.15% 85.34% 
5 132 97 17 86.36% 85.09% 
6 131 116 11 96.95% 91.34% 
7 132 107 15 92.42% 87.70% 
8 93 80 9 95.70% 89.89% 
9 120 98 12 91.67% 89.09% 
10 146 127 15 97.26% 89.44% 
11 108 92 15 99.07% 85.98% 
12 125 105 17 97.60% 86.07% 
13 110 95 13 98.18% 87.96% 
14 97 81 14 97.94% 85.26% 
15 119 102 10 94.12% 91.07% 
16 127 104 15 93.70% 87.39% 
17 134 112 17 96.27% 86.82% 
18 105 92 10 97.14% 90.20% 
19 118 99 15 96.61% 86.84% 
20 122 99 22 99.18% 81.82% 
21 145 122 19 97.24% 86.52% 
22 129 109 18 98.45% 85.83% 
23 107 96 9 98.13% 91.43% 
24 131 103 20 93.89% 83.74% 
25 124 95 25 96.77% 79.17% 
26 114 94 18 98.25% 83.93% 
27 131 103 19 93.13% 84.43% 
28 126 111 13 98.41% 89.52% 
29 102 82 16 96.08% 83.67% 
30 119 95 18 94.96% 84.07% 
Table 38.   Alternative #2 Arena® Results – Response Consistency 
Finally, to determine possible performance differences in the alternative 
architectures, the results of the two models were compared, specifically the time from 
response option to executable response.  The second column of and the second column 
were the respective data.  First, an F-Test was conducted to determine if the variances of 
the two data sets were equal.  Specifically, the null hypothesis was H0: σ21 = σ22 and the 
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test hypothesis was H1: σ21 ≠ σ22.  The results are shown in Table 39.  Since F > f0.0005 
(29, 29), the null hypothesis can be rejected and variances are assumed to be unequal. 
F-Test:   
Two-sample for Variances Alternative #1 Alternative #2 
Mean 16.31342 14.9548 
Variance 1.911203 6.914298 
Observations 30 30 
df 29 29 
F 3.617773  
f0.0005 (29, 29) 3.566697  
f0.9995 (29, 29) 0.280371  
Table 39.   F-Test Results 
Next, a t-test was conducted to determine if the mean of the two data sets were 
equal.  Since the variances are assumed to be unequal they cannot be pooled.  
Specifically, the null hypothesis was H0: µ1 = µ2 and the test hypothesis was H1: µ1 > µ2.  
The results are shown in Table 40.  Since t > t0.02 (43) – One-tail, the null hypothesis can 
be rejected and it can be assumed that the mean of Alternative #1 is greater than 
Alternative #2.  
t-Test:   
Two-sample for Mean Alternative #1 Alternative #2 
Mean 16.31342 14.9548 
Variance 1.911203 6.914298 
Observations 30 30 
Hypothesized difference in means 0  
df 43  
t 2.504906  
t0.02 (43) – One-tail 2.41625  
Table 40.   t-Test Results 
Alternative #2 generates executable responses, on average, in less time than 
Alternative #1, but with more variance.  In addition, Alternative #2 generates consistent 
executable responses approximately 87% of the time.  Since Alternative #1 generates 
only one executable response for each response option, the consistency of response is 
100% by default.  The above simulations and analysis demonstrates the possible 
performance differences between the two alternative designs.  However, as discussed in 
Chapter VII, the reader is warned not to draw specific conclusions on performance of the 
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alternative system designs from such results.  Instead, the reader should be encouraged 
that modeling and simulation can determine possible performance differences in 
alternative designs using the architectural framework developed in this thesis. 
 
 225 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
Ackoff, R.L. (1989)  From Data to Wisdom.  Journal of Applied Systems Analysis, 16, 3-
9. 
Air Force Doctrine Document 1: Air Force Basic Doctrine (2003) [Electronic Version].  
Air Force Doctrine Center. 
Alberts, D.S., Garstka, J.J., & F.P. Stein (1999).  Network Centric Warfare: Developing 
and Leveraging Information Superiority (2nd Ed.)  [Electronic Version].  
Washington, D.C.:  Department of Defense Command and Control Research 
Program. 
Alberts, D.S. & R.E. Hayes (2006).  Understanding Command and Control [Electronic 
Version].  Washington, D.C.:  Department of Defense Command and Control 
Research Program. 
Athans, M. (1986).  Command and Control (C2) Theory:  A Challenge to Control 
Science [Electronic Version].  IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control 32(4), 
286-293. 
Baran, P. (1964).  On Distributed Communications: I. Introduction to Distributed 
Communications Networks [Electronic Version].  Santa Monica, California:  The 
RAND Corporation. 
Bindi, V.C., Baker, J., Billington, R., Gallassero, T., Gueary, J., Harts, et al. (1997).  
Littoral Undersea Warfare in 2025 [Electronic Version].  Unpublished master’s 
thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California.  
Booth, W.C., Colomb, G.G., & J.M. Williams (2008).  The Craft of Research (3rd ed.).  
Chicago:  The University of Chicago Press.   
Boyd, J. (1987).  Organic Design for Command and Control [Electronic Version].  
Unpublished lecture notes.  Retrieved February 17, 2009, from:   
http://www.d-n-i.net/dni/john-r-boyd/. 
Boyd, J. (1996).  The Essence of Winning and Losing [Electronic Version].  Unpublished 
lecture notes.  Retrieved October 23, 2008, from:  
http://www.chetrichards.com/modern_business_strategy/boyd/essence/ 
eowl_frameset.htm. 
Bruegge, B. & A.H. Dutoit (2004).  Object-Oriented Software Engineering:  Using UML, 
Patterns, and Java (2nd ed.).  Upper Saddle River, New Jersey:  Prentice Hall. 
Buede, D.M. (2000).  The Engineering Design of Systems: Models and Methods 
[Electronic Version].  New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 
Cebrowski, A.K. & J.J Garstka (1998).  Network-Centric Warfare:  Its Origin and Future 
[Electronic Version].  U.S. Naval Institute. Proceedings 124(1), 28-35.  Retrieved 
September 8, 2008, from http://proquest.umi.com.libproxy.nps.edu. 
 226 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3500.04D:  Universal Joint Task List 
(August 2005) [Electronic Version]. Washington, D.C.: Joint Staff. 
Clark, T. & T. Moon (2000, June).  Assessing the Military Worth of C4ISR Information 
[Electronic Version].  In 7th Annual International Command and Control 
Research and Technology Symposia, Quebec City, Canada. 
Clausewitz, C. von. (1984). On War (M. Howard & P. Paret Trans.)  Princeton, New 
Jersey:  Princeton University Press. 
Committee on C4ISR for Future Naval Strike Groups, Naval Studies Board, Division on 
Engineering and Physical Sciences (2006).  C4ISR for Future Naval Strike 
Groups [Electronic Version].  Washington, D.C.: National Academies Press. 
The Cooperative Engagement Capability [Electronic Version] (1995).  Johns Hopkins 
APL Technical Digest, 16(4), 377-396.  Retrieved July 19, 2008, from 
http://techdigest.jhuapl.edu/td1604/index.htm. 
Defoe, J.C. (1993, January 21).  An Identification of Pragmatic Principles – Final Report 
[Electronic Version].  Seattle, Washington:  International Council on Systems 
Engineering.  Retrieved September 24, 2008, from 
http://www.incose.org/ProductsPubs/techresourcecenter.aspx. 
Descartes, R. (1850).  Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting the Reason and 
Seeking the Truth in the Sciences (J. Veitch, Trans.) [Electronic Version].  
Edinburgh:  Sutherland and Knox.  Retrieved September 8, 2008, from 
http://books.google.com. 
Director, Force Transformation, Office of the Secretary of Defense (2005, January 5).  
The Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare [Electronic Version].  Retrieved 
August 13, 2008, from 
www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/transformation/oft_implementation_ncw.pdf. 
Field Manual 6-0, Mission Command:  Command and Control of Army Forces (2003) 
[Electronic Version].  Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army. 
Forsberg, K., Mooz, H. & H. Cotterman (2005).  Visualizing Project Management:  
Models and Frameworks for Mastering Complex Systems (3rd Ed.).  Hoboken, 
New Jersey:  John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 
George, A.L. (1984).  Crisis Management:  The Interaction of Political and Military 
Considerations [Electronic Version].  Survival 26(5), 223-234. 
Hayes, S., Krulisch, A., & R. White (2008).  Preventing and Winning Wars.  
Unpublished manuscript, Chief of Naval Operations Strategic Studies Group 
XXVII, Newport, Rhode Island. 
Hunerwadel, J.P. (2006).  New USAF Doctrine Publication: Air Force Doctrine 
Document 2-1.9, Targeting [Electronic Version].  Air & Space Power Journal 
20(3).  Retrieved February 17, 2009, from 
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj06/fal06.htm. 
 227 
Hurley, J.S. (2005, October).  Cross-Functional Working Groups: Changing the Way 
Staffs Are Organized.  Joint Force Quarterly: JFQ, (39), 91-96.  Retrieved 
December 5, 2008, from Military Module database.  (Document ID: 913686111). 
Jane’s Information Group (2008, March 19).  Command and control of US naval forces 
[Electronic Version].  In Jane’s Fighting Ships.  Retrieved November 26, 2008, 
from: http://search.janes.com. 
Joint Publication 1-02:  Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated 
Terms (2008, May 30) [Electronic Version].  Washington, D.C.:  Joint Chiefs of 
Staff. 
Joint Publication 3-60: Joint Targeting (2007) [Electronic Version].  Washington, D.C.:  
Joint Chiefs of Staff. 
Joint Publication 6-0:  Joint Communications Systems (2006) [Electronic Version].  
Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff. 
Kasunic, M. & W. Anderson (2004).  Measuring Systems Interoperability: Challenges 
and Opportunities [Electronic Version].  Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania:  Carnegie 
Mellon University. 
Keeney, R. L. (1996).  Value-Focused Thinking.  Cambridge, Massachusetts:  Harvard 
University Press. 
Klein, G.A. (1988).  Naturalistic Models of C3 Decision Making.  In S.E. Johnson and 
A.H. Levis (Eds.), Science of Command and Control:  Coping with Uncertainty 
(pp. 4-9).  Washington, D.C.:  AFCEA International Press. 
Lawson, J.S., Jr. (1981).  Command and Control as a Process [Electronic Version].  IEEE 
Control Systems Magazine 1(1), 5-11. 
Levis, A.H. & M. Athans (1988).  The Quest for C3 Theory:  Dreams and Realities.  In 
S.E. Johnson and A.H. Levis (Eds.), Science of Command and Control:  Coping 
with Uncertainty (pp. 4-9).  Washington, D.C.:  AFCEA International Press. 
Levis, A.H. & L.W. Wagenhals (2000).  C4ISR Architectures: I. Developing a Process 
for C4ISR Architecture Design [Electronic Version].  Systems Engineering 11(3), 
225-247. 
Lynn, J.A. (2004).  Battle:  A History of Combat and Culture.  Cambridge, 
Massachusetts:  Westview Press. 
Mack, W. P. (1998).  Naval Officer’s Guide (11 Ed.).  Annapolis, Maryland:  Naval 
Institute Press. 
Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 6:  Command and Control (1996) [Electronic 
Version].  Washington, D.C.: Department of the Navy. 
Mish, F.C., et al. (Ed.) (1994).  Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (10th ed.).  
Springfield, Massachusetts: Merriam-Webster, Incorporated. 
 228 
NATO Research and Technology Organization (2002, October).  NATO Code of Best 
Practice for Command and Control Assessment [Electronic Version].  Retrieved 
August 13, 2008, from www.dodccrp.org/files/NATO_COBP.pdf. 
NATO Research and Technology Organization (2006, January).  Exploring New 
Command and Control Concepts and Capabilities – FINAL REPORT [Electronic 
Version].  Retrieved August 13, 2008, from 
http://www.dodccrp.org/html4/research_nato.html. 
NATO Standardization Agency (2008).  NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions 
(English and French) [Electronic Version].  Brussels:  NATO Headquarters. 
Naval Doctrine Publication 6:  Command and Control (1995) [Electronic Version].  
Washington, D.C.:  Department of the Navy. 
Payne, C. (2006).  Principles of Naval Weapons Systems.  Annapolis, Maryland: Naval 
Institute Press. 
Perry, W. L., Button, R.W., Bracken, J., Sullivan, T. & J. Mitchell (2002).  Measures of 
Effectiveness for the Information-Age Navy: The Effects of Network-Centric 
Operations on Combat Outcomes [Electronic Version].  Santa Monica, California:  
The RAND Corporation. 
Rice, M.A. & A.J. Sammes (1989).  Communications and Information Systems for 
Battlefield Command and Control.  London:  Brassey’s. 
Sage, A.P. & J.E. Armstrong, Jr. (2000).  Introduction to Systems Engineering.  New 
York:  John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 
Stytz, M.R. & S.B. Banks (2006, June).  Metrics for Assessing Command, Control, And 
Communications Capabilities [Electronic Version].  In 2006 Command and 
Control Research and Technology Symposia, San Diego, CA. 
Sun Tzu (1971).  The Art of War (S.B. Griffith, Trans.).  London:  Oxford University 
Press. 
Sun Tzu (1994).  The Art of War (R.D. Sawyer, Trans.).  Boulder, Colorado:  Westview 
Press. 
Sweeney, M.M. (2002).  An Introduction to Command and Control [Electronic Version].  
Unpublished master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. 
Van Creveld, M. (1985).  Command in War.  Cambridge, Massachusetts:  Harvard 
University Press. 
Washburn., W.R. (2001).  Bits, Bangs or Bucks?  The Coming Information Crisis 
[Electronic Version].  Phalanx 34(3), pp. 6-7 and 24-27. 
 229 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia  
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California  
 
3. ADM James R. Hogg, USN (Ret.) 
Chief of Naval Operations Strategic Studies Group 
Newport, Rhode Island 
 
4. Mr. William Glenney 
Chief of Naval Operations Strategic Studies Group 
Newport, Rhode Island 
